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Introduction: ‘It’s Difficult’ 
 
What is important to study cannot be meas-
ured and that which can be measured is not 
important to study. 
PHILIP CONVERSE (1964: 206) 
 
 
For this book Philip Converse’s words can be modified: sometimes, what is 
important, or at least valuable and fruitful to study has not (yet) been identi-
fied as worth studying – for instance, the striking omnipresence of the adjec-
tive global in contemporary discourses. 
Something curious has been going on over the past two decades: the ad-
jective global has invaded and populated public, political and academic dis-
courses. There is hardly anything, which has not been labelled ‘global’ in 
one context or another. Late Pope John Paul II was lauded as “the first truly 
global Pope” (Sells 2014). The New York Times (URL) promotes its “new 
Global Edition” as providing “readers with a 24/7 flow of geopolitical, busi-
ness, sports and fashion coverage from a distinctly global perspective”. In a 
randomly chosen edition of the UK’s The Guardian, the one from 21 De-
cember 2005, the reader learns about the “global ‘war on drugs’”, about the 
“global collapse” of “global civilisation”, about Renault’s “global motor-
sport programme”, about a consultancy called “Global Insight” and an NGO 
called “Global Witness”, about the need to teach “Britain’s global history”, 
the “global positioning system developed by the US Department of De-
fense”, the “damaged global confidence” in the Tokyo Stock Exchange, 
“football’s global village”, and, in three different articles, about “global 
warming”.  
These days, more and more institutional names, official events and con-
ferences run under a label that contains the adjective global, such as “The 
Global Fund”, the “UN Global Compact” and the “Global Alliance for In-
formation and Communication Technologies”. In the academy, more pre-
cisely in the social and political sciences, ‘governance’ has become ‘global 
governance’, ‘civil society’ has become ‘global civil society’, and, of 
course, ‘the market’ is time and again referred to as the ‘global market’.  
In political discourses, US President Barack Obama (2008b) stresses that 
the world is entering “a new era of global cooperation”, the World Bank 
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makes clear that “a global crisis needs a global response” (World Bank 
URL), US President George W. Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Junichi-
ro Koizumi adjure their two countries’ “bilateral global cooperation” (Bush-
Koizumi 2001), UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown (2009a) has the vision 
of “a world of shared global rules founded on shared global values”, his 
predecessor, Tony Blair (2007), sees the ‘war on terror’, including the US-
led military intervention in Iraq in 2003, as a “battle for global values”, and 
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (2004) speaks of the 2004 tsunami in the 
Indian Ocean as a “global catastrophe” that requires a “global response”. 
More generally, the world is in the midst of a ‘global war on terror’ and a 
‘global financial crisis’, faces ‘global warming’ and ‘global poverty’, people 
are concerned about ‘global health’ and, as for instance the United Nations 
(URL) suggest, about the ‘global South’ …  
 
… the ‘global South’?  
 
When, how and why did ‘the South’ become ‘global’? And what does this 
mean? What is a ‘bilateral global cooperation’? Why was the 2004 tsunami 
for Kofi Annan a ‘global catastrophe’ that required a ‘global response’ 
whereas the earthquake that struck South Asia in October 2005 and affected 
some four million people was not ‘global’ and did not ‘ask for a global re-
sponse’, though it left Annan (2005) “deeply saddened”? And how did UK 
Prime Minister Gordon Brown (2008a) manage to use the adjective global 
47 times in a single speech? 
Actually at home in the political studies and International Relations (IR) 
discourse, I was intrigued by the seeming omnipresence of the adjective 
global and its colourful and somewhat paradoxical gestalt. Simultaneously, 
I was surprised by the fact that the adjective and its striking popularity have 
attracted but little attention from scholars and commentators. The academic 
literature is not short of engagements with the notion of ‘the global’. Yet, 
there is rarely any engagement with the word global. The adjective global is 
widely used but less widely debated or scrutinised.  
 
“Let us assume that we are reasonably clear about what is meant by ‘global’ and by 
‘religion’. But what about ‘civil society’?”, 
 
writes Peter Berger (2005: 11) in his study of religion and ‘global civil soci-
ety’ and, with that, provides an apt example of how lightly the adjective 
global is usually taken.  
Looking across the many uses of global in public, political and academic 
discourses, the adjective appeared to me to be a “difficult” word, to borrow 
the language that Raymond Williams (1976) uses in his study of ‘culture’. It 
triggered my interest. I wanted to explore what this popularity, this (quasi) 
omnipresence of the adjective global is about. Is it the manifestation of the 
fact that we are living in a ‘global age’, as Martin Albrow (1996: 80-81) 
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suggests, and/or the indicator of a ‘global consciousness’? Does this mean 
that US President George W. Bush had a relatively more pronounced ‘global 
consciousness’ in 2006 than in the rest of his term – given that he uses the 
adjective in 2006 more frequently in his public communication than in any 
other year? And, if so, what does this actually mean? What does the linguis-
tic sign global refer to?  
 
 
MY ARGUMENT 
 
In this book I develop the argument that the omnipresence of the contempo-
rary adjective global is more than a linguistic curiosity. I argue it is a politi-
cal phenomenon and, as such, a valuable, albeit ‘unconventional’, object of 
study for scholars outside the linguistics discourse. I argue that the omni-
presence of the contemporary adjective global constitutes the discursive re-
production of a web of meanings that is best labelled ‘new world’. As such, 
the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective global constitutes a distinct 
dimension of the enduring contestation over the construction of the world. 
Given the word’s current popularity and unscrutinised existence, as well as 
the loaded nature of the web of meanings ‘new world’ that it brings out, I 
argue, this dimension is not just a minor matter but plays an important, 
hence, research-worthy role in the contemporary symbolic struggle over the 
world.     
My conceptualisation of the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective 
global as the re-production of a web of meanings ‘new world’ is grounded 
in two central insights that arise from my empirical engagement with the ad-
jective global. The first of these two insights is the empirically grounded 
understanding that the contemporary adjective global is closely enmeshed 
with the talk about (different ideas associated with the word) globalisation; I 
call this talk ‘globalisation’-discourse. As I demonstrate, the contemporary 
adjective global has come to be used in the sense of ‘outcome of globalisa-
tion’. This makes the adjective a ‘new word’. What is ‘new’ about the con-
temporary global, I argue, is that it implies ideas that are associated with the 
word globalisation. I develop my argument that the contemporary adjective 
global is best be taken as a ‘new word’ by building on relevant discussions 
among lexicographers about when a word is appropriately called ‘new’, as 
well as by drawing on a theory of language and meaning, according to 
which language and meaning are not natural and referential but conventional 
and ‘productive’.   
The second central insight that arises from my empirical engagement 
with the contemporary global and that underlies my conceptualisation of the 
omnipresence of global as the re-production of a web of meanings ‘new 
world’ refers to the word globalisation. It is the insight that all utterances, 
which contain the word globalisation, can be seen as constituting a discur-
sive re-production of an object that is best labelled ‘new world’. In other 
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words, my conceptualisation of the omnipresence of global builds on my 
understanding that what all uses of the word globalisation have in common 
– despite and in addition to the myriad of meanings that are associated with 
this word in whichever context it is used – is that they imply the ‘proclama-
tion’ of a ‘new world that came’.  
This insight makes what I call ‘globalisation’-discourse different from 
existing conceptualisations under this label, such as the one by Hay and 
Smith (2005). Normally, the ‘globalisation’-discourse is conceptualised 
based on a scholarly preconception of what the word globalisation refers to, 
such as market integration or the spread of neoliberalism. In contrast, my 
suggestion that we understand the uses of the word globalisation as a dis-
cursive re-production of a web of meanings that is best called ‘new world’ is 
grounded in an approach that takes the polysemy of the word globalisation 
seriously. In addition, it builds on an elaboration of the question how and 
when the concept/s ‘globalisation’ and the neologism globalisation came to 
be “in the true” (Foucault 1981: 61), i.e. became socially accepted and 
‘normal’ tools to grasp the world.  
As I discuss in this book, developments, which have come to be ad-
dressed with the word globalisation, existed before this neologism became 
popular at the end of the 1980s and in the course of the 1990s. Given that 
meaning is not inherent in social reality but conventional, the question aris-
es, why a new word was perceived to be needed and accepted at the end of 
the 1980s and 1990s, i.e. at that particular moment in time. My answer to 
this question is that this was because the end of the Cold War was perceived 
to have brought out a ‘new world’, for which existing conceptual tools were 
perceived to be inadequate. This ‘new world’ was perceived as having pro-
duced a conceptual vacuum. This is apparent in assessments, such as that of 
IR theorist James N. Rosenau (1990: 5), who argued after the end of the 
Cold War that observers were left “without any paradigms or theories that 
adequately explain the course of events”. I argue, it was this perceived vac-
uum that opened the discursive door and let the concept/s ‘globalisation’ 
and the neologism globalisation step in to fill it. Consequently, the use of 
the word globalisation can be conceptualised as re-producing and filling the 
conceptual space ‘new world’ with meaning.       
It is the synthesis of these two insights that allows me to conceptualise 
the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective global as a distinct phe-
nomenon, namely, as a discursive re-production of a web of meanings called 
‘new world’. This phenomenon, I argue in this book, is relevant and inter-
esting in two respects.  
First, it is a relevant and interesting phenomenon by virtue of its wide 
spread but ‘untroubled’ existence. I put forward that the influential but un-
scrutinised existence of global itself justifies paying critical attention to the 
word. Second, the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective global is a 
relevant and interesting phenomenon because the proclamation of the ‘new 
world’, which is implied in the web of meanings that it re-produces, indi-
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cates an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of the process of moderni-
sation. I develop this point by comparing the (modern) proclamation of the 
‘new world’ to come with the proclamation of the ‘new world’ that came, as 
well as grounded in a discussion of sociologist Ulrich Beck’s theory (e.g. 
Beck 2006), according to which contemporary social reality is shaped by 
two aspects and their interplay.  
On the one side, it is shaped by the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of the process 
of modernisation, which is constituted by the ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of 
national societies, the existence of ‘global risk’ and the ‘return of uncertain-
ty’. The reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation brings out a social reality, in 
which not only modern institutions but also modern principles are chal-
lenged, outmoded and, in fact, rendered obsolete through the process of 
modernisation itself. Modern institutions and principles are radicalised as a 
side effect of modernisation, its institutions and principles, and the actions 
shaped by them, where this side effect, however, is not the ‘dark side’ of 
modernisation but the manifestation of the very success of modernisation.  
On the other side, contemporary social reality is shaped by the preva-
lence of what Beck (2006) calls “the national perspective” and “methodo-
logical nationalism”. This second aspect is a political perspective and a 
scholarly take on the world that looks through and is grounded in “catego-
ries […] that take the nation-state as the norm” (ibid. 73). The ‘national per-
spective’ obscures the view at (the reality of) the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of 
modernisation, especially the internal cosmopolitisation of national socie-
ties. As I demonstrate in this book, grounded in such an understanding of 
social reality as being ‘reflexive modern’, the omnipresence of the adjective 
global is intriguing because its study is a study of historical actualisations of 
the ‘national perspective’, i.e. of a central aspect of the contemporary reflex-
ive modern world. 
But I do not just argue that the omnipresence of global is a relevant and 
interesting phenomenon. I argue that it is also a political phenomenon, i.e. 
of interest to scholars, who explore the political world. It is a political phe-
nomenon in that it constitutes a distinct dimension of the symbolic construc-
tion of social reality. In general, the omnipresent use of the adjective global 
is a way of making the social world meaningful. I make this argument by 
building on a theory of the relationship between language, meaning and so-
cial reality, according to which the latter is the product of the former. But 
there is also something particular about the omnipresent use of global. I ar-
gue that it makes meaningful an important temporal category and conceptual 
space, namely the ‘present’. With that, the omnipresence of global, this dis-
cursive re-production of the web of meanings ‘new world’, is a special and 
noteworthy part of the perpetual contest over understandings of the world. 
Given that this contest does not just mirror a world that exists outside of it-
self but brings out (the) social reality (it is talking about), the omnipresent 
use of the word global constitutes a distinct political phenomenon. Inevita-
bly, the re-produced web of meanings ‘new world’ makes some things pos-
14 | THE NEGOTIATION OF THE “NEW WORLD” 
 
sible and rules out others – this applies to socially binding decisions, i.e. 
‘political’ decisions in a narrow sense, and beyond. Consequently, the om-
nipresence of the contemporary adjective global constitutes an object of 
study for those who are interested in the contemporary political world – al-
beit, as I explain, it constitutes an ‘unconventional’ object of study at the 
‘unconventional’ margins of the political studies and IR scholarship.  
 
 
THE NATURE OF MY PROJECT 
 
The aim of this book is to develop the argument outlined above and to con-
ceptualise the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective global as a polit-
ical phenomenon. This is not a straightforward academic exercise. Like the 
adjective global, this exercise, too, is ‘difficult’. However, the challenge it 
poses does not have anything to do with the argument as such; there is noth-
ing particularly ‘difficult’ about my argument. Rather, the difficulty has 
something to do with how my argument emerged, i.e. with the nature of the 
knowledge production process that brought it out.  
Normally, a research project in the political studies and IR discourse in-
volves looking at an object of study that already ‘exists’ in a distinct litera-
ture and debate. The aim is to contribute to and push forward the respective 
debate by engaging with the particular object of study in a value-adding 
way, e.g. by approaching it from an alternative perspective or guided by in-
novative, theoretically-grounded research questions, or through a method 
that promises novel insights. As Nobel laureate Albert Szent-Györgyi sug-
gests, “[d]iscovery consists of looking at the same thing as everyone else 
and thinking something different” (quoted in Li, Wang, Li and Zhao 2007: 
214). In the context of such an endeavour, the ‘thing’, i.e. the object of 
study, is automatically legitimised because it comes out of and is located in 
a clearly identifiable disciplinary field. It is relatively easy to make the case 
for its study because the parameters of research are pre-set and the audience, 
which the research addresses, is pre-defined. 
In the case of my interest in the adjective global, no such a clearly set, 
discursively confined research environment existed. My engagement with 
the adjective global is not shaped by linguistic interests and parameters, 
simply because I am not a linguist. Nor is it about the study of an already 
‘discovered’ political studies ‘problem’ from an ‘alternative’ perspective. It 
does not follow the rationale that is implied in Szent-Györgyi’s understand-
ing of ‘discovery’ as something that flows from an original engagement 
with something that ‘everyone else’ looks at. The kind of ‘discovery’ in my 
project is different from such an endeavour because I was not ‘thinking 
something different’ while ‘looking at the same thing as everyone else’. I 
came to see something in something that has not really been looked at so 
far; I came to see a political phenomenon in the omnipresence of the con-
temporary adjective global that is worth investigating as a way to generate 
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insights into the political world. In other words, I came to see a (new) object 
of study in the omnipresence of the adjective global.  
This does not make my findings more or less original in comparison to 
other findings, nor does it make my findings more or less a ‘discovery’. Yet, 
it makes my project different in terms of how the research process unfolded. 
I did not set out by putting an anchor in a particular scholarly debate as a 
pre-defined point of reference for my ‘discovery’. My ‘discovery’ of the 
omnipresence of the adjective global as a political phenomenon evolved 
gradually, in many respects inductively, and in an interweaved way. In 
short, I did not start with the aim of dismantling the omnipresence of the ad-
jective global as a political phenomenon. This was because I did not know 
that this is what it is; that is, I did not start with a research question, such as 
‘what kind of a phenomenon is the omnipresence of the adjective global?’  
In fact, initially, my focus was not on the linguistic sign global and its 
omnipresence in and of itself to begin with. Of course, it was not about the 
word global because a focus on a distinct linguistic sign, such as the adjec-
tive global, adds value to and advances the linguistics scholarship; for the 
scholarship that is dedicated to the study of politics, however, its value is 
less naturally apparent, if it exists at all. If one is at home in the political 
studies and IR discourse, the focus on a word is not intuitive and natural 
(see also Selchow 2016). This does not mean that the study of language is 
alien to scholars in the field. As we will see in the course of this book, in 
various ways scholars in political studies and IR take language seriously. 
Yet, in the study of politics, the analysis of language is normally a means to 
a distinct disciplinary end that is not about language as such. It is normally a 
means to gain insight into something ‘behind’ language. For instance, Gun-
ther Hellmann, Christian Weber, Frank Sauer and Sonja Schirmbeck (2007) 
study the development of German foreign policy between 1986 and 2002 
through the analysis of how the use of the ‘key concepts’, which they see 
manifest in the words Germany, Europe, power, responsibility, self-
confidence and pride, has changed over time within elite texts. They make 
the argument that their language-focused analytical approach, which they 
call ‘vocabulary analysis’, is a fruitful way of generating novel insights into 
the issue of German foreign policy and, with that, adds value to existing ap-
proaches in this established field of study. Despite the explicit focus on lan-
guage, their object of study is German foreign policy. The analysis of a 
handful of chosen words is a methodological means to this end. It is not the 
linguistic signs and their appearances, which are the centre of interest, but 
German foreign policy as an established object of study.   
 At the beginning of my project and reflecting the disciplinary conven-
tions of the political studies and IR scholarship, I had an approach in mind 
similar to Hellmann et al’s. Triggered by the increasing number of works in 
political studies and IR that speak of and set out to analyse ‘global politics’, 
in the sense of politics in a world of fundamental changes concerning the 
idea of the international system and traditional statist steering media, I was 
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interested in analysing collectively-held perceptions of ‘the global’ to see if 
they play a role in processes of policy formation, and, if so, what kind of 
role they play. I felt that, although many accounts of ‘globalisation’ in polit-
ical studies and IR stress that there is an important ideational side to the con-
temporary ‘global transformations’ (e.g. Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor 2001; 
Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton 2003; Robertson 1990), this idea-
tional side has so far only attracted sporadic systematic attention by scholars 
in the field. Consequently, I became interested in grasping the extent to 
which contemporary political imaginations are penetrated by ideas of ‘the 
global’. It was in this context, inspired by studies, such as the above men-
tioned one by Hellmann, Weber, Sauer and Schirmbeck (2007), that the om-
nipresence of the adjective global in contemporary discourses moved to the 
centre of my interest. Initially, I thought of it as the linguistic manifestation 
of notions of ‘the global’, similar to how the above mentioned Albrow 
(1996) seems to understand the adjective. I thought to study the use of the 
word global in order to gain insights into existing notions of ‘the global’. 
However, what appeared to be a relatively straightforward or ‘conventional’ 
research endeavour turned into a tautological trap around questions such as, 
what am I actually looking for when I am setting out to study perceptions of 
‘the global’? How do I know ‘the global’ when I see it without just finding 
what I set out to look for? And, in turn, what am I actually analysing when I 
am focusing on the adjective global? Is it really valid to take the word glob-
al as a linguistic materialisation of notions of ‘the global’? 
 Increasingly, I found myself caught-up in tautological dilemmas and felt 
that, by starting with the presumption that the study of the adjective global 
gives me insights into notions of ‘the global’, I was only finding what I set 
out to look for. Of course, nothing ever exists ex nihilo. As Rob Pope (2005: 
xv) puts it, “[t]here is always something ‘before the beginning’”, which in-
evitably guides what one is looking for, hence, somewhat predetermines 
what one is finding. Yet, inspired by those scholars in political studies and 
IR, who argue that the task of political research needs to be to generate “un-
expected insights” (Torfing 2005: 26), to intervene into “conventional un-
derstandings or established practices” (Campbell 2007: 219) and to ‘make 
strange’ (Der Derian and Shapiro 1989) normalised knowledge, I gradually 
became less interested in the re-production of established theories through 
empirical explorations and more interested in a more experimental inductive 
approach to the ‘global’ political world and to the popularity of the adjective 
global.     
 Consequently, in the course of my exploration of the notion of ‘the 
global’ and the adjective global, I gradually moved away from my initial re-
search path and started to explore the various questions and subsequent in-
sights that came up while I was pursuing the path of tracking and thinking 
about the adjective global. I sailed into various different directions, within 
and beyond the disciplinary boundaries of the field of political studies and 
IR. I brought together different theoretical readings on language, meaning, 
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the concept ‘discourse’, reflexive modernisation, and social constructivism 
with empirical insights that I generated by looking at the use of the contem-
porary adjective global in various contexts. It was in the process of these 
tentacle-like explorations into various different cross-disciplinary directions 
and debates, allowing for a high degree of ‘spreading loss’, that the ‘unex-
pected’ insight arose that the omnipresence of the adjective global consti-
tutes a political phenomenon because it is the discursive re-production of a 
web of meanings that is best called ‘new world’.  
In this sense, my main argument cyrstallised on an initially relatively 
‘empty’ field and through an exercise that resembles the putting together of 
a mosaic. It is this mosaic and its individual pieces that I am presenting in 
this book. 
   
 
OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
 
My conceptualisation of the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective 
global as a political phenomenon unfolds in five main steps. In the first step, 
in Chapters 2 and 3, I problematise the word global. Again using Williams’ 
(1976: 21) words, I add an “extra edge of consciousness” to the contempo-
rary adjective global in order to make it ‘strange’ and lift the ‘veil of invisi-
bility’, under which it is covered. I do this by highlighting three noteworthy 
aspects that constitute the contemporary global.  
In Chapter 2, I focus on two of these three aspects. I first highlight that 
the contemporary global is extraordinary popular & ‘free’, in the sense of 
semantically open, and, second, stress that it has what I call a ‘disputedly 
undisputed’ existence. I show that, taken together, these two aspects of the 
contemporary global form a seeming paradox between a colourful use of the 
word and a widening of its meanings, on the one side, and a striking easi-
ness, with which it is taken as if it was obvious, on the other side. Both sides 
of this paradox account for the discomfort that the word regularly triggers in 
public and scholarly discourses, where its popularity and diverse uses are 
perceived – and sometimes dismissed – as a meaningless fad or as a symbol-
ic confirmation and reproduction of hegemonic (‘Northern’) discourses. At 
the same time, however, as I show, these concerns have not led to a height-
ened sensibility or a commitment to a more reflective use of the adjective. 
Nor have they led to an increased curiosity about or systematic approaches 
to the adjective global. The contemporary global seems to be everywhere 
and, yet, it is ‘invisible’. It is causing irritation but does not generate sys-
tematic and dedicated critical reflection.  
An important part of Chapter 2 is a reflection on the nature of language 
and meaning as something that is conventional and ‘productive’, rather than 
natural and referential. I refer to Ferdinand de Saussure’s (2000[1916]) lan-
guage theory and poststructuralist revisions of it (e.g. Derrida 1976; Eagle-
ton 1983; Hall 1997). Furthermore, by presenting findings from an empirical 
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analysis of the adjective global in the post-9/11 rhetoric of US President 
George W. Bush, I give a sense in Chapter 2 that a systematic and critical 
look at the word global holds the potential of revealing interesting insights 
into the ‘world making’-practice, which is the use of language. 
In Chapter 3, I focus on the third aspect that constitutes the contempo-
rary adjective global. This is its enmeshment with the ‘globalisation’-
discourse. The term ‘globalisation’-discourse plays an important role in my 
book and I have a distinct understanding of it that differs from the way in 
which it is usually used in the political studies and IR scholarship. I dedicate 
Chapter 4 to the development of my conception of the ‘globalisation’-
discourse. In Chapter 3, I use the term without further meta-reflection. For 
the time being, I use it to refer to the re-production of a distinct web of 
meanings through utterances, which contain the word globalisation. Build-
ing on this, I show in Chapter 3 that the adjective global is enmeshed with 
the ‘globalisation’-discourse in two different ways. First, the adjective is 
used to establish and justify conceptions of the signified that is associated 
with the word globalisation. I argue that since the concept ‘globalisation’ 
has come to play an influential role, the adjective global, too, plays an im-
portant part in the production of knowledge about the contemporary world. 
At the same time, I suggest that the distinct relationship between global and 
the concept ‘globalisation’ means that the word global largely disappears in 
the shadow of the debate about ‘globalisation’. Second, I show that the con-
temporary adjective global actually gains one of its meanings from the 
‘globalisation’-discourse, that is, from the re-production of a distinct web of 
meanings through utterances, which contain the word globalisation. This in-
sight is grounded in my analysis of the contemporary use of the adjective 
global in public, political and academic discourses. This analysis shows 
that, in addition to all the many other meanings that are associated with the 
adjective, the contemporary global is used to signify ‘outcome of globalisa-
tion’. Drawing on this second point, I conclude my engagement with the 
contemporary adjective global in the first two chapters of this book by con-
ceptualising global as a ‘new word’. What is ‘new’ about it is its close rela-
tionship with the ‘globalisation’-discourse, that is, with the re-production of 
a distinct web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word 
globalisation. To make this point, I refer to lexicographers’ understanding 
of when a word is appropriately taken as ‘new’.  
In Chapter 4, I move away from the adjective global and focus on what I 
mean by the ‘globalisation’-discourse. I extend and substantiate my concep-
tion of the ‘globalisation’-discourse as the re-production of a distinct web of 
meanings through utterances, which contain the word globalisation. My 
main argument in Chapter 4 is that this web of meanings is best called ‘new 
world’. In other words, I argue in Chapter 4 that – in addition to all kinds of 
other meanings – the uses of the word globalisation bring out an object 
called ‘new world’. This argument is grounded in my critical engagement 
with the scholarship on ‘globalisation’ and is an answer to the question why 
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the concept/s ‘globalisation’ and the neologism globalisation became popu-
lar at the end of the 1980s and in the course of the 1990s. In order to devel-
op my argument, I start Chapter 4 with a discussion of the concept ‘dis-
course’, in which I refer to Michel Foucault’s work (e.g. Foucault 1972, 
1981). I present ‘discourse’ as an analytic tool that captures the “symbolic 
meaning systems or orders of knowledge” (Keller 2013: 2), which bring out 
the world. I stress that discourses “systematically form the objects of which 
they speak” (Foucault 1972: 49). This relates back to my theoretical excur-
sus on language and meaning in Chapter 2.  
In the main part of Chapter 4, I then draw a picture of the ‘life’ of the 
web of meanings that is re-produced through applications of the word glob-
alisation, i.e. I draw a picture of what I call the ‘globalisation’-discourse. I 
do this by recasting Nick Bisley’s overview of the development of the con-
cept ‘globalisation’ (Bisley 2007). I identify and discuss five facets that 
characterise the ‘globalisation’-discourse. One of these facets is that the idea 
‘new world’ plays an important and, I argue, constitutive role in the life of 
this discourse. Grounded in my critical exploration of the diverse scholar-
ship that deals with (authors’ various ideas of) ‘globalisation’, I demonstrate 
that it was the notion that the breakdown of the bipolar bloc system at the 
end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s brought about a ‘new world’, 
which gave birth to the ‘globalisation’-discourse; it gave birth to the accept-
ed use of the neologism globalisation and, consequently, to the web of 
meanings that this use re-produces. I argue that it was the conceptual vacu-
um, which the breakdown of the Berlin Wall (was perceived to have) 
brought about, that allowed the neologism globalisation to enter the lan-
guage and enabled idea/s called ‘globalisation’ to come to be “in the true” 
(Foucault 1981: 61). This insight is the ground on which I label the web of 
meanings that is re-produced through utterances, which contain the word 
globalisation, ‘new world’. In other words, I conclude Chapter 4 with the 
argument that the use of the word globalisation, no matter in which context 
and in which sense it is used, constitutes a moment in the re-production of a 
web of meanings that brings out an object called ‘new world’.   
In Chapter 5, I focus on the issue of the ‘new world’ and carve out what 
is distinct and interesting about the fact that the ‘globalisation’-discourse 
brings out the object ‘new world’. I do this by reflecting on what it means if 
a ‘new world’ is (implicitly or explicitly) ‘proclaimed’. In order to grasp the 
characteristics of the proclamation of the ‘new world’, I contrast it with an-
other kind of proclamation of the ‘new world’. This other kind of proclama-
tion of the ‘new world’ is a familiar component of modern politics. It is the 
proclamation of a ‘new world’ to come as a result of progressive, active, 
confident, and targeted action. It is a kind of proclamation of the ‘new’ that 
is grounded in the modern fondness (for the striving) for the ‘new’, which is 
widely taken as a foundational aspect of societal progress and development. 
It is a familiar feature of political discourses, in which “a new way forward” 
(Reagan 1985), a “new thinking” (Brown 2008) and “new approaches to 
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government” (Cameron and Clegg 2010: 7) are promised. In contrast with 
this (modern) proclamation of the ‘new’ to come, I carve out the characteris-
tics of the kind of proclamation of the ‘new’ that is manifest in the reaction 
to the post-1989 reality and call it a proclamation of the ‘new world’ that 
came. I show that the latter implies a passive speaking position of an ob-
server, who is confronted with a ‘new’ reality and whose task it is to grasp 
this reality, rather than to actively shape it(s future development). I conclude 
this conceptualisation by framing the proclamation of the ‘newness’ of the 
world as an aspect of political actors’ struggle to legitimise past and future 
decisions and actions.  
In a second analytical move in Chapter 5, I argue that, while the procla-
mation of the ‘new world’ to come is a manifestation of the modern, opti-
mistic fondness for innovation, progress and development, the proclamation 
of the ‘new world’ that came is a manifestation of an ‘awareness’ of the re-
flexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation. I substantiate this point with reference 
to sociologist Ulrich Beck’s work (Beck 1994, 2004, 2006). This substantia-
tion forms the core of Chapter 5, in which I lay out my conception of the 
‘reflexive modern’ social reality with its two constitutive aspects: the reflex-
ive ‘backfiring’ of the process of modernisation, which is constituted by the 
‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of national societies, the existence of ‘global 
risk’ and the ‘return of uncertainty’, and the prevalence of the tradition of 
the ‘national perspective’, which is a political perspective on the world that 
is shaped by and re-produces a world grounded in modern and national cat-
egories. I conclude Chapter 5 by pointing out the analytical frame that arises 
from my Beck-inspired conception of social reality. Notably, through this 
frame the various conceptions of the ‘newness’ of the world, which are 
manifest in the re-production of the ‘globalisation’-discourse, are to be seen 
as ways, in which the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, that is, the 
‘internal cosmopolitisation of national societies’, the existence of ‘global 
risk’ and the ‘return of uncertainty’, are dealt with and negotiated. As such, I 
argue, their study facilitates insights into the actualisation of the tradition of 
the ‘national perspective’ in distinct historical moments.   
In Chapter 6, I return to the adjective global and present my main argu-
ment. Chapter 6 is divided into three parts. First, I bring together and syn-
thesise the insights that I generated in previous chapters. This allows me to 
conceptualise the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective global as the 
re-production of a web of meanings that is best labelled ‘new world’. Se-
cond, I elaborate on the two aspects that make the phenomenon of the omni-
presence of the contemporary adjective global relevant and interesting; the-
se are its widespread but ‘untroubled’ existence, as well as, the fact that the 
proclamation of the ‘new world’, which is implied in the object that the use 
of the adjective global re-produces, indicates an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive 
‘backfiring’ of the process of modernisation. Building on this, I go a step 
further. Rather than ‘just’ relevant and interesting, I argue, the omnipresence 
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of the contemporary adjective global is also a political phenomenon; I frame 
the re-production of the web of meanings through utterances, which contain 
the adjective global, as something, the study of which enables insights into 
the political world. I argue that the omnipresence of global is a political 
phenomenon because it constitutes a dimension of the symbolic construction 
of social reality, in general, and, in particular, because it makes meaningful 
an important conceptual space and temporal category, namely the ‘present’. 
In this sense, I frame the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective global 
as a distinct part of the perpetual contest over the understanding of the 
world, which does not simply mirror a world that exists ‘outside’ of lan-
guage but constitutes, in the sense of constructs this world. Constructions of 
the world make some things possible and imaginable and others impossible 
– this applies to socially binding decisions, i.e. ‘political’ decisions in a nar-
row sense, and beyond.  
Here, my argument is grounded in a distinct theory of the relationship 
between language, meaning and social reality, which builds on the post-
structuralist premises that I sketch in Chapter 2, and on the concept ‘dis-
course’ that I introduce in Chapter 4. In Chapter 6, I elaborate on this theory 
by comparing it with what appear to be similar but are, in fact, significantly 
different understandings of the relationship between language, meaning and 
social reality, namely speech act-inspired approaches and social constructiv-
ist premises in IR. I choose a comparative approach in this context because 
it allows me to embed and situate my project in the broader political studies 
and IR discourse. My theoretical elaborations in Chapter 6 include a reflec-
tion on the ‘unconventional’ ideas of ‘politics’ and ‘power’ that are implied 
in the underlying conception of the relationship between language, meaning 
and social reality, where politics is seen as “contests over the alternative un-
derstandings [of the world] (often implicit) immanent in the representational 
practices that implicate the actions and objects one recognizes and the vari-
ous spaces […] within which persons and things take on their identities” 
(Shapiro 1989: 12) and ‘power’ is a discursive product. I conclude Chapter 
6 by introducing the study of the omnipresence of the adjective global as an 
unconventional, experimental and ‘provisional’ scholarly endeavour that 
demands a certain degree of creativity.  
The conceptualisation of the omnipresence of global is at the heart of 
my book; it is its main purpose. Nevertheless, in Chapter 7, I take an initial 
step into an empirical exploration of the omnipresence of the adjective 
global, understood as the re-production of a web of meanings called ‘new 
world’. In an exemplary study, I generate insights into the web of meanings 
‘new world’ that is re-produced in US President Barack Obama’s 2013 pub-
lic communication. I find a complex picture of a ‘modern hyper-
cosmopolitised’ ‘new world’ that is constituted of ‘pragmatic’ national units 
in an environment shaped by a market, that appears like a second nature and 
22 | THE NEGOTIATION OF THE “NEW WORLD” 
 
brings out a distinct ‘national’. Overall, I discover that the ‘new world’ in 
Obama’s 2013 Papers leaves little room for radical re-imaginations of the 
world beyond the modern, while, simultaneously and forcefully, fueling the 
process of a distinct cosmopolitisation of ‘the national’. I conclude Chapter 
7 by positioning my findings as the initial empirical ground for three kinds 
of future research directions into the study of the omnipresence of the adjec-
tive global. One of them is about the rewriting and ‘radicalisation’ of my 
findings themselves, in an effort to advance the search for and establishment 
of a language that enables us to capture the reality of the ‘reflexive modern’ 
world, rather than to re-produce the modern national idea of it. 
In the Conclusion of this book, I position my project in the broader con-
text of ‘unconventional’ studies in the social sciences, in general, and the 
political studies and IR scholarship, in particular.    
 
   
            
 
   
  
2  The Contemporary Adjective Global I: 
Popular & Free and                       
Disputedly Undisputed 
 
[G]lobal means global.  
GEORGE W. BUSH’S SPOKESWOMAN (BUSH 
2001) 
 
The simplest words for the lexicographer 
are the not very common [words] with just 
one clear meaning, like jabber, jackal, 
jackass, jackdaw and jacuzzi.  
COLLINS COBUILD ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
DICTIONARY (1987: XVIII) 
 
 
The adjective global has become de rigueur in discourses worldwide. Yet, 
despite its quasi omnipresence, global attracts little critical attention. It has 
somewhat remained off the radar of concern. President Bush’s spokeswom-
an’s above quoted insight “global means global” is often as far as reflections 
on the word go. 
The aim of Chapter 2 and the subsequent Chapter 3 is to set the ground 
for taking the contemporary adjective global seriously. This is a warranted 
move, given that the adjective global is more often than not treated as if it 
was clear and ‘innocent’. Using Raymond Williams’ (1976: 21) words, the 
aim of Chapters 2 and 3 is to add an “extra edge of consciousness” to the 
word global. My aim is to make the contemporary global ‘strange’, to put 
the spotlight on it and to lift the ‘veil of invisibility’, under which it exists.  
In this present chapter, I do this by highlighting two of three noteworthy 
aspects that constitute the contemporary global. The first aspect is that the 
adjective global is extraordinary popular and ‘free’, with which I mean that 
it is semantically open. The second aspect is that it has – somewhat paradox-
ically – a ‘disputedly undisputed’ existence. I present these two aspects 
grounded in an empirical exploration of how the adjective global is used 
these days in public, political and academic contexts. I use quotes from var-
ious sources to illustrate and support my points. In the course of my discus-
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sion, I engage with a theory of language and meaning, according to which 
language and meaning are not natural and referential but conventional and 
‘productive’. This theory will be taken up again in later parts of this book.  
In the subsequent Chapter 3, I focus on the third aspect that constitutes 
the contemporary adjective global. This is its enmeshment with what I un-
derstand as the ‘globalisation’-discourse. Given the relevance and the com-
plexity of this third aspect, I dedicate a whole chapter to developing it.         
 
 
POPULAR & FREE 
 
There is no question, the adjective global is popular these days. As of 1 Jan-
uary 2015, US President Obama had used the word at least once in 18.5% of 
his Public Papers.1 By comparison, none of the first 31 US Presidents 
(George Washington to Herbert Hoover) applied the adjective global even 
once in publicly recorded contexts. Franklin D. Roosevelt was the first to 
use the word publicly on 7 September 1942,2 and eventually applied it at 
least once in 2.6% of his Public Papers. While neither the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights nor the United Nations Charter contain the word 
global, contemporary UN-related documents are unimaginable without this 
adjective. Alone in the Human Development Report 2014 (URL) it is ap-
plied 513 times over 239 pages; and in the World Development Report 2014 
(URL), one of the flagship publications of the World Bank Group, we find 
global 278 times in the main body of the text that comprises 286 pages.3 
Former UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown (2008a) uses the adjective 47 
times in a single speech, and the annual number of articles in The New York 
Times, in which the adjective global is used at least once, increased between 
1980 and 2015 more than fifteenfold (from 476 in 1980 to 7,375 in 2015).  
These examples are not isolated cases but mirror a broader trend in the 
British and American English language. Both the COBUILD American and 
                                                    
1 Here and in the following when I refer to US Presidential Public Papers I use the 
collection of documents that is provided by The American Presidency Project 
(URL). The ‘Public Papers’ of the US Presidents include all public messages, 
statements, speeches, and news conference remarks, as well as documents such 
as proclamations, executive orders, and similar documents that are published in 
the Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations, as required by law (see 
The American Presidency Project [URL]). 
2 “The Nation must have more money to run the war. People must stop spending 
for luxuries. Our country needs a far greater share of our incomes. For this is a 
global war, and it will cost this Nation nearly $100,000,000,000 in 1943” (Roo-
sevelt 1942; emphasis added).    
3 These numbers exclude the use of global in the table of content, the bibliographic 
references, within names such as ‘World Bank Global Findex’, and in the appen-
dix.   
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the COBUILD British English corpora show the steady rise in the (written) 
use of the adjective global over the past 100 years (Figure 1).4 And in their 
2010 A Frequency Dictionary of Contemporary American English Mark 
Davies and Dee Gardner (2010: 74) list global as number 1,223 in the list of 
the 5,000 most frequently used words in American English with a raw fre-
quency of 31,793 and a relatively good dispersion score of 0.89. In compari-
son, the adjective does not feature in prominent predecessors of Davies and 
Gardner’s dictionary, such as Edward L. Thorndike’s 1921 Teacher’s Word 
Book (Thorndike 1921), which lists 10,000 English words and their frequen-
cy, its revised and extended version, The Teacher’s Word Book of 30,000 
Words from 1944 (Thorndike and Lorge 1944), or in Michael West’s 1953 
A general service list of English words (West 1953).  
 
Figure 1: Written use of the adjective global in the COBUILD British 
English corpus (left) and COBUILD American English corpus (URL) (right) 
 
But the adjective global is not just popular these days, it also seems to be 
perceived as expressing the zeitgeist. Global is chic, it is ‘in’, it is the adjec-
tive to use. As Duncan Bell (2013: 254) puts it, the contemporary adjective 
global has “an almost shamanic aura” surrounding it. The contemporary 
naming strategy of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) illustrates this 
point. The database of the Union of International Associations (URL) re-
veals that the number of new NGOs with global in their name has increased 
dramatically over the past 15 years. Even more intriguing is that there are 
existing organisations that have global-ised their names: for instance, the 
Evangelical Missionary Alliance founded in 1958 changed its name to 
Global Connections in 2000 (URL); the Australian Baptist Foreign Mission 
of 1913 became Australian Baptist Missionary Society in 1959 and Global 
Inter-Action (URL) in 2002; Global Impact (URL) was founded as Interna-
tional Service Agencies in 1956; Citizens for Global Solutions started off in 
1975 as Campaign for UN Reform; and the International Association on the 
Political Use of Psychiatry, which was founded in 1980, was renamed 
Global Initiative on Psychiatry (URL) in 1991 (see also Selchow 2008: 
229).  
                                                    
4 In Chapter 3, I will reflect on the peak that we can see in the American English 
corpus in the 1940s. 
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Still looking at the zeitgeist-nature of the adjective global, consider also 
the curious case of the Social Sciences Citation Index database of Thomson 
Reuters’ Web of Science (URL). The Web of Science, which is a popular 
source in scientific research, covers content from over 12,000 journals, 
which reach back to 1900. When one searches for articles that contain glob-
al in their titles, the database provides a large number of entries. Of these, 
48 fall into the period of 1900-1915. So, what kind of academic articles 
where published between 1900-1915 with the word global in their titles? 
The database displays article entries such as “The global Problem” by Isaac 
Loos, published in Amercian Journal of Sociology in 1915, “Canada. Na-
tional Economy Principles and Global Economic Relations” from the Amer-
ican Economic Review, published in 1914, and “Geography of Global 
Commerce and Global Traffic” from a 1914 edition of the Bulletin of the 
American Geographical Society of New York. The issue becomes curious if 
one looks at the original (digitised) texts behind the 1900-1915 list of arti-
cles that, according to the Web of Science database, have the word global in 
their titles. It is readily apparent that none of these texts actually contain the 
word global, either in their titles or in their text bodies. It turns out that the 
respective articles are English language reviews of books entitled Le prob-
lème mondial (Torres 1913), Kanada: Volkswirtschaftliche Grundlagen und 
weltwirtschaftliche Beziehungen (Fleck 1911), and Geographie des 
Welthandels und Weltverkehrs (Friedrich 1911). Each of these book titles 
(in their original language) is used as the title for the respective review arti-
cle. Given that none of these book titles contains the word global, none of 
the titles of the review articles actually contains this adjective. Yet, the word 
appears in the database entry for each article. These database entries are 
English translations of the titles of the articles. What becomes obvious, then, 
is that it was the Web of Science database editor’s decision to translate the 
French word mondial and the German word Welt into the English word 
global, and to use this adjective in the name of the database entries for the 
three review articles. Hence, for instance, the database entry for the article 
with the title “Kanada: Volkswirtschaftliche Grundlagen und weltwirtschaft-
liche Beziehungen” is “Canada. National Economy Principles and Global 
Economic Relations”. If the aim of the wording of the database entry is to 
best capture what the authors of the reviewed books referred to in their use 
of the words mondial and Welt, one would expect the English word world to 
be used for the database entries (i.e. ‘Geography of World Commerce and 
World Traffic’, instead of ‘global commerce’ and ‘global traffic’). In the 
case of the German titles this is not least because, in contrast to the word 
global, Welt is not an adjective that modifies a noun – it is a noun itself. In 
the case of Friedrich’s book, the word Welt (world) is used to form a new 
word in combination with the word Handel (trade): Welthandel. One can as-
sume that the Web of Science database editor, who creates the names of the 
database entries by translating the non-English titles of the respective arti-
cles, is familiar with the foreign languages they translate. Hence, the use of 
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the adjective global must have been a conscious choice and not one made 
out of ignorance. It seems to have been a conscious decision to translate the 
respective book titles for the database entry not only from French and Ger-
man into English but into a language that the translator seems to have per-
ceived as being adequate, maybe in the sense of ‘contemporary’, i.e. a lan-
guage in which the word world is naturally replaced by global. Global 
seems to be the word to use these days.  
The above examples illustrate two points. The adjective global is more 
popular these days than ever and it seems to be perceived as capturing the 
zeitgeist.  
Furthermore, the contemporary global is also used in increasingly di-
verse contexts. There is hardly anything these days that is not saddled with 
the word global in one context or another. As mentioned in the introductory 
chapter, late Pope John Paul II is lauded as the “first truly global Pope” 
(Sells 2014) – in fact, so is one of his successors, Pope Francis I (Franco 
2013). For Sam Sifton (2004) the menu of a New York restaurant is “post-
global”.5 University College London (URL) calls itself “London’s Global 
University”, an Arts Council England-funded project called Global Local is 
all about the “hottest Global music”, and Campbell’s Foodservices (URL) 
provides a “global soup collection”. For Patrick Diamond, Anthony Giddens 
and Roger Liddle (2006) “Europe” is (worth being called) global, Ulrich 
Beck, Nathan Sznaider and Rainer Winter (2003) have discovered “global 
America”, and Scott Lash, Michael Keith, Jakob Arnoldi and Tyler Rooker 
(2010) look at “global China”. Lucy Williams (2010) studies “global mar-
riage”, Dennis Altman (2002) has discovered “global sex”, Jean-Francois 
Bayart (2007) investigates “global subjects”, Saskia Sassen (1991) the 
“global city”, and Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie Russel Hochschild (2003) 
the “global woman”. For many, the recent crisis in the financial sector is 
most accurately labelled global; and the adjective is frequently used to mod-
ify the nouns warming, economy, change, system, market, climate, issue, 
network, trade, community, positioning, environment, and is applied in 
combination with the words economic, environmental, local, regional, in-
ternational, financial, increasingly, truly, all of which Davies and Gardner 
(2010: 74) identify as the top current collocates of the adjective. There is al-
so “the global North” (e.g. Zincone and Agnew 2000), “the global South” 
(e.g. United Nations URL) and, in fact, “the global world” (e.g. Greenaway 
2012).  
So, the contemporary global is used more often than ever and also used 
more widely. But this is still not all there is to global: on top of things, the 
adjective is today also applied with an array of different meanings attached 
to it.  
                                                    
5 It is especially the “warm salad of curried chicken, with tiny dumplings flecked 
with coriander and lemony yogurt sauce” that Sifton finds “post-global”. 
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A look at the context of the just provided examples illustrates this point. 
For instance, Heather Sells (2014) explains her assessment of John Paul II 
as the “first truly global Pope” with the fact that “[h]e visited more than 120 
countries – the most ever for a pope – and held audiences with more than 17 
million people.” For Massimo Franco (2013: 71), Pope Francis I is the “first 
global Pope” because through his election  
 
“[t]he Americas have moved from the periphery to the very heart of the Catholic 
world. Eurocentrism is no more. The creation of a council of eight cardinals taken 
from all five continents as global advisers […] confirms his intention to fundamental-
ly reshape the government of the Church.” 
 
Whereas Sells uses the adjective global in a geographical sense to refer to 
the worldwide outreach of Pope John Paul II, for Franco global means ‘not 
European’ or ‘not Eurocentric’. We see two uses of the adjective global in 
similar contexts but with different meanings: first, ‘geographically far reach-
ing’ and, second, ‘not Eurocentric’. Or take the following two reactions to 
the communiqué of the 2009 G20 London Summit (URL) and especially to 
its clause: “[a] global crisis requires a global solution”. US economist Jo-
seph Stiglitz (2009) bemoans that “[t]his global crisis requires a global re-
sponse, but, unfortunately, responsibility for responding remains at the na-
tional level”. Former Caribbean diplomat Sir Ronald Sanders (2009) is simi-
larly critical about the communiqué and its announcement that “[a] global 
crisis requires a global solution”. He writes:  
 
“There was not a word of admission that the global crisis was caused by the financial 
establishment in the G7 countries. […] Instead there was the sanctimonious line: ‘A 
global crisis requires a global solution’. Well, if that is so, why weren’t countries rep-
resented at the meeting in a global way?” 
 
Again, we see two uses of the adjective global in the same context but with 
different meanings. Stiglitz uses the adjective global in the sense of ‘not na-
tional’, whereas Sanders understands it in the sense of ‘inclusive of coun-
tries from beyond the boundaries of the club of G20 countries’.  
And there are many more meanings of the adjective global than these 
four. Sometimes global is used to refer to worldwide, sometimes to ‘the 
North’, sometimes to ‘the West’, sometimes to ‘everybody’, sometimes to 
‘universal’, sometimes to ‘including developing countries’, sometimes to 
‘the developed world’, sometimes it is used as a synonym for the word in-
ternational, sometimes it means ‘transnational’, sometimes “international 
and ethnic inspired”, as in the above mentioned case of Campbell’s “global 
soup collection” (Campbell’s Foodservice URL). And, sometimes, the ad-
jective global refers to ‘including tourists from Western countries’, ‘unprec-
edented’ and ‘exceptional’, like when UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
(2004) called the consequences of the 2004 Boxing Day earthquake in the 
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Indian Ocean and its subsequent tsunami a “global catastrophe” that requires 
a “global response”.  
As highly specialised geo-scientific studies suggest, the 2004-seaquake 
in the Indian Ocean made the entire planet vibrate (e.g. Lay 2005). Hence, 
in this context the adjective global could meaningfully refer to ‘affecting the 
entire planet’. Yet, Annan’s decision to call the event a “global catastrophe”, 
and International Crisis Group’s Gareth Evans’ (2005) decision to speak in 
the same context of a “real global momentum”, do not seem to have been 
motivated by and refer to the actual planetary impact of the seaquake – they 
seem to carry a different meaning. After all, the geological insight that the 
quake actually affected the entire planet was not yet known at the point in 
time when these two public statements were made.  
A look at the context, in which the word was applied, suggests that it 
was a complex web of perceptions and interpretations, and, prominently, a 
notion of ‘unprecedentedness’ and ‘exceptionality’ that accounted for the 
consequences of the tsunami being attributed with the adjective global. It 
appears these perceptions were due to the degree of the impact of the quake: 
the tsunami affected 11 countries and, even more significantly, it not only 
hit locals but also an unusual high number of citizens of Western countries, 
who spent their holidays in the region. These ‘Westerners’, in turn, used 
their mobile phones and digital cameras to spread first-hand accounts and 
pictures all over the world, bringing “the wave of death: chaos in paradise” 
(The Mirror 2004), almost ‘live and in colour’ into the living-rooms around 
the globe with an unprecedented immediacy. This, in turn, facilitated and 
amplified the extraordinary media coverage that accompanied and simulta-
neously ‘made’ the event. Hence, in the case of the 2004-tsunami the adjec-
tive global seems to have been applied because of the high number of vic-
tims who were from Europe, Australia and the US, and the subsequent 
worldwide media attention to which the catastrophe was subject. This inter-
pretation is supported in view of the reactions to other major earthquakes, 
such as the one that struck China in 2008 and affected more people than any 
other earthquake between 1980-2008, namely a total of 46 million people 
(CRED 2010), or the one that struck South Asia in October 2005 and affect-
ed some four million people only a few months after the 2004-tsunami. Nei-
ther of these were labelled ‘global catastrophes’ or perceived as demanding 
‘a global response’. For instance, Annan’s official reaction to the 2005 
South Asia disaster was his assurance that it left him “deeply saddened” 
(Annan 2005).  
If we take all of the above together, we notice two things. First, the con-
temporary word global is like a chameleon that adapts apparently effortless-
ly to any context in which it appears. Second, and moving on from here, the 
many different meanings, with which the word is accorded these days, have 
often not much to do with those that are provided in English language dic-
tionaries, such as the latest The Concise Oxford English Dictionary, edited 
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by Stevenson and Waite (2011: 605; emphasis in the original). The Concise 
Oxford English Dictionary defines global as  
 
“adj. 1 relating to the whole world; worldwide. 2 relating to or embracing the whole 
of something, or of a group of things. Computing operating or applying through the 
whole of a file or program. DERIVATIVES globalist n. & adj. globally adj.” 
 
The 2011 edition of the The Concise Oxford English Dictionary is of course 
not the only dictionary that features the adjective global. For instance, the 
2006 edition of The Concise Oxford American Dictionary (2006: 381) de-
fines the word global as 1. “of or relating to the whole world; worldwide”; 
2. “of or relating to the entire earth as a planet”; 3. “relating to or embracing 
the whole of something, or of a group of things”; 4. “Comput. operating or 
applying through the whole of a file, program”. And in the 1998 edition of 
The Chambers Dictionary (1998: 681; emphasis in the original), the adjec-
tive global is listed with the meanings:  
 
“spherical; worldwide; affecting, or taking into consideration, the whole world or all 
peoples; (of products or companies) having a name that is recognized throughout the 
world (marketing); comprehensive; involving a whole file of data (comput.).” 
 
Looking through the array of existing English dictionaries over time, we see 
that global has had a relatively long ‘dictionary life’; though, admittedly, it 
did neither appear in what is often seen as the first monolingual English dic-
tionary, namely Robert Cawdrey’s A Table Alphabeticall of Hard Usual 
English Words from 1604 (Cawdrey 1966[1604]), nor in Samuel Johnson’s 
1755 A Dictionary of the English Language (Johnson 1983[1755]). Both 
publications feature the word globe, which Cawdrey (1966[1604]: 61) de-
fines as “any thing, very round”. Johnson further lists the adjectives globat-
ed, globular and globulous. Globated is defined as “adj. [from globe.] 
Formed in the shape of a globe; spherical; spheroidical”, globular as “adj. 
[...] In form of a small sphere; round; spherical”, and globulous as “adj. [...] 
In form of a small sphere; round” (Johnson 1983[1755]: 428; emphasis in 
the original). Yet, although not listed in these two famous historical diction-
aries, global already appeared in 1901 in the influential A New English Dic-
tionary on Historical Principles. This dictionary is influential because it is 
the foundation of what is now called the Oxford English Dictionary. In A 
New English Dictionary on Historical Principles global is listed as deriving 
from the noun globe; the meaning that is provided for it is “spherical; globu-
lar” (as seen in the 1933 reprint, The Oxford English Dictionary 1933: 223). 
In the 1933 Supplement to the A New English Dictionary on Historical 
Principles a second meaning of global is added, namely, “pertaining to or 
embracing the totality of a group of items, categories, or the like” (The Ox-
ford English Dictionary 1933a: 417). And, some forty year later, in the 1972 
A Supplement to the Oxford English Dictionary (1972), which was edited by 
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R. W. Burchfield and served to replace the 1933 Supplement, the meaning 
that was added in 1933 was extended to: “pertaining to or embracing the to-
tality of a number of items, categories, etc.; comprehensive, all-inclusive, 
unified; total; spec. pertaining to or involving the whole world; world-wide; 
universal” (A Supplement to the Oxford English Dictionary 1972: 1240; em-
phasis in the original). In comparison, in the 1964 edition of The Concise 
Oxford Dictionary of Current English, edited by McIntosh, we find the ad-
jective global listed under the noun globe. It is listed both as an adjective 
with the meaning “world-wide; embracing the totality of a group of items, 
categories, etc.”, and as a verb, meaning: “Make (usu. in pass.), or become 
globular” (The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English 1964: 521-2). 
In the 1976 edition of The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, 
edited by John B. Skyes, global is explained as being an adjective with one 
meaning, namely “[w]orld-wide; pertaining to or embracing the whole of a 
group of items etc.; total.” Here, it has its own entry, separate from the noun 
globe (The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English 1976: 453). 
This brief look at various dictionaries shows us three things. First, the 
adjective global has a relatively long dictionary-life, starting at least in 
1901. Second, there are different dictionary meanings of global. Finally, as 
already mentioned, it shows us that the many different meanings, which the 
contemporary chameleon global has in different contexts today, such as 
‘non-Eurocentric’ or ‘affecting a high number of Westerners’, are not only 
diverse but also do not necessarily overlap with the meanings we find in dic-
tionaries.  
This ‘mismatch’ between the myriad of uses of global and the dictionary 
meanings does, of course, not suggest that the word is used in incorrect 
ways, or, alternatively, that there is something wrong with past or current 
dictionaries. Rather, it makes us aware that the contemporary adjective 
global is a word that is shaped by a high degree of semantic openness. Ar-
guably, a high degree of semantic openness reduces the precision of a word 
and the effectiveness of those communicative exchanges, in which the word 
is used. As such, the fact that the contemporary global is used to convey a 
vast number of different meanings could well be perceived as problematic. 
Yet, it would be misguided to say that there was something wrong with its 
polysemic use.  
Meanings are arbitrary, in the sense that there is no meaning naturally at-
tached to a linguistic sign. Which meaning is linked to a linguistic sign is 
subject to social ratification rather than natural pre-determination. Meanings 
and, more broadly, language are in constant flux and arise in the context of 
their actualisation, that is, in the context of the use of them.  
 
“Words can lose or gain meanings relatively easily, due to [their] elasticity; and they 
do not have to lose an earlier sense to gain a new one”, 
 
explains April McMahon (1994: 176).  
32 | THE NEGOTIATION OF THE “NEW WORLD” 
 
“Thirty years ago, who would have thought that we would be ‘surfing’ in our own 
homes, or that ‘chips’ would be good things to have inside our equipment, or that we 
would be excited ‘to google this’ and ‘to google that’.” (Davies and Gardner 2010: 1) 
 
And did you know that “in the thirteenth century, ‘girl’ could mean a child 
of either sex, a ‘youth’ or a ‘maiden’, and because of this ambiguity, a boy 
was usually referred to as a ‘knave girl’” (Room 1986: 127)? Clearly, mean-
ings of words change. 
Before having a closer look at the institution of the dictionary, I want to 
stay with the issue of meaning for a moment. I want to substantiate the 
claim that meaning is arbitrary and language is flexible. The way to do this 
is to start with Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure’s structural language 
philosophy and to end with poststructuralist revisions of this theory.  
With his structural language philosophy, de Saussure developed one of 
the central language philosophical traditions.6 In this philosophy, de Saus-
sure (2000[1916]) demonstrates that meanings are not naturally inherent in 
linguistic signs. He uses the metaphor of the chess game in order to illustrate 
this point and to support his distinct idea about how meaning emanates in 
language. For de Saussure, the chess pieces (the linguistic signs) do not have 
an inherent role (meaning). The roles (meanings) of the chess pieces (lin-
guistic signs) evolve from their position within the chess game (system of 
language). More precisely, in de Saussure’s imagination, roles (meanings) 
emanate from within their relation to other chess pieces (linguistic signs) 
within the structure, which holds them together. Consequently, de Saussure 
argues for a synchronic or static perspective on language and not, as was 
common for linguists up to his time, for a diachronic or historical approach 
to language (de Saussure 2000[1916]: 81). His ‘structural linguistics’ inves-
tigates language as a structured system of signs that is stable and fixed at 
any given moment.7  
                                                    
6 The other important tradition is the pragmatic language philosophy that Ludwig 
Wittgenstein (1952) established. It will play a role in Chapter 6.  
7 In comparison, in developing his pragmatic language philosophy, Wittgenstein 
(1953), too, argues that meaning is not attached to a linguistic sign. Yet, while 
sharing this premise with de Saussure, he develops a theory that is different from 
de Saussure’s. Like de Saussure, Wittgenstein compares language to a chess 
game. He understands meaning as the outcome of moves within a language, i.e. 
within this chess game. The individual chess piece (the linguistic sign) within 
this (language) game does not have an inherently fixed role (meaning). Yet, the 
game is based on fixed rules, according to which each chess piece can be moved 
(linguistic sign can be used). These rules are known to each player (to each lan-
guage user). The role of the chess piece (the meaning of the linguistic sign) 
evolves from within the moving process (through the use of the linguistic sign), 
an act, which can be called communicative action. Hence, in Wittgensetin’s im-
agination, it is from within the process of moving of the chess pieces (the use of 
THE CONTEMPORARY ADJECTIVE GLOBAL I | 33 
 
The basic premises of de Saussure’s synchronic understanding of lan-
guage and his notion of linguistic signs and meanings can be summarised as 
follows: de Saussure distinguishes between ‘language’, which is the system 
of signs, ‘language faculty’ (original in French langage), which is the gen-
eral ability to speak, and ‘speech’, which is the individual executive act of 
using language (original in French parole) (see de Saussure 2000[1916]: 8-
17). Since speech depends on the existence of the system of signs, de Saus-
sure argues, it is this system that needs to be of primary interest to linguists. 
Elaborating on the nature of signs as the components of this language sys-
tem, he stresses that there is nothing referential about signs; signs are con-
ventional. He draws a clear distinction between a sign (such as the word 
wall) and an external referent (such as an actual cement construction), and 
argues that signs do not get their meanings from their relation to an external 
reality. Rather, meanings evolve from within the language system, that is, 
they evolve in contrast to other signs.  
This understanding is grounded in how de Saussure envisages the nature 
of linguistic signs. He argues, a sign consists of two components: the ‘sig-
nal’ (signifier) and what he calls the ‘signification’ (signified). The signal is 
to be understood as “the hearer’s psychological impression of a sound, as 
given to him by the evidence of his sense” (ibid. 66), like the spoken word 
wall. The signification is the abstract concept that is associated with a spe-
cific signal; in other words, it is the meaning of the word, in the sense that it 
is the mind image (not the actual thing in empirical reality) of a cement con-
struction. Central for de Saussure’s theory is that the two sides of a sign are 
to be imagined as the two sides of a piece of paper, which cannot be sepa-
rated from each other. He stresses that the “two elements are intimately 
linked and each triggers the other” (ibid.). Nevertheless, the relationship be-
tween signal and signification is purely arbitrary. There is nothing inherent 
or natural about the link between a specific signifier (such as the word wall) 
and a specific signified (such as the mind image of a cement construction). 
The fact that there are different languages with different signifiers for the 
‘same’ signified supports his point well: the signified that is linked to the 
signifier ‘wall’ in English is linked to the signifier ‘Mauer’ in German – 
clearly, it is a matter of convention, which signifier is linked to which signi-
fied.  
Flowing from this insight, de Saussure concludes that meanings are best 
understood as not being inherent in a sign but as evolving from within the 
                                                    
the linguistic signs), based on pre-determined rules that the chess pieces (the lin-
guistic signs) get their role (their meaning). Above and beyond and more gener-
ally, according to this philosophical tradition linguistic signs become meaningful 
based on the knowledge of the extra-linguistic context, such as the situation of 
the user of the sign, the historical context etc. In short, Wittgenstein (1953: 43) 
postulates: “the meaning of a word is its use in the language”; hence his language 
philosophy runs under the label pragmatic language philosophy.  
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process of differentiation from other signs within the stable system of lan-
guage. In his words,  
 
“a language is a system in which all elements fit together, and in which the value of 
any one element depends on the simultaneous coexistence of all the others.” (de 
Saussure 2000[1916]: 113) 
 
Signs are defined negatively in difference to other signs within the language 
system.  
The above theoretically grounds and substantiates two important points: 
First, it substantiates that linguistic signs and their meanings are not referen-
tial, in the sense that they do not arise from a natural relationship with a ref-
erent in empirical reality. Rather, meanings evolve from differences to other 
meanings. Second, the above supports the point that the link between a sig-
nifier and a meaning is arbitrary; it is the product of conventions.  
Both of these two points are intriguing and foundational. Yet, de Saus-
sure’s linguistic insights do not go far enough in grasping the complexity 
and flexibility of language and meaning. There is more to language and 
meaning than de Saussure’s structural, that is, synchronic conception of lan-
guage captures. Thinkers, who are commonly labelled poststructuralists, 
such as Jacques Derrida (1976, 1981) and his conception of ‘deconstruc-
tion’, elaborate on this argument. By engaging with and by rewriting de 
Saussure’s initial theory, they develop a much more complex idea of mean-
ing. Along with this more complex idea of meaning comes a less stable no-
tion of language.     
To put it in a nutshell, while poststructuralists agree with de Saussure’s 
basic argument that meanings evolve from difference not from (unconven-
tional, that is, natural) reference, they focus on the question of where this 
process of differentiation possibly starts and ends within a supposedly 
closed system of signs – to remind us, de Saussure imagines language as a 
closed system, in which meaning is generated from within difference. The 
implications of taking the process of differentiation seriously are that, in or-
der to bring the process of negative definition to an end, there would have to 
be something over and above the closed and stable sign system, which could 
serve as a fixed starting point – a meta-sign at which the process of differen-
tiation starts and ends. But what would that be? Given that the idea of a 
transcendental point of reference is not beyond dispute, de Saussure’s notion 
of language as a closed and stable system of signs is problematic. This, in 
turn, questions the notion of his synchronic perspective and brings history 
(back) in. 
Poststructuralists start with the above problem and somewhat radicalise, 
or, one could say, ‘de-essentialise’ de Saussure’s theory of structural lin-
guistics. They do this by questioning the idea of structure as an essence, and, 
as it is for instance elaborated in much detail in Belsey (2002), Culler 
(2008), Campbell (2007), Eagleton (1983) and Hall (1997), by critically en-
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gaging with de Saussure’s dualistic concept of signs. They challenge the no-
tion that the two sides of a sign are inseparably linked to each other (‘like a 
piece of paper’, as de Saussure imagines it). According to poststructuralists, 
a specific signified (in other words mind image or meaning) is not inter-
linked with one specific signifier. Furthermore, the meaning of a sign cannot 
be understood as evolving neatly from a signifier’s difference to one other 
signifier. Rather, meaning evolves from the differentiation between an in-
definite number of signifiers. The signifier ‘wall’ does not get its meaning 
by distinction from one signifier (let’s say ‘fence’), but it gets its meaning 
also from its distinction from, for instance, ‘house’ or ‘door’. These signifi-
ers themselves get their meanings from within a web of differences in an in-
finite regress. As literary theorist Terry Eagleton (1983: 127) puts it,  
 
“meaning is the spin-off of a potentially endless play of signifiers, rather than a con-
cept tied firmly to the tail of a particular signifier.” 
 
Thus, a sign must not be conceptualised as if it was carrying one fixed signi-
fied in it (in other words: one fixed mind image or meaning), which could 
be ‘discovered’ in its difference from another sign. As Derrida (1976: 7) 
stresses,  
 
“there is not a single signifier that escapes, even if recaptured, the play of signifying 
references that constitutes language.” 
 
In this light, meaning evolves from within an unlimited and constantly 
changing constellation of signs, whose meanings refer to each other. Each 
signifier is constituted by the difference between itself and other signifiers, 
which themselves are constituted by the difference between themselves and 
other signifiers, which themselves are constituted by the difference between 
themselves and other signifiers …. ad infinitum. Accordingly, meaning can 
never be fully grasped. It is a “constant flickering of presence and absence 
together” (Eagleton 1983: 128), filtering through language like a web-like 
shadow. As Derrida (1981: 85) stresses, it is structurally impossible to close 
this web, to bring the process of interlinkages to an end, to draw a border 
and ‘put on hold’ (the endless re-production of) meaning.8   
                                                    
8 These poststructuralist premises serve as the ground for Derrida’s philosophical 
programme of deconstructing the binary oppositions, which he and all other post-
structuralist thinkers detect as the fundamental structure of (Western) thinking. 
Jacob Torfing (2005: 11) puts this point as follows: “Derrida argues that Western 
thinking tends to organize the world in terms of binary hierarchies between the 
privileged essential inside and an excluded, inferior, and accidental outside […]. 
He shows that the outside is not merely posing a corruptive and ruinous threat to 
the inside, but is actually required for the definition of the inside. The inside is 
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As such, poststructuralist premises make us aware that language and 
meaning are less stable than de Saussure’s theory suggests. Thus, poststruc-
turalist theories, in general, and Derrida’s theory of ‘deconstruction’, in par-
ticular, constitute a turning away from, in Eagleton’s words (1983: 131), the 
 
“belief in some ultimate ‘word’, presence, essence, truth or reality, which will act as 
the foundation of all our thought, language and experience.” 
 
Accordingly, a transcendental ‘ultimate’ reality cannot exist; more precisely, 
it cannot be thought of and treated as independently and naturally existing 
because there is nothing that is not constituted through differences.9 Conse-
                                                    
marked by a constitutive lack that the outside helps to fill.” For instance, in the 
context of International Relations, this binary opposition is most prominently the 
opposition between ‘sovereign’ and ‘anarchic’ which, in turn, as for instance Mi-
chael Shapiro (1989) comprehensively dismantles, automatically constructs the 
state as the quasi-natural point of reference in political thinking and action. See 
also David Campbell’s seminal work on security (Campbell 1998[1992]) and, of 
course, the work of IR theorist R. B. J. Walker (1993).  
9 Ultimately, for Derrida (1973: 147), this means that presence can “no longer [be 
understood] as the absolutely matrical form of being but rather as a ‘determina-
tion’ and ‘effect’. [It] is a determination and effect within a system which is no 
longer that of presence but that of differance.” The term différance is a term cre-
ated by Derrida. He takes the French word difference and changes one letter; this 
change of one letter transforms the whole meaning of the word. The change of 
meaning, however, is only visible in the written word différance, since the pro-
nunciation of difference and différance is the same. This is linked to Derrida’s 
elaborations on ‘writing’ versus ‘speech’, which is one of the major aspects of 
his theory. He explains ‘difference’ as follows: “First, différance refers to the 
(active and passive) movement that consists in deferring by means of delay, del-
egation, reprieve, referral, detour, postponement, reserving. In this sense, differ-
ance is not preceded by the original and indivisible unity of a present possibility 
that could reserve, like an expenditure that would put off calculatedly for reasons 
of economy. What defers presence, on the contrary, is the very basis on which 
presence is announced or desired in what represents it, its sign, its trace […]. Se-
cond, the movement of différance, as that which produces different things, that 
which differentiates, is the common root of all the oppositional concepts that 
mark our language. […] Third, différance is also the product, if it still can be put 
this way, of these differences, of the diacriticity that the linguistics generated by 
Saussure, and all the structural sciences modelled upon it, have recalled is the 
condition for any signification and any structure.” (Derrida 1981a: 9; for Derri-
da’s discussion of the relationship between ‘writing’ versus ‘speech’ see further 
Derrida 1976, 1978). 
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quently, there is nothing that could stand beyond dispute and social negotia-
tion – and beyond power.10 
If we consider just these few theoretical elaborations, language and 
meaning and the adjective global become intriguing indeed. Thanks to de 
Saussure’s conception of language we see that meaning is the product of 
language rather than something that is inherent in something that pre-exists 
externally and then gets picked up in language. Thanks to the poststructural-
ist revision of de Saussure’s language theory, we become aware that mean-
ing is more like a moving ‘shadow’ than something stable and fixed. Mean-
ing is something that evolves from within the interplay of signifiers, which 
themselves are interplays of signifiers. Hence, meanings are like complex 
texts, which refer to other texts and constitute a network of changing rela-
tionships (in other words, a web of intertextuality). They change constantly, 
even if only slightly, from context to context, and from moment to moment 
– they are never exactly the same but are essentially blurred and ambiguous. 
Meaning is a web-like shadow that filters through language.  
This is how the theory goes. Yet, if we look at the reality of language 
(use) we realise that language and meaning are, of course, not entirely arbi-
trary and individual after all. This is aptly captured in Lewis Carroll’s 
(2001: 223) exchange between Alice and Humpty Dumpty:11  
 
“‘[…] and that shows that there are three hundred and sixty-four days when you 
might get un-birthday presents –’  
‘Certainly,’ said Alice.  
‘And only one for birthday presents, you know. There’s glory for you!’  
‘I don’t know what you mean by ‘glory’,’ Alice said.  
Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. ‘Of course you don’t – till I tell you. I 
meant ‘there’s a nice knock-down argument for you!’’  
‘But ‘glory’ doesn’t mean ‘a nice knock-down argument’,’ Alice objected.  
‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, ‘it means just 
what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less.’  
‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so many different 
things.’  
‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master – that’s all.’” 
 
Humpty Dumpty is, in principle, correct when he suggests that “the question 
[of meaning] is which is to be master”, that is, who is in the position to 
‘tame’ the endless play of meanings. Yet, Humpty Dumpty’s individual use 
of language is simply not successful in that he does not follow the socially 
ratified use of language. The way Humpty Dumpty uses the word glory does 
not enable him to communicate with Alice. Instead, he is forced to translate 
for Alice what he means when he uses the word glory. Although, in princi-
                                                    
10 I come back to the issue of ‘power’ in Chapters 4 and 6. 
11 Catherine Belsey (2002: 1-2) points this out. 
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ple, meanings are arbitrary and floating, only what is communicated in a 
way that is connected and adapted to general, socially ratified perceptions of 
the world is ‘successful’, in the sense that it gets understood. As the earlier 
mentioned word conventional suggests, there is a social dimension to mean-
ing. Although, in theory, they are anything but stable and fixed, linguistic 
signs appear as if they carried a clear and ‘natural’ meaning – otherwise we 
would not be able to communicate.  
This draws our attention to the obvious but important point that, alt-
hough signifiers are in principle arbitrary, conventions and rules ‘suggest’ 
and ‘restrict’ which (shadow) of a meaning is (to be) associated with which 
signifier. While the use of signs is individual and while a person (or Humpty 
Dumpty), who uses a sign, has an individual idea of which mind image (in 
other words, meaning) they would like to be or assume will be associated 
with the used sign, the production of meaning is a social phenomenon which 
takes place within and against the backdrop of socially ratified, collective 
understandings of meanings.  
In Chapter 4, I discuss the concept ‘discourse’ and, with that, come back 
to the issue of the social nature of language and the ‘taming’ of meanings. 
For now, we take from the above an understanding of the inherent flexibility 
of language and meaning. This brings me back to the institution of the dic-
tionary and to the phenomenon of lexical meanings, which I already touched 
on above when I pointed out that the actual uses of the adjective global of-
ten do not correspond with the meanings that we find in dictionaries.  
Linguists distinguish between codified lexical meanings and actual 
meanings. The latter are meanings of words that are activated in actual dis-
course, like the many different meanings of the adjective global that we saw 
at the beginning of this chapter. The codified lexical meanings, in compari-
son, are always only the “context-free, speaker-free, non-referential mean-
ings” of a word (Wavell 1986: 29). These are the meanings that dictionaries 
provide, like the various meanings of the adjective global in A New English 
Dictionary on Historical Principles and in the successors of this seminal 
dictionary.  
The above sketched insights into the theory of language and meaning 
make it apparent that it is impossible for lexicographers to capture in a dic-
tionary the breadth of actual existing meanings, which – following the above 
– only ever exist as a shadow that runs through language. At the same time, 
it makes obvious that every ‘taming’ of a meaning of a word in a dictionary 
is a practice that intervenes in the “constant flickering of presence and ab-
sence” (Eagleton 1983: 128) that is meaning. This makes dictionaries, on 
the one hand, “mines whose word-gems encapsulates centuries of language, 
history and cultural traditions; they are store-houses of meanings and uses” 
(Facchinetti 2012: 1). On the other hand, however, it makes dictionaries 
publications that are “out of date as soon as they are published” (Gramley 
and Pätzold 2004: 26), because the language has ‘moved on’. Furthermore, 
and fundamentally, it makes obvious that dictionaries need to be taken as 
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edited books that only ever provide an assembled picture of a language. 
Dictionaries are the product of “persistent and inevitable filtering process-
es”, explains John Willinsky (1994: 13). Given that they never capture the 
entirety of a language, i.e. given that they only ever provide selected lexical 
meanings, dictionaries are not simply neutral mirrors of a language and of 
the changes of meanings in this language. On the contrary, they play a cen-
tral role in the establishment and, in fact, production of this language.  
For instance, looking at the production and reproduction of Standard 
English and the extraordinary role of the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) 
in this respect, Michael Stubbs (1996: 64-66) finds that what has come to be 
considered as Standard English is the product of the work of a distinct social 
group and, in fact, of distinct individuals and their personal decisions. He 
finds that 
 
“there is no doubt that the definitions found in dictionaries display the bases of the 
particular social group who constructed them.” (ibid. 65) 
 
Willinsky (1994: 13) goes further by pointing to the self-referential charac-
ter of the entries in the OED: 
 
“It is still easy to mistake what we find in the dictionary for the entirety of the Eng-
lish language, to imagine that the definitions provided in its pages are carefully lifted, 
via the citation, directly out of the language. To consider the idea is to realize that we 
know better, not only as print is only one code in the use of an English language that 
has a long history of authority and resistance, but as the print record of the OED 
forms its own record of the language’s past and present.” 
 
As the practice of establishing dictionaries goes, the selected picture of a 
language that dictionaries, such as, in the case of English, most prominently 
and powerfully the OED, provide is constructed on the basis of both past 
and, importantly, written occurrences of words. The lexical meanings of the 
words are determined by these occurrences. These selected past and written 
occurrences are usually listed as ‘citations’ or ‘quotations’.  
This makes it apparent then that, for better or worse, dictionaries inevi-
tably reproduce the ‘tamed’ meanings they provide from within a distinct, 
arguably, elitist historical canon (of written work). Just consider that the 
most frequently quoted work in the current Second Edition of the OED from 
1989 is the Bible and the most frequently quoted single author is William 
Shakespeare, with around 33,300 quotations (OED Dictionary Facts URL).  
The origin of the OED is the already mentioned A New English Diction-
ary on Historical Principles; Founded Mainly on the Materials Collected by 
the Philological Society that was originally edited by James A. H. Murray 
and published as a serial magazine over 44 years, between 1884 and 1928. 
The aim of the A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles was to  
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“present in alphabetical series the words that have formed the English vocabulary 
from the time of the earliest records down to the present day, with all the relevant 
facts concerning their form, sense-history, pronounciation, and etymology.” (The Ox-
ford English Dictionary 1933b: v) 
 
The original dictionary contains more than 400,000 words illustrated 
through around 2 million quotations, which were selected from a pool of 
“some five million excerpts from English literature of every period amassed 
by an army of voluntary readers and the editorial staff” (Murray quoted in 
Wells 1973: 29). In 1933 A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles 
was reprinted, with a Supplement of around 850 pages. It was published un-
der the title The Oxford English Dictionary (OED). Further Supplements 
followed, such as the above mentioned one in 1972, and a Second Edition of 
the OED was published in 1989. Currently, in 2015, a completely reworked 
version of the OED is in progress, and it is only now that for “the first time 
material written by Murray and the early editors has been changed since 
they finished in 1928” (History of the OED ULR). Given the flexibility and 
historical nature of language, this is remarkable. As this indicates, the con-
struction and promotion of current Standard English through the OED is 
done by relying on and utilising what Willinsky (2004: 13) calls a “nine-
teenth century artefact”. He argues:      
 
“This dictionary, in all of its magnificence, could reasonably be considered as the last 
powerful outreach of an imperial age; it is an icon of learnedness that continues to 
shape the modern understanding of the word on a global scale. We need to appreciate 
how the OED has fashioned the English language out of classical allusion and poetic 
metaphor, scientific discovery and scholarly research, while filling it out with the 
prose of a working press and publishing trade.” (ibid.) 
 
I reflect on the nature of dictionaries and the distinction between lexical and 
actual meanings in some detail here because ever so often – and, as we will 
see later, including in the scholarly literature on ‘globalisation’ – dictionar-
ies are treated (by scholars in political studies and IR) as the unquestionable 
authority on a particular language and its meanings. As linguist Ernest 
Weekly (1924) observes,  
 
“almost the only individual to approach the sacred book [dictionary] in the spirit of a 
doubter is the lexicographer himself.” 
 
Taken together, the above elaborations make us aware that there is some-
thing problematic about relying on a dictionary for a supposedly authorative 
meaning, i.e. for the meaning of a word, such as the adjective global. To 
look at a dictionary means to look at decisions of those who were and are in 
a position to, first, determine which words are to be taken up in a dictionary, 
and, second, which (written) sources are to be used as the basis for the de-
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tection of what would enter a dictionary as the lexical meanings of these se-
lected words. To look at a dictionary, then, is not to look at an a-historical 
source but to look at a highly self-referential, edited book, in which an end-
less web of references is ‘tamed’ into distinct lexical meanings.  
I come back to these insights into the nature of meanings and dictionar-
ies in Chapters 3 and 6. For now, I want to return to the contemporary word 
global.  
It is clear now that the above observation that global is used with a vast 
number of meanings, which are not only at times contradictory in them-
selves but also often differ from the codified lexical meanings that are pro-
vided in current dictionaries, does not indicate incorrect uses of the word 
nor shortcomings in the dictionaries. It is a manifestation of the fact that 
global is shaped by a relatively high degree of semantic openness. In the 
“Introduction” to his 2004 New Words dictionary Orin Hargraves (2004: vii) 
explains  
 
“a new word’s appearance in a dictionary is the beginning of the end of its freedom: 
while lexicography pays these novel formations the respect of recognizing them as 
worthy additions to the language, it does so for a price, and that price is the sugges-
tion, if not the insistence, that the new words settle down somewhat in form and 
meanings and stop flailing about.” 
 
As we saw in the short overview of the ‘dictionary life’ of global, the adjec-
tive has been accredited with “the respect of being recognised as a worthy 
addition to the language” already for a while now – at least since 1901 and 
the A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles. Yet, the word re-
mains extraordinarily ‘free’ and continues to ‘flail about’ today. Indeed, as 
the various examples of its usage, which I provided in this chapter, show, 
perhaps global is today even freer and more prone to ‘flailing about’ than 
ever. It seems there is a self-reinforcing development in place: the more the 
adjective global is used, the freer it becomes because an inflation of mean-
ings and patterns of use makes it harder to pin it down and ‘tame’ it. “The 
simplest words for the lexicographer are the not very common [words] with 
just one clear meaning, like jabber, jackal, jackass, jackdaw and jacuzzi”, 
explains John Sinclair, editor-in-chief of the 1987 edition of the Collins 
COBUILD English Language Dictionary (1987: xviii). As we have seen 
above, global is anything but simple.  
To conclude, the first noteworthy aspect of the contemporary adjective 
global is that it is popular and free. Above and beyond this, we saw in this 
section that language and meanings are not natural and referential but flexi-
ble and conventional, that there is a difference between lexical and actual 
meanings, and that dictionaries are exciting historical documents but not the 
bearer of the meaning of a word – language is too alive to be tamed in a 
book.   
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DISPUTEDLY UNDISPUTED 
 
The second aspect that constitutes the contemporary adjective global is that 
there is something paradoxical in how it is used and how it is treated. To re-
flect this point, I call the contemporary global ‘disputedly undisputed’. I 
suggest, this ‘disputedly undisputed’ existence of the adjective is due to two 
– for a lack of a better word – ‘extreme’ treatments.  
On the one side, as we saw above, global is not only widely used but 
widely used without critical reflection. If we look at the adjective’s applica-
tion across discourses, including the social scientific scholarship, we notice 
that global is often simply overlooked as a word that might require reflec-
tion and explanation. Global seems to be ‘invisible’. It is off the radar of 
scholarly concern.  
On the other side, however, global and its current popularity is very 
clearly ‘visible’ to commentators. This is evident in the fact that, not infre-
quently, (the use of) the adjective is dismissed as a fad and rejected as a lin-
guistic manifestation of the discourses of ‘globality’ and ‘globalisation’.  
In the following, I illustrate each of these two points in turn. 
 
Global, the undisputed 
We saw above that the contemporary word global is shaped by a high de-
gree of semantic openness. We saw that it is used in many different senses. 
This is most obvious when applied in the same context, such as in the as-
sessment of which Pope is / was the first ‘global’ Pope, or in the debate 
about a ‘global’ response to the financial crisis. Yet, despite this striking 
ambiguity, the adjective global is, more often than not, treated as if there 
was no doubt about what it meant. This is manifest in two different ways.  
First, there is the predominant practice of using the adjective without 
problematising it. The case of the journalist from the beginning of this chap-
ter, who problematised the use of global in a statement of President Bush’s 
spokeswoman, is an exception. Just scroll through any of the countless pub-
lications that contain the adjective in their title – chances are that the word is 
applied but not explained. Or, look into recent reference books that aim to 
capture “the new language of international politics” (Morris URL) and to 
engage with “terms, concepts, jargon, acronyms and abbreviations used in” 
the contemporary political debate (Saunier and Meganck 2007), such as 
Globalization: The Key Concepts (Mooney and Evans 2007), A Dictionary 
of Globalization (Wunderlich and Warrier 2007), Roland Robertson and Jan 
Aart Scholte’s four-volume-comprising Encyclopedia of Globalization 
(2007), and the Dictionary and Introduction to Global Environmental Gov-
ernance (Saunier and Meganck 2007). While these publications feature an 
array of fixed and semi-fixed phrases that contain the adjective global, such 
as ‘global cities’, ‘global civil society’, ‘global commons’, ‘global con-
sciousness’, ‘global culture’, ‘global division of labour’, and ‘global finan-
cial crises’, the adjective in and of itself is not subject to problematisation. It 
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is not explicitly discussed, let alone has it its own individual entry. As this 
indicates, global is perceived to be a useful adjective to apply, it is spread 
throughout these books but it is clearly not perceived and treated as suffi-
ciently problematic to provoke explicit reflections.12  
The earlier mentioned World Development Report 2014 (ULR) with its 
278 globals on 286 pages does not only constitute another example for this 
phenomenon – none of the 278 applications of the word is subject to explicit 
reflection – it is also an example for another, related phenomenon, which il-
lustrates that global is taken as ‘undisputed’. This is the predominant use of 
the adjective as a pre-modifier.  
Adjectives are words that are used to modify a noun. They can be ap-
plied as pre-modifiers, such as in the case of ‘the global market’, or as post-
modifiers, such as in the phrase ‘the market is global’. In the case of ‘the 
market is global’, the adjective is explicitly part of the proposition about 
‘the market’. In contrast, in its use as a pre-modifier, i.e. ‘the global mar-
ket’, as it is the case in 275 out of 278 uses of the adjective global in the 
World Development Report 2014, global ‘is there’ and ‘does’ something to 
the noun it is applied to, but partially disappears in its co-existence with the 
noun. In contrast to ‘the market is global’, in the phrase ‘the global market’ 
the adjective does not invite disputation. It is normalised and taken for 
granted, as if it was clear. 
The second manifestation of my observation that the adjective global is 
taken as if it was straightforward is its ‘invisibility’ in academic discourses, 
such as the political studies and IR scholarship. In this body of scholarly 
work, global is simply not considered worth studying. Of course, as I 
acknowledged in the Introduction to this book (see also Selchow 2016), the 
study of distinct linguistic signs, such as the word global, is normally not at 
the core of the disciplines of political studies and IR. Yet, even in the sub-
part of the scholarship that takes (the use of) language and distinct words se-
riously the adjective global has not been subject to meaningful express ex-
ploration. In fact, global is sometimes even positively overlooked. We can 
see this, for instance, in the debate about the ‘global war on terror/ism’ 
(GWOT), i.e. the narrative that has shaped political discourses since the ter-
rorist attacks in New York City and Washington, DC in September 2001.  
The GWOT has triggered a considerable number of public discussions 
about, assessments of and scholarly engagements with the language that 
constitutes and makes it. The metaphor ‘war’ has been discussed at length, 
as well as the words terrorism, terror and terrorist.13 These discussions even 
                                                    
12 As an exception see Neoliberalism: The Key Concepts by Matthew Eagleton-
Pierce (2016). 
13 The ‘war’-metaphor came under critical scrutiny right from the beginning. Ben-
jamin B. Ferencz (2001), former prosecutor at the Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, 
was one of the first who argued that the 9/11-attack needs to be understood and 
treated as a “crime against humanity” rather than as a “declaration of war”. In 
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led to the Obama-Administration publicly announcing in 2009 that it would 
no longer use the phrase ‘war on terror/ism’ (Los Angeles Times 2009).14 
Yet, surprisingly, the word global has not attracted critical attention in this 
context. Indeed, it has not even been acknowledged as a noteworthy compo-
nent of the ‘global war on terror/ism’ narrative in the first place. This is de-
spite the fact that it is clearly a constitutive part of it.15  
For instance, Jeffrey Record (2004: 2) examines the features of the 
‘global war on terrorism’ for the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and argues 
that there are “two issues that continue to impede understanding of the 
GWOT: its incomplete characterisation as a war, and the absence of an 
agreed upon definition of terrorism” – omitting ‘the issue’ of the adjective 
global as the third issue that ‘impedes understanding of the GWOT’. Rich-
ard Jackson (2005) does the same in his study, which expressly aims to pro-
vide an analysis of, as he puts it, the “public language” of the ‘war on ter-
ror/ism’ by investigating how language has been deployed in order to justify 
                                                    
critical security studies, various voices criticise the application of the term war 
on the basis that it constitutes a speech act that brings war into being in the first 
place and that ‘securitises’ terrorism, which means that it frames terrorism as an 
existential threat, and, consequently, leads to the justification of the suspension 
of normal politics (see Fierke 2005: 53-55). More generally, it has been widely 
pointed out that the idea of ‘war’ is faulty in that it implies perceptions of victo-
ry, defeat, as well as peace; as even noticed by US President Bush (see Borger 
2004), these orthodox perceptions are actually untenable in the case of the ‘war 
against terrorism’ – so is the clear line between ‘we’ and ‘them’, the enemy, 
which is implicitly invoked by the ‘war’-metaphor (see Fierke 2005: 54; also 
Beck 2003). George Soros (2006) calls the ‘war’ metaphor a “false metaphor”, 
and Robert Higgs (2005) brings the linguistic critique to the point when he states: 
“‘War on terror’ made no sense: you can’t drop a bomb on an emotion.” 
14 In actual fact, although the Obama administration made an explicit point in pub-
licly rejecting the expression ‘global war on terror/ism’, it already came under of-
ficial criticism before. In July 2005 Defence Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld 
(2005) started to replace the metaphor ‘global war on terror/ism’ with the phrase 
“global struggle against violent extremism”; and in March 2007 US Democratic 
staff director Erin Conaton wrote a memo in which she advised her colleagues in 
charge of the preparation of the US defence authorisation bill to “‘avoid using 
colloquialisms,’ such as the ‘war on terrorism’ or the ‘long war,’ and not to use 
the term ‘global war on terrorism’” (International Herald Tribune 2007). 
15 This is for instance evident in the fact that it is part of the acronym ‘GWOT’. The 
acronym GWOT appeared in official documents for the first time in a 2002 fact 
sheet of the US Department of State (URL). See William Safire (2002) for a wit-
ty commentary on the acronym, highlighting its inappropriateness for that it can 
be “pronounced with a rising inflection as ‘Gee-what?’ The image it projects is 
of a brass hat scratching his head.”   
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and normalise a “global campaign of counter-terrorism”. He, too, overlooks 
the adjective global.  
If we take the above together, global is everywhere but somewhat ‘invis-
ible’. It is (apparently) ‘undisputed’ and treated as if it was innocent, 
straightforward and self-evident. 
 
Global, the disputed 
Curiously, just as much as the adjective global is ‘undisputed’ and treated as 
if it was innocent and clear, that is, just as much as the word disappears un-
der a ‘cloak of invisibility’, the (phenomenon of its) general popularity ever 
so often causes express irritation. Global and its rising popularity are like 
climate change and income tax – hardly anyone is blasé about it, when 
asked for their view. At a recent visit of the library at The University of 
Melbourne a librarian guided me to the library’s dictionary section and 
asked what I was working on. I explained I was interested in the word glob-
al, which triggered an immediate outburst of  
 
“uugghh – global?! That’s a new word. It used to be international. But today every-
thing is global ... I don’t like this word.” 
 
There are two grounds on which the adjective global is dismissed. First, it is 
precisely the extensive and unreflective use of the word that causes irrita-
tion. As is obvious in the above quoted librarian’s reaction, global (due to 
its popularity) seems to be perceived – and rejected – as a fad.  
Second, a look across commentaries suggests that global causes irrita-
tion and aversion based on the argument that it is part of ‘globe-talk’ (e.g. 
McGrew 1992a: 470), ‘global babble’ (e.g. Abu-Lughod 1991: 131) or 
‘globaloney’ (e.g. Veseth 2005). Here, commentators usually mean to sug-
gest one of two things: First, they suggest that the adjective global is a lin-
guistic ingredient in the discourse of ‘the global’ and ‘globality’. Second, 
they suggest that the adjective global is part of the talk about ‘globalisation’.  
The irritation about the adjective, which each assumption causes, is 
grounded in the perception that the discourses of ‘the global’ and ‘globality’ 
and, in particular, the talk about ‘globalisation’ are Northern hegemonic and / 
or neoliberal discourses. Consequently, the adjective global and its omni-
presence are seen as an instance in the reproduction of the hegemonic domi-
nance of the North and / or of an ‘untamed’ capitalism. Such an understand-
ing of and aversion to global is apparent in Indian activist Vandana Shiva’s 
following quote: 
 
“The notion of ‘global’ facilitates this skewed view of a common future. The con-
struction of the global environment narrows the South’s options while increasing the 
North’s.” (Shiva 1998: 233) 
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Taking the above together, there is something paradoxical about the con-
temporary adjective global. On the one hand, it is used happily without 
much meta-reflection and is overlooked by even critical scholars who are 
generally aware of the relevance of language – global is covered by a ‘cloak 
of invisibility’ as if it was clear and innocent. On the other side, its omni-
presence provokes irritation. Here, global gets dismissed as a fad, and is met 
with suspicion as a supposed linguistic manifestation of the discourse of ‘the 
global’ and ‘globality’, and the talk about ‘globalisation’. It is this mix of 
approaches to global that leads me to label the contemporary adjective 
global ‘disputedly undisputed’.            
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter constitutes the first of two steps, in which I introduce the adjec-
tive global and make it ‘strange’ in order to add an ‘extra edge of con-
sciousness’ to our approach to it. With this aim in mind, I presented in this 
chapter two noteworthy aspects that I identify as constituting the contempo-
rary global. First, global is popular and free, the latter in the sense of seman-
tically open. Second, global leads a ‘disputedly undisputed’ existence.  
Together these two aspects form a seeming paradox between a colourful 
use of the word and a widening of its meanings, on the one side, and a strik-
ing easiness, with which it is taken as if it was obvious, on the other side. 
Both sides of this paradox account for the discomfort that the word regularly 
triggers in public and scholarly discourses, where its popularity and diverse 
uses are perceived – and dismissed  – as a meaningless fad or as a symbolic 
confirmation and reproduction of hegemonic (‘Northern’) discourses. At the 
same time, however, these concerns have not led to a heightened sensibility 
for or a commitment to a more reflective use of the adjective. Nor have they 
led to an increased curiosity towards, scholarly suspicion of or systematic 
approach to the adjective global. The contemporary global seems to be eve-
rywhere and, yet, it is ‘invisible’. It is causing irritation but no systematic 
and dedicated critical reflection.  
I want to conclude this chapter by giving a taster for that a systematic 
and critical look at the word global holds the potential of revealing interest-
ing insights into the ‘world making’-practice, which is the use of language. I 
want to do this by having a look at the GWOT-discourse. In particular, I 
want to have a look at how the adjective global is used in the Public Papers 
of one of the main ‘authors’ of the GWOT-narrative, namely US President 
George W. Bush. I explicitly choose the GWOT-discourse for my brief ex-
ploration of the adjective global ‘in use’ because, as we saw above, the ad-
jective global is usually overlooked in this particular discourse, even by 
those above mentioned scholars, who set out to study the use of language in 
the context of the GWOT. This, my brief analysis shows, is unfortunate be-
cause a close look at the use of global in Bush’s rhetoric provides the sense 
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that the adjective is more than a casually applied pre-modifier. It appears to 
be strategically deployed in a distinct ‘making’ of the world.16   
The ‘global war on terror’-narrative captured the US political discourse 
and shaped discourses around the world after the terrorist attack on 11 Sep-
tember 2001 (9/11). It was ‘written’ by US President George W. Bush 
(2001a), proceeding from his assessment that, with the terrorist attack, an 
“act of war was declared on the United States of America.”  
If one takes a systematic look at the use of the adjective global in Presi-
dent Bush’s post-9/11 public communication by determining the words that 
the adjective global most frequently pre-modifies, something intriguing be-
comes apparent. The ‘global war on terror’ was initially not (called) ‘glob-
al’, at least not in the rhetoric of the US Commander in Chief. It was a ‘war’ 
on global terror or global terrorism, which Bush launched after 9/11, not a 
‘global war’ on terror / terrorism. This is readily apparent in the list of most 
frequent co-occurrences of the adjective global, which I generated from all 
of President Bush’s 813 Public Papers between 30 January 2001 and 31 De-
cember 2006 that contain the word global at least once.17 As Table 1 and the 
following selected quotes illustrate, it is the words terrorism, terrorists and 
terror, as well as the noun reach that are pre-modified with the adjective 
global after 11 September 2001, not the noun war:  
 
“Today I am pleased to issue the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. This 
strategy outlines the effort our Nation is making to win the war against global terror.” 
(Bush 2003a; emphasis added) 
 
“America will not rest; we will not tire until every terrorist group of global reach has 
been found, has been stopped, and has been defeated.” (Bush 2002b; emphasis add-
ed) 
 
“[…] our Nation is just beginning in a great objective, which is to eliminate those ter-
rorist organizations of global reach.” (Bush 2002c; emphasis added) 
 
Interestingly, the species ‘global terrorist’ and the phenomenon ‘global ter-
rorism’ did not exist in the public communication of the US Presidents be-
fore 9/11. Both were given birth to by President Bush on 11 September 
2001. This is apparent if one looks beyond Bush’s Public Papers at the pub-
lic communication of his Presidential predecessors, such as President Clin-
ton. Neither the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on 7 
August 1998, nor the attack on the USS Cole on 12 October 2000 in Yemen 
                                                    
16 For the following see also Selchow (2008: 238-241).   
17 I constructed my dataset from the database of US Presidential Public Papers that 
is provided by The American Presidency Project (URL) (see fn1 in this chapter). 
Furthermore, I used the freeware AntConc for my analysis. I will come back to 
AntConc in Chapter 6. 
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were considered to be attacks by ‘global terrorists’ or to be instances of 
‘global terrorism’, although they were committed by the same terrorist net-
work as the attack on 11 September 2001. As a matter of fact, before Sep-
tember 2001 the word terrorist was pre-modified with the adjective global 
by any US President only once and terrorism only four times, namely in 
Clinton’s communication (1995a, 1995b, 1996, 1998b, and 1999a). With the 
9/11-incident, however, the nouns terrorist and terrorism co-occurred most 
frequently with global in the President’s communication, replacing the noun 
economy, which had been the top co-occurrence until then. Again, this trend 
is illustrated below in Table 1, which shows us co-occurrences with global 
in the Public Papers of President George W. Bush before and after 11 Sep-
tember 2001.   
 
Table 1: The four words most frequently pre-modified with the adjective 
global in US President George W. Bush’s Public Papers  
 2001  
(pre-9/11) 
2002 2004 2006 
1 global economy global terror global test global war 
2 global trade global terror-
ism 
global war global economy 
3 global climate global coali-
tion 
global economy global poverty 
4 global warming global reach global campaign global world 
 
Table 1 also indicates that the ‘birth’ of the ‘global war’ on terror, as op-
posed to the war on ‘global terror’, took place sometime between 2002 and 
2006. There is a notable shift in the words that were most frequently pre-
modified by the adjective global between 2002 and 2006, from terror, via 
test, to war. So, when and why did this shift take place? 
A closer investigation of Bush’s Public Papers provides an answer to 
this question. In fact, the linguistic shift can be tracked down to a precise 
date: the 30 September 2004, which was the day when President Bush en-
tered an election campaign discussion with Democrat John F. Kerry in Coral 
Gables, Florida (Bush-Kerry 2004). It was on this day that Bush’s practice 
of applying the adjective global mainly to pre-modify the nouns terror and 
terrorism shifted towards pre-modifying the noun war. What exactly hap-
pened?  
On close analysis it becomes clear that the shift in Bush’s use of the ad-
jective global was prompted by an answer that John F. Kerry gives during 
the Presidential Debate to moderator Jim Lehrer’s question:  
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“What is your position on the whole concept of preemptive war?” (ibid.) 
 
Kerry explains:  
 
“The president always has the right, and always has had the right, for preemptive 
strike. […] But if and when you do it, Jim, you have to do it in a way that passes the 
test, that passes the global test where your countrymen, your people understand fully 
why you’re doing what you’re doing and you can prove to the world that you did it 
for legitimate reasons.” (ibid.) 
 
Asked for his position, President Bush responds: 
 
“Let me – I’m not exactly sure what you mean, ‘passes the global test,’ you take 
preemptive action if you pass a global test. My attitude is you take preemptive action 
in order to protect the American people, that you act in order to make this country se-
cure.” (ibid.; emphasis added) 
 
As a systematic analysis of the deployment of the adjective global shows, 
from then on, Senator Kerry’s expression ‘global test’ was taken up by Pres-
ident Bush in a total of 62 of his campaign speeches, as well as in two of the 
President’s Radio Addresses between 1 October and the election day of 2 
November 2004. It was also taken up by Vice President Dick Cheney in the 
Vice Presidential Debate with Senator John Edwards (Cheney-Edwards 
2004). ‘Global test’ turned into a key linguistic tool and point of reference in 
Bush’s effort to distinguish himself from Kerry. As the following quote al-
lows us to assume, the intention of taking up the expression ‘global test’ was 
to present Senator Kerry as a weak leader who would let America’s security 
get out of his hands: 
 
“As part of his foreign policy, Senator Kerry has talked about applying a ‘global 
test.’ […] As far as I can tell, it comes down to this: Before we act to defend our-
selves, he thinks we need permission from foreign capitals. […] Senator Kerry’s 
‘global test’ is nothing more than an excuse to constrain the actions of our own coun-
try in a dangerous world. I believe in strong alliances. I believe in respecting other 
countries and working with them and seeking their advice. But I will never submit 
our national security decisions to a veto of a foreign government.” (Bush 2004d) 
 
It was in this context then that Bush’s public use of the adjective global 
shifted from mainly pre-modifying the nouns terror and terrorism to even-
tually mainly attributing the adjective global to the noun war. According to 
Bush’s post-September-2004-rhetoric the US were not fighting anymore a 
‘war against global terrorism’ but a ‘global war against terror’ (see Figure 
2).  
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This shift in the use of global means that, suddenly, it was not the 
‘threat’ that was attributed with the adjective global but the American ac-
tion, namely ‘war’: 
 
“And so long as I’m sitting here in this Oval Office, I will never forget the lessons of 
September the 11th, and that is that we’re in a global war against coldblooded kill-
ers.” (Bush 2005c; emphasis added) 
 
“[W]e are now waging a global war on terror – from the mountains of Afghanistan to 
the border regions of Pakistan, to the Horn of Africa, to the islands of the Philippines, 
to the plains of Iraq.” (Bush 2005a; emphasis added) 
 
Figure 2: Insights into the use of the adjective global in US President 
George W. Bush’s Public Papers between 11 September 2001 and 31 
December 2006 
 
At first sight, this may appear to be a minor rhetorical shift. However, given 
that the word global is used by President Bush with the meaning ‘world-
wide’ and ‘everywhere around the globe’, the shift in the application of the 
adjective can be read as indicating a significant shift of perspective and atti-
tude. It can be seen as a distinct symbolic construction of the security envi-
ronment and the US in it. The notable shift from a perceived ‘global’ threat 
to a perceived ‘global’ action, where ‘action’ refers to war and the adjective 
global means ‘worldwide’ and ‘everywhere’, stands for and symbolically 
supports an offensive, proactive and even preemptive position following the 
attitude that  
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“[i]n our time, terrible dangers can arise on a short moment anywhere in the world, 
and we must be prepared to oppose these dangers everywhere in the world.” (Bush 
2005b) 
 
In one of his election campaign speeches Bush explains:  
 
“We are now nearing the first Presidential election since September the 11th, 2001. 
People of the United States will choose the leader of the free world in the middle of a 
global war. The choice is not only between two candidates; it’s between two direc-
tions in the conduct of the war on terror.” (Bush 2004c) 
 
Following from the above, these “two directions in the conduct of the war 
on terror”, of which Bush speaks, are the ones that he constructs through the 
shift in the use of the adjective global: the first one is about defending the 
US against a ‘global’ threat and the second one is about fighting a ‘global’ 
war wherever a threat to the US can be found.18 
I return to the word global in US Presidential Public Papers in Chapter 
7. For the time being, my brief analysis is meant to conclude this chapter by 
supporting the simple point that it is worth taking the adjective global seri-
ously. Global is not only widespread, polysemic, complex, and ‘disputedly 
undisputed’ – it also matters as it is obviously used by political actors to 
symbolically construct a distinct world. In the above sketched case of US 
President George W. Bush, this is a world, in which a preemptive approach 
to secure ‘US national security’ is ‘justified’.    
 
 
 
                                                    
18 This supports analyses in security studies, which point out and study the preemp-
tive turn in national security practices (e.g. de Goede 2008; Stockdale 2013). 

  
 
3  The Contemporary Adjective Global II: 
Enmeshed with                                        
the ‘Globalisation’-Discourse 
 
Talk of ‘globalization’ has become rife 
among academics, journalists, politicians, 
business people, advertisers and entertain-
ers. Everyday conversation now includes 
regular reference to global markets, global 
communications, global conferences, global 
threats, the global environment, and so on.   
JAN AART SCHOLTE (2005: 51) 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I highlighted two noteworthy aspects of the con-
temporary word global: it is a highly popular and free adjective, and it is 
‘disputedly undisputed’. In this present chapter, I reflect on a third aspect. I 
highlight that the contemporary adjective global is intimately enmeshed 
with what I call the ‘globalisation’-discourse. With the term ‘globalisation’-
discourse I refer to the re-production of a distinct web of meanings through 
utterances, which contain the word globalisation.   
Presenting a selection of different contemporary uses of the adjective 
global, I show that global is enmeshed with the ‘globalisation’-discourse in 
two different ways. First, the adjective is used to establish and justify con-
ceptions of the signified associated with the word globalisation. Second, the 
contemporary adjective global gains one of its meanings from the ‘globali-
sation’-discourse, that is, from the re-production of a distinct web of mean-
ings through utterances, which contain the word globalisation.   
The chapter is divided into two main parts, in which I elaborate on each 
of these two points in turn. Drawing on the second point and synthesising 
the observations from this present Chapter 3 and the previous Chapter 2, I 
conclude my engagement with the contemporary adjective global by con-
ceptualising it as a ‘new word’.  
My conceptualisation of the contemporary adjective global as ‘new’ 
serves two kinds of purposes. In general, my labelling of global as a ‘new 
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word’ is a final scholarly move to draw attention to the hitherto overlooked 
word, i.e. to free it from its predominating environment by establishing it as 
something to look at in itself, namely as a ‘new word’. In other words, my 
use of the word new is a strategic move to put the spotlight on the adjective 
global.      
In particular, my conceptualisation of the contemporary adjective global 
as ‘new’ is to make us aware that there is, indeed, something ‘new’, in the 
sense of distinct about the contemporary global. What is distinct about it is 
its close relationship with the ‘globalisation’-discourse, that is, with the re-
production of a distinct web of meanings through utterances, which contain 
the word globalisation. Yet, contrary to existing takes on the word global 
(e.g. Scholte 2005: 50), I argue the adjective is not to be seen as the natural 
‘pedigree’ of the word globalisation, in other words, it is not to be taken as 
the linguistic sign, from which the word globalisation springs and receives 
its meanings. Rather, I argue, it is the other way around: what is ‘new’, in 
the sense of distinct and not yet sufficiently acknowledged about the con-
temporary adjective global is that it implies the ‘globalisation’-discourse. 
 
 
GLOBAL AS A TOOL TO ESTABLISH THE SIGNIFIED  
OF GLOBALISATION 
 
Since the end of the 1980s and in the course of the 1990s, it has come to be 
a common practice to capture and explain the social world with the help of 
the word globalisation. Putting it differently, it was in the 1990s that, what I 
call, the ‘globalisation’-discourse was born. In Chapter 4, I focus in detail 
on the concept ‘globalisation’-discourse. For now, it is sufficient to under-
stand that when I speak of ‘globalisation’-discourse I refer to the re-
production of a distinct web of meanings through utterances, which contain 
the word globalisation. 
A look across scholarly works on ‘globalisation’ makes us aware that 
the adjective global plays a central role in what I understand to be the ‘glob-
alisation’-discourse. The adjective is used as nothing less than a tool to es-
tablish and justify scholarly ideas of ‘globalisation’. This is done in two dif-
ferent ways.   
First, and most commonly, the signified of the adjective global is taken 
as a key feature of what scholars set out to conceptualise as the phenomenon 
(they call) ‘globalisation’. In other words, scholars establish and justify an 
understanding of what they call ‘globalisation’ by suggesting that what is 
distinct about it is that there is something ‘global’ about it.  
 This is readily apparent in those works, in which scholars set out to de-
velop their conception of the phenomenon that they capture with the word 
globalisation by asking and answering the (rhetorical) question: “What is 
global about globalisation?”. Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton (2003: 
15), Scholte (2005: 50), Kirchberger (2002), Axford (2000: 239), and An-
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yanwu (2000: 2-4) do this. Implied in this question is the claim that whatev-
er the adjective global signifies, i.e. whatever its meanings is, is a key char-
acteristic of what these scholars set out to conceptualise with the help of the 
word globalisation. Going a step further, the signified of global is actually 
taken here as the central feature that distinguishes the (respective) idea 
‘globalisation’ from phenomena that are referred to with other linguistic 
signs, such as the words internationalisation or transnationalisation.  
In this sense, the adjective global serves an important purpose for ‘glob-
alisation’-scholars. Given that the word globalisation is a neologism, these 
scholars are inevitably faced with the task of not only drawing a distinction 
between the meaning of the word globalisation and the signifieds of other, 
already existing and established words. They also have to make clear what it 
is that is the ‘new’ that the neologism globalisation captures and that is not 
already captured by existing vocabulary. I discuss the issue of the ‘new’ in 
more detail in Chapter 4. Here, I want to make us aware that it is precisely 
the adjective global that helps scholars in these instances with nothing less 
but the establishment of the (supposed) ‘newness’ of whatever the word 
globalisation is applied to refer to.  
Let me illustrate the above described scholarly practice with concrete 
examples. Take, for instance, Jan Aart Scholte (2005: 52) who, in his semi-
nal Globalization: A Critical Introduction, cautions that the word globalisa-
tion “should not merely restate what can be known with other terminology”, 
and who criticises, “[m]uch if not most existing analysis of globalization is 
flawed because it is redundant”. In order to avoid this ‘flaw’ himself, Schol-
te (2005: 50) sets out to show “what, precisely, is ‘global’ about globaliza-
tion.” With that, Scholte suggests what makes the signified of the word 
globalisation distinct is that there is something ‘global’ about it. In other 
words, Scholte suggests that it is the signified of the adjective global that 
makes the phenomenon, which he associates with the word globalisation, a 
‘new’ phenomenon, i.e. worthy being captured with a neologism, namely 
globalisation.  
Alexandre Kirchberger (2002), Barrie Axford (2000: 239) and Chika 
Anyanwu (2000: 2-4) argue in precisely the same way, and so do David 
Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton (2003: 15). 
The latter group of authors stress the significance of what they associate 
with the linguistic sign global in and for their conception of the signified of 
the word globalisation by lamenting,  
 
“there is scant evidence in the existing literature of any attempt to specify precisely 
what is ‘global’ about globalization.” 
 
By specifying “precisely what is ‘global’ about globalization” themselves, 
Held et al aim to distinguish their conceptualisation of the meaning of the 
word globalisation from others, such as those building on notions of “accel-
erating interdependence” (Ohmae 1990), “action at a distance” (Giddens 
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1990), and “time-space compression” (Harvey 1990). Held et al appreciate 
these notions but do not consider them as capturing what is ‘global’ about 
‘globalisation’, i.e. what makes the meaning of the word globalisation dis-
tinct for them (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton 2003: 15). 
I come back to this scholarly practice in due course. At this point, I want 
to turn to a second manner, in which the adjective global is used as a tool to 
establish and justify scholarly ideas of ‘globalisation’. This second manner 
differs slightly from the first one. It is a less common practice than the one 
above. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out because it can be found in one 
of the most influential, in the sense of, often-cited works in the ‘globalisa-
tion’-discourse, namely Scholte’s above mentioned Globalization: A Criti-
cal Introduction (Scholte 2005).  
In this second manner, the scholarly idea ‘globalisation’ is established 
and justified with reference to the meaning of the linguistic sign globalisa-
tion. And the meaning of the linguistic sign globalisation is established and 
justified with reference to the meaning of the linguistic sign global. More 
precisely, the word global is taken as the radical of the word globalisation, 
and the meaning of the word globalisation, which is established in this way 
with the help of the word global, is taken as equalling the idea ‘globalisa-
tion’.  
Bringing the above together, we see, for a start, that the adjective global 
is utilised by scholars to establish and justify their respective conceptions of 
‘globalisation’. This observation becomes intriguing, when we now take a 
closer look at which meanings these scholars actually attach to the word 
global, that is, to this central tool in their conceptualisation of ‘globalisa-
tion’. More precisely, the above observation becomes intriguing when we 
realise how the meanings of the adjective global, which then serve as the 
basis for the respective scholarly conceptions of ‘globalisation’, are actually 
determined.  
Let me start with a look at the first group of scholars that I looked at 
above, namely those commentators, like Held et al, who use the word global 
to establish an understanding of what they address with the word globalisa-
tion by suggesting that what is distinct about ‘globalisation’ is that there is 
something ‘global’ about it. Curiously, these scholars determine the mean-
ing of the adjective global in a somewhat tautological way. They derive the 
meaning from a pre-set idea ‘globalisation’. This means they derive it from 
the very idea of ‘globalisation’ that they actually set out to establish with the 
help of the word global to begin with. On scrutiny we see that the meaning 
of the adjective global is derived in these cases from what these scholars 
consider is specific about the phenomenon they set out to grasp with the 
word globalisation, and that they intend to establish with the help of the 
meaning of the adjective global. What might sound abstract is easily illus-
trated if we look back at the above mentioned scholars and the way they de-
rive their concept of ‘globalisation’. 
THE CONTEMPORARY ADJECTIVE GLOBAL II | 57 
 
For instance, for Held and his colleagues what is ‘global’ about the sig-
nified of the word globalisation are “its distinctive spatial attributes and the 
ways these unfold over time” and transform “the organization of human af-
fairs by linking together and expanding human activity across regions and 
continents” (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton 2003: 15). For Kirch-
berger (2002) “what is ‘global’ about ‘globalisation’ is the ideology of 
‘globalisation’ that literally spreads everywhere”. For Axford (2000: 241, 
243; drawing on McGrew 1992b) what is ‘global’ about the signified of 
globalisation is the production of “‘an essential sameness’ in the surface ap-
pearance of social and political life across the globe” together with “contra-
dictory tendencies towards increasing interconnectedness and greater frag-
mentation”. And for Anyanwu (2000: 2-4), what is ‘global’ about the signi-
fied of the word globalisation is the subsumption of 
 
“the cultural and geopolitical differences of people. While globalisation is a form of 
neo-colonialism where the non-western Other is placed in a deceptive position of ar-
tificial competitiveness, it is a system that uses what Robert Stam would call the ‘fic-
tive we’ to subjugate us through what Roland Barthes would call a ‘subjective nomi-
nated truth’.” 
 
What we see above is an intriguing scholarly practice, in which the key 
character of the phenomenon that is captured with the word globalisation, is 
taken to be that it is ‘global’. The signified of the word global, in turn, is 
explained as whatever the commentators consider to be the key characteris-
tics of what they pre-imagine as the phenomenon to which they refer with 
the word globalisation. Hence, the respective understanding of the distinct 
feature of the phenomenon, to which these scholars refer with the word 
globalisation, arises out of and is justified based on a tautological move, 
which has the adjective global at its heart.   
Referring back to the discussion in Chapter 2, I suggest it is this kind of 
use of the word global that partly accounts for and explains the above ob-
served ‘invisibility’ of the adjective. As is apparent in these practices, in a 
curious way the contemporary word global is locked into the orbit of the re-
production of the web of meanings, labelled ‘globalisation’, through utter-
ances that contain the word globalisation. In this setting, it is the signified of 
the word globalisation that is at the centre of critical attention. The adjective 
global, in turn, is utilised in a way that turns it into something like a satellite 
of this interest. Global is locked into the shadow of ‘globalisation’. The 
word global is strategically utilised but then ‘disappears’ as a supposedly 
self-evident and ‘innocent’ linguistic ingredient of the negotiation of the 
signified/s of the noun globalisation. 
The above mentioned second manner, in which the adjective global is 
used to establish and justify ideas of ‘globalisation’, namely the one that we 
find in Scholte’s seminal Globalization: A Critical Introduction, is as intri-
guing as the tautological practice, which I just sketched. Instead of describ-
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ing it in the abstract, let me turn to a concrete example straight away to illus-
trate my point.   
As we saw above, in order to establish what Scholte understands ‘glob-
alisation’ to be, he turns to the linguistic level and stresses the importance of 
a robust definition of the word globalisation. He writes, 
 
“[k]nowledge of globalization is substantially a function of how the word is defined. 
Thus every study of globalization should include a careful and critical examination of 
the term itself.” (Scholte 2005: 50) 
 
In order to come up to this task, Scholte decides to set the foundation for his 
definition of the word globalisation through what he refers to as “trac[ing] 
the rise of the vocabulary of globalization in academic and lay thinking” 
(ibid.).  
In doing this, Scholte builds on two premises. First, he pre-assumes that 
the word globalisation is a derivative of the words globe and global, as well 
as globalise and globalism. He claims these words are the natural “pedigree” 
(ibid.) of the word globalisation. Second, Scholte suggests that a fruitful 
way of ‘trac[ing] the rise of the vocabulary of globalization in academic and 
lay thinking’ is to look up the etymology of these, for him, interconnected 
words as it is recorded in a selection of one English and two American-
English dictionaries.  
This second premise is evident in the fact that, as if it was a natural mat-
ter, Scholte starts his ‘tracing’ by consulting the 2003 edition of the Mer-
rian-Webster Dictionary and the 1989 edition of the Oxford English Dic-
tionary, as well as the Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the 
English Language from 1961; he also refers to the insights of two other 
scholars who appear to have gone through a similar dictionary consultation 
exercise (Robertson 2001, 1983 and Schreiter 1997). 
The first of Scholte’s premises is expressed in his opening explanation:  
 
“Although the term ‘globalization’ was not coined until the second half of the twenti-
eth century, it has a longer pedigree. In the English language, the noun ‘globe’ dates 
from the fifteenth century (derived from the Latin globus) and began to denote a 
spherical representation of the earth several hundred years ago (Robertson 2001: 6, 
254; MWD 2003). The adjective ‘global’ entered circulation in the late seventeenth 
century and began to designate ‘planetary scale’ in the late nineteenth century, in ad-
dition to its earlier meaning of ‘spherical’ (OED 1989: VI, 582).” (Scholte 2005: 50) 
 
In this text segment, we also see that Scholte picks out ‘planetary scale’ as 
the meaning of the word global. Given that he understands the word global-
isation to be a derivative of the word global, he takes the word globalisation 
to imply ‘planetary scale’, too. Consequently, he takes the condition ‘plane-
tary scale’ as a central component of his definition of the phenomenon that 
he labels with the word globalisation. In other words, Scholte derives a con-
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stitutive part of what he associates with the word globalisation from his def-
inition of the word globalisation, which he derives from a meaning of the 
word global that he picks out from a number of codified lexical meanings, 
which are provided in a selection of dictionaries.  
The insights into lexical meanings that I provided in the previous chap-
ter make the strategy, which Scholte follows in order to conceptualise ‘glob-
alisation’, intriguing. We saw above that dictionaries do not provide the 
meaning of a word. Consequently, “precisely because words change in 
meaning over time, the meaning of a word cannot be established from its et-
ymology” (Stubbs 2001: 172). Hence, as lexicographer David Crystal 
(1995: 136) puts it, “[f]ascinating as etymologies are, in debate they can on-
ly be a rhetorical cheat”. The meaning ‘of planetary scale’, which Scholte 
suggests is the meaning of the word global and, consequently, is the (natu-
ral) characteristic of the phenomenon he associates with the word globalisa-
tion is, of course, not the meaning of the adjective global. As we saw in the 
previous chapter, there is no ‘the meaning’ of any word that could be natu-
rally derived from a consultation of a dictionary. Hence, Scholte’s way of 
establishing the (supposedly natural) meaning of the adjective global as a 
means to determine the (supposedly natural) meaning of the noun globalisa-
tion, in order to present it as the (supposedly natural) feature of the phenom-
enon, which he associates with the word globalisation, is a distinct way of 
legitimising a scholarly decision by building on the authority of the diction-
ary and on the etymology of a word. 
To be clear, Scholte’s conceptualisation of the phenomenon ‘globalisa-
tion’ in his Globalization: A Critical Introduction might be valuable in 
many respects. There is also nothing wrong per se with his move to select 
one codified lexical meaning of the word global, namely ‘planetary scale’, 
and use it as the centre of his definition of the word globalisation, and sub-
sequently, as what he understands as the phenomenon ‘globalisation’. Yet, 
his move needs to be acknowledged as a scholarly practice, rather than a 
neutral and natural depiction of an unquestionable (linguistic) reality; how-
ever, the latter is the way, in which he presents it.  
My above reflection of the case of global in the ‘globalisation’-literature 
captures one way in which the contemporary adjective global is closely en-
meshed with the ‘globalisation’-discourse. I illustrated that the adjective 
global is applied in various ways by commentators to establish and justify 
conceptions of ‘globalisation’, i.e. of the (constructed) object that is the 
product of the various utterances, which contain the word globalisation. In 
addition to this general insight, we also got a sense from the above that there 
is something intriguing about how this is done. Like in my brief analysis of 
the use of global in the post-9/11 rhetoric of President George W. Bush at 
the end of Chapter 2, we get again a sense of the politics of the use of the 
word global, this time in the context of the scholarly (‘globalisation’-)
discourse, in which the adjective global features as nothing less than a tool 
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for scholars to establish and justify their individual conceptions of the phe-
nomenon that they associate with the word globalisation.   
 
 
GLOBAL AS AN ‘OUTCOME OF GLOBALISATION’  
 
In addition to the above, I identify a second way, in which the contemporary 
adjective global is enmeshed with the ‘globalisation’-discourse. This is that 
the adjective actually gains one of its meanings from this discourse.  
As we saw in the previous chapter, meanings are not naturally attached 
to a linguistic sign. They are also not fixed entities that could be easily 
looked up in a dictionary. Meanings arise and are visible in the use of lan-
guage; they are conventional.  
In the previous chapter, we saw that there are countless of meanings at-
tached to the adjective global. In the following section, I carve out another 
of these countless of meanings that is attached to the contemporary adjective 
global. This carving out is grounded in an empirical exploration of the use 
of the contemporary global. With the help of a selection of concrete exam-
ples, I show that the contemporary adjective global also means ‘outcome of 
globalisation’. Grounded in this observation, I argue that the adjective gains 
one of its meaning from the ‘globalisation’-discourse.  
Let me start my selection of illustrative examples with a familiar case, 
namely Jan Aart Scholte’s Globalization: A Critical Introduction. As we 
saw above, Scholte begins his conceptualisation of the signified of the word 
globalisation by referring to etymological insights into the linguistic signs 
globalisation and global. He suggests that the word globalisation goes back 
to the adjective global, which itself goes back to the noun globe. We noticed 
that what Scholte labels a linguistic ‘tracing’ of the word globalisation is ac-
tually the establishment of a scholarly claim by utilising a selected lexical 
meaning of the word global (which he takes as the supposed radical of 
globalisation) and by building on the widely perceived authority of diction-
aries. Scholte decides to take ‘planetary scale’ as the meaning of the adjec-
tive global in order to claim that the word globalisation refers to ‘planetary 
scale’. This, then, serves as the ground, on which Scholte argues that the 
condition ‘planetary scale’ is a key component of the phenomenon that he 
imagines the word globalisation refers to. In other words, as we saw above, 
Scholte derives a constitutive aspect of his definition of the signified of the 
word globalisation from a meaning of the word global that he picks out 
from a number of codified lexical meanings provided in a selected set of 
dictionaries. Now, what is intriguing about Scholte’s case is not only that he 
utilises etymological insights to establish a scholarly concept. At least as in-
triguing is that, despite the importance he attributes to his theory that global 
means ‘of planetary scale’, he himself does not use the adjective global with 
this meaning. Reading through his body of work and looking carefully at 
how he uses the adjective global brings to light that Scholte’s own applica-
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tion of global encodes something different from what he claims the adjec-
tive ‘really’ encodes (i.e. ‘of planetary scale’). On scrutiny, it becomes ap-
parent that, somewhat curiously, Scholte’s use of the adjective global en-
codes that it is something that is the outcome of ‘globalisation’. The follow-
ing section of his Globalization: A Critical Introduction illustrates my point: 
 
“Talk of ‘globalization’ has become rife among academics, journalists, politicians, 
business people, advertisers and entertainers. Everyday conversation now includes 
regular reference to global markets, global communications, global conferences, 
global threats, the global environment, and so on.” (Scholte 2005: 51; emphasis add-
ed) 
 
Here, Scholte implies that the existence of concepts, which have come to be 
pre-modified with the adjective global, is a manifestation of the “talk of 
‘globalization’”. In other words, Scholte uses the adjective global here as 
encapsulating (whatever is the signified of the word) globalisation. More 
precisely, he uses global to refer to something that is the ‘outcome of glob-
alisation’. 
 As soon as we look beyond Scholte, we realise that he is by no means 
alone in using (as opposed to defining) the adjective global in this way. Re-
viewing all sorts of social and political studies publications shows that this 
is a common usage of the adjective. For example, Mary Kaldor (2003: 1) 
sets out to re-conceptualise ‘civil society’ as ‘global civil society’ and ex-
plains, “[w]hat is new about the concept of civil society since 1989 is glob-
alization”. In other words, what motivates Kaldor to add the adjective global 
to the concept ‘civil society’ is what she associates with the word globalisa-
tion. In a similar vein, Olaf Cramme and Patrick Diamond (2009: 3; empha-
sis added) make clear that by “rethinking social justice in the global age” 
they aim to articulate “a modern conception of social justice that remains 
relevant for an era of rapid globalisation.” Similarly, for Anthony Giddens 
(2007: ix), in his Europe in the Global Age, “the global age” is an age 
shaped by “intensifying globalization”, a process “responsible for those 
changes”, which make the age a “global age”. Equally, for Peter Berger 
(2005: 13), it is the “intense discussion of the phenomenon of globalization” 
that prompts him to speak of ‘global civil society’, rather than just ‘civil so-
ciety’. John Tomlinson (1999: 32) applies the adjective global to the noun 
modernity, i.e. uses the term ‘global modernity’, in order to express “the 
empirical condition” that he refers to with the word globalisation. “One 
clear manifestation of the impact of globalisation in the governance of na-
tions can be seen in the emergence of the global market […]”, suggest 
Tadashi and Ashizawa (2001: 16; emphasis added) and, with that, they too 
use the adjective global as encapsulating the signified of globalisation. 
More precisely, in all of these different cases global means something like 
the ‘outcome of globalisation’.  
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This list of examples from all sorts of contemporary writings could be 
easily extended, for instance with the earlier mentioned Dennis Altman 
(2001: 1), who, in his conception of ‘global sex’, aims to “connect two of 
the dominant preoccupations of current social science and popular debate, 
namely globalization and the preoccupation with sexuality”, and with Brice 
Cossart’s understanding of ‘global history’ as being partly about “focusing 
on the history of globalization” (Cossart 2013: 1). The same kind of use of 
the adjective global is also apparent beyond academic texts. See for instance 
how former BP manager James Krupka (URL) links the adjective global 
with the signified of globalisation: “[w]hether it is the global reach and in-
terconnectedness of BP's business worldwide, […] or the global impact of 
groups like CRS; globalisation is real”; or look at US President George W. 
Bush (2006), who uses the expression “in this global world” for the world 
shaped by “the effects of globalization”: 
 
“I’ll give you an example of the effects of globalization. When India buys more fossil 
fuels, it causes the price of crude oil to go up, which causes our price of gasoline to 
go up. That’s an example of globalization. As these new jobs of the 21st century 
come into being, people are going to hire people with the skill sets. And if our folks 
don’t have the skill sets, those jobs are going to go somewhere else. That’s one of the 
effects of the world in which we live. […] A lot of countries, in trying to be competi-
tive in this global world, are doing the same thing to encourage research and devel-
opment […].” 
 
US President Clinton’s spokesperson, Mike McCurry (Clinton 1998; em-
phasis added), uses global in a similar way in his account of a conversation 
between Clinton and French President Jacques Chirac: 
 
“Other subjects they discussed – the situation in the Asia economy, a fascinating dis-
cussion about globalization and its impact on domestic economies. There’s a 
longstanding and vibrant exchange of views between France and the United States 
about the effects of globalization on our respective economies. And the President 
[…] very much appreciated the opportunity to hear the Prime Minister’s [sic.] think-
ing and to learn more about his views of how global economies can balance the need 
for job creation with the provision of benefits that improve the quality of life for the 
citizens of these global economies.” 
 
Even if we leave the English language and look at the German adjective 
global, we see a similar use of the word, for instance, in German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel’s rhetoric (Merkel 2006). Merkel follows the same logic in 
her use of the adjective when she links the word global with the signified of 
globalisation in an interview in which she elaborates on her argument that 
‘the social market economy requires a regulatory framework’. In this inter-
view, she explains her understanding of the nature of the signified of global-
isation in order to conclude that ‘in a global world it is of course not possi-
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ble that each country develops its own rules’.1 Again, the adjective global is 
applied here to encode something that is an outcome of the phenomenon that 
is associated with the word globalisation. And, going back to the English 
word global, to give a final example, this is the same way the adjective is 
used in Kofi Annan’s report ‘We the Peoples: The Role of the United Na-
tions in the 21st Century’. Annan writes, “[t]his system [of the post-1945 in-
ternational order] worked, and made it possible for globalization to emerge. 
As a result we now live in a global world” (Annan 2000; emphasis added).
  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
My project was triggered by the question what the highly popular use of the 
adjective global in public, political and scholarly discourse implies, if any-
thing interesting at all, and what global actually means. My project was 
shaped by the observation that there is little scholarly engagement with the 
word global in the political studies and IR scholarship and beyond. The 
word is taken as if it was obvious. In this way, it has become ‘invisible’. 
Consequently, the aim of this present chapter and the previous chapter was 
to make the adjective global ‘visible’ to begin with, and to bring it onto the 
scholarly radar. I set out to do this by making the contemporary global 
strange. For this purpose, I highlighted three aspects that I identify as consti-
tuting the contemporary adjective global. First, in the previous chapter, I 
suggested global is popular and free. Second, I pointed out that it is, in a 
somewhat paradoxical way, ‘disputedly undisputed’. Finally, in this present 
chapter, I demonstrated that global is closely enmeshed with the ‘globalisa-
tion’-discourse, where I understand ‘globalisation’-discourse to be the re-
production of a distinct web of meanings through utterances, which contain 
the word globalisation.  
 In the above sections, I developed this latter point by illustrating that 
global is used by commentators as a tool to establish their idea of ‘globalisa-
tion’. At the same time, I showed that the contemporary global gains one of 
its meanings from the ‘globalisation’-discourse. This is evident in the fact 
that global is used (though not necessarily defined) these days to denote 
‘outcome of globalisation’.  
                                                    
1 Merkel (2006; emphasis added): “Weil sich durch die Globalisierung die Mobili-
tät und die Reaktionsgeschwindigkeit des Kapitals im Vergleich zur Arbeit mas-
siv erhöht hat. Das ist ein neuer Trend, der auch eine der Ursachen dafür ist, dass 
die Menschen gar nicht mehr verstehen, was heute eigentlich die Maßstäbe von 
Erfolg und Misserfolg sind. Denn das, was sie überblicken, ihre Arbeit, ist nur 
noch ein Teil der Wertschöpfung, während ein großer und zunehmender anderer 
Teil Bedingungen unterworfen ist, auf die eine einzelne Volkswirtschaft, so auch 
Deutschland, immer weniger Einfluss nehmen kann. […] In einer globalen Welt 
ist es natürlich nicht möglich, dass jedes Land seine eigenen Regeln macht.” 
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 Moving on from this observation, I want to finalise my attempt to re-
move the cloak of invisibility, under which the adjective global has been 
hidden, and conclude this chapter by conceptualising the contemporary 
global as a ‘new word’.  
 
Global as a ‘new word’ 
What makes a word a ‘new word’? Sara Tulloch, editor of The Oxford Dic-
tionary of New Words: A Popular Guide to Words in the News, suggests this 
“is a question which can never be answered satisfactorily, any more than 
one can answer the question ‘How long is a piece of string?’” (Tulloch 
1991: v). There is not one ultimate and objective criterion that makes a word 
a ‘new word’. The question when it is useful and meaningful to call a word 
‘new’ is inevitably a question of context and scholarly reasoning and deci-
sion.  
 Most obviously, a word is reasonably acknowledged as ‘new’ if it con-
stitutes a new lexem, such as the recently invented words metrosexual or 
crowdsourcing. Words can also be usefully called ‘new’ if their sense is 
‘new’, i.e. if a lexem that used to refer to one thing, e.g. to a male honey 
bee, has come to be used also to refer to another thing, e.g. to an unmanned 
aerial vehicle, like in the case of the word drone;2 or if a company/product 
name is used to refer to the activity of searching the Internet for information, 
as it is the case with the verb googling. But there are also infinitely more in-
stances, in which it makes sense to speak of ‘new’ words. Tulloch (1991: v), 
for instance, applies the following criterion in her The Oxford Dictionary of 
New Words: 
 
“a new word is any word, phrase, or meaning that came into popular use in English 
or enjoyed a vogue during the eighties and early nineties. [...] the deciding factor has 
been whether or not the general public was made aware of the word or sense during 
the eighties and early nineties.” 
 
Lexicographer Orin Hargraves (2004: viii), in turn, suggests more generally 
that a word is usefully called ‘new’ if there is “something genuinely innova-
tive about the word hitherto unnoted in dictionaries”. He suggests applying 
the following criteria in the ‘search’ for ‘new words’:   
 
“Has the word escaped a relatively narrow field of usage, such as youth slang or trade 
jargon, to enjoy more general currency? Is the word likely to enjoy continuing cur-
                                                    
2 Following Zaloga (in Mehta 2013), the use of the word drone to refer to an un-
manned aerial vehicle (UAV) dates back to 1935, when the US used UAVs for 
gunnery practice. As Zaloga explains, the word drone was chosen to refer to the-
se UAVs in reference to the British Royal Navy’s system with the same function 
that was called DH 82B Queen Bee (see Selchow 2015: 58). 
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rency, or does it designate a fad or phenomenon that will probably no longer need a 
word for next year.” (ibid.) 
 
In Chapter 2, we saw that the adjective global has had a long dictionary life. 
Adding to this, over the course of its life, global has also been explicitly 
perceived as a ‘new word’ three times. Hence, my move to recognise global 
as a ‘new word’ is not without precedent. In the three instances, in which the 
adjective had been acknowledged as ‘new’, this was done on the grounds 
that global had gained a noteworthy meaning that, using Hargraves’s words 
from above, had remained “hitherto unnoted in dictionaries” (ibid.). The 
three instances, in which global was acknowledged as a ‘new word’, were in 
1954 and 1955 with regard to the sense of ‘worldwide’ and in 1991 in light 
of the adjective’s use in environmental discourses.  
In 1954 A. M. Macdonald (1954: 94) finds,  
 
“[p]erhaps, the most significant of all new words in English is the adjective global: 
war, strategy, problems of food and other necessities, are no longer regional but 
world-wide.” 
 
A year later Mary Reifer (1995), too, takes up global as a ‘new word’ in her 
Dictionary of New Words. The ‘new’ sense that she identifies the adjective 
global had acquired by 1955 is: “[p]ertaining to a strategic or political view 
which includes the whole world in its scope” (Reifer 1955: 93). Both in-
stances bring us back to Chapter 2 because they seem to be related to the 
peak in the use of the word global that is apparent in the COBUILD Ameri-
can English corpus (ref. Figure 1).  
Not long after global was treated as ‘new’ in the 1950s, it was also taken 
up in the revised edition of H. W. Fowler’s popular A Dictionary of Modern 
English Usage (1965), where it was called a ‘vogue word’. Ernest Gower, 
the editor of Fowler’s A Dictionary of Modern English Usage, explains a 
‘vogue word’ as follows:  
 
“Every now and then a word emerges from obscurity, or even from nothingness or a 
merely potential and not actual existence, into sudden popularity. It is often, but not 
necessarily, one that by no means explains itself to the average man, who has to find 
out its meaning as best he can. His wrestlings with it have usually some effect upon 
it; it does not mean quite what it ought to, but to make up for that it means some 
things that it ought not, by the time he has done with it. […] Ready acceptance of 
vogue words seems to some people the sign of an alert mind; to others it stands for 
the herd instinct and lack of individuality. […] the second view is here taken. […] 
Many, it should be added – perhaps most – are vogue words in particular senses only, 
and are unobjectionable, though liable now to ambiguity, in the senses that belonged 
to them before they attained their vogue.” (Gower 1965: 684) 
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Gowers distinguishes between different kinds of ‘vogue words’ and explains 
that the adjective global is one of the “words owing their vogue to the joy of 
showing that one has acquired them” (ibid. 229). He puts it into one group 
with words such as allergic, ambience, ambivalent, and catalyst, and ex-
plains it as follows:  
 
“The original meaning, now archaic, was globular. Towards the end of the 19th c. it 
acquired a new one: ‘pertaining to or embracing the totality of a number of items, 
categories, or the like’ (OED Supp.). With that meaning it was a useful word, but 
there seems to be a curious attraction in it […] that leads to its misuse for aggregate 
or total, with which it is properly in antithesis. For instance, the compensation paid to 
the coal industry on nationalization was a global figure representing the estimated 
value of the industry as a whole, to be apportioned among its constituent units, not an 
aggregate figure arrived at by adding together the estimated values of the several 
units. Global, moreover, seeking wider fields, has now established itself unnecessari-
ly but firmly, as a synonym for what we used to call world-wide. Mondial is also 
available for writers who dislike both words.” (ibid.) 
 
The third ‘discovery’ of global as a ‘new word’ after 1954 and 1955 took 
place in 1991 in the above mentioned The Oxford Dictionary of New Words: 
A Popular Guide to Words in the News, compiled by Sarah Tulloch. The 
Oxford Dictionary of New Words sets out to “provide an informative and 
readable guide to about two thousand high-profile words and phrases which 
have been in the news during the past decade” (Tulloch 1991: v). The new 
meaning of global is described here as one that has appeared in “environ-
mental jargon”:    
 
“global […] adjective In environmental jargon: relating to or affecting the Earth as 
an ecological unit. Used especially in: global consciousness […]; global warming 
[…].” (ibid. 133; emphasis in the original)  
 
In concluding this chapter and my initial engagement with the adjective 
global, I suggest that we understand the contemporary global again as a 
‘new word’ – for the fourth time after 1954, 1955 and 1991.  
My move to call the contemporary global a ‘new word’ has two differ-
ent purposes. On the one side, it is a scholarly decision with the aim of 
drawing attention to the widely overlooked word global and, with that, to 
free it from its dominating environment by establishing it as something to 
look at, namely a ‘new word’. It is a final move to free the adjective global 
of the shadow of the word globalisation and the concept ‘globalisation’, in 
which it has come to be ‘locked up’. We saw this in the above provided 
overview of how the adjective global is used by scholars to establish ideas 
of ‘globalisation’. Given the general nature of proclamations of something 
as ‘new’, the scholarly decision to call something ‘new’, like “new wars” 
(Kaldor 2006[1999]), “new terrorism” (Neumann 2009), or, in fact, ‘new 
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word’, is a strategic move that problematises this respective ‘something’ in 
contrast to existing perceptions and understandings of it, and, as such, inevi-
tably provokes critical attention.   
On the other side, my move to call the contemporary global a ‘new 
word’ has the purpose of highlighting that there is, indeed, something ‘new’, 
in the sense of distinct and, using Hargraves’ words from above again, 
“hitherto unnoted” (Hargraves 2004: viii) about the contemporary global. 
This is the new meaning, with which the adjective is used these days, name-
ly ‘outcome of globalisation’.  
In and of itself, and especially if one is not a linguist, the discovery of 
the ‘new’ meaning of the contemporary adjective global is not more nor less 
interesting than the acknowledgment of all the various other meanings the 
word is used with, which I pointed out in Chapter 2. And yet, it makes the 
adjective global interesting because it forces us to think about the distinct 
relationship between global and the ‘globalisation’-discourse, which it im-
plies, and, ultimately, about the nature of the ‘globalisation’-discourse: 
Above, we saw that the adjective global is naturally locked into the 
shadow of ‘globalisation’, i.e. into the shadow of the web of meanings that 
is re-produced through utterances, which contain the word globalisation. 
This is because global is taken as the natural “pedigree” of the word global-
isation; Scholte’s (2005: 50) use of the word global illustrated this point. 
We saw that the adjective global is considered as and treated like something 
that comes from ‘outside’ into the ‘globalisation’-discourse. However, 
grounded in my above sketched insights into the enmeshment of the adjec-
tive global with the ‘globalisation’-discourse, in general, and, in particular, 
the realisation that the adjective has come to be used these days with the 
meaning ‘outcome of globalisation’, I argue that, in actual fact, the relation-
ship between the contemporary global and globalisation is best to be 
thought of the other way around. I argue what is distinct about the contem-
porary global is that it cannot be thought of anymore as independent of and 
existing outside the ‘globalisation’-discourse. The contemporary global is 
inextricably enmeshed with the ‘globalisation’-discourse, i.e. with the re-
production of a distinct web of meanings through utterances, which contain 
the word globalisation.     
In this sense, I partly confirm the intuition of those commentators, men-
tioned in Chapter 2, who criticise the adjective global, grounded in the sus-
picion that it is part of the talk about ‘globalisation’ and, as such, part of a 
hegemonic Northern and capitalist discourse. Grounded in my above analy-
sis, I agree with these commentators and confirm that the contemporary 
global is interlinked inextricably with the ‘globalisation’-discourse. Yet, as I 
unfold in the following chapters, this means something more complex and 
intriguing than that the use of the adjective global fosters a Northern neolib-
eral discourse of open markets. This is because ‘globalisation’, i.e. the web 
of meanings that is re-produced in the ‘globalisation’-discourse, is some-
thing more complex than a world shaped by widespread market integration. 
68 | THE NEGOTIATION OF THE “NEW WORLD” 
 
As I will argue in the following Chapter 4, the ‘globalisation’-discourse is 
about the reproduction of a web of meanings called ‘new world’. It is this 
distinct nature of the ‘globalisation’-discourse that makes it intriguing and 
that makes the discovered enmeshment of the adjective global with the 
‘globalisation’-discourse noteworthy.  
For now, I conclude my reflection on the word global in this present and 
the previous chapters by introducing the adjective as a ‘new word’ that is 
inextricably interlinked with the ‘globalisation’-discourse. This insight and 
the fact that it is a popular and free word, which leads a ‘disputedly undis-
puted’ shadow existence, while simultaneously serving an important role in 
the re-production of the web of meanings commonly called ‘globalisation’, 
leads me to argue that, contrary to what seems to be the widespread concep-
tion among the majority of scholars, the contemporary global is worthy of 
being taken seriously. There is something intriguing about this adjective. It 
is not enough to “assume that we are reasonably clear about what is meant 
by ‘global’” (Berger 2005: 11).  
      
  
 
4 The ‘Globalisation’-Discourse and           
the ‘New World’ 
 
Globalization is an idea whose time has 
come.  
DAVID HELD, ANTHONY MCGREW, DAVID 
GOLDBLATT AND JONATHAN PERRATON 
(2003: 1) 
 
It is always possible that one might speak 
the truth in the space of a wild exteriority, 
but one is ‘in the true’ only by obeying the 
rules of a discursive ‘policing’ which one 
has to reactivate in each of one’s discours-
es.  
MICHEL FOUCAULT (1981: 60) 
 
 
In the previous two chapters, I focused on the contemporary adjective glob-
al. I concluded these chapters by conceptualising global as a ‘new word’. 
What is ‘new’ about the contemporary global and what makes it intriguing, 
I argued, is that it is inextricably interlinked with the ‘globalisation’-
discourse.  
This brings me to the issue of the ‘globalisation’-discourse. Above, I ex-
plained that I use the term ‘globalisation’-discourse to refer to the re-
production of a distinct web of meanings through utterances, which contain 
the word globalisation. This requires explication and substantiation. In this 
chapter, I focus on what I mean by ‘globalisation’-discourse.  
I start by providing a brief reflection on how I use the word discourse. 
This includes a discussion of what is distinct about my conception ‘globali-
sation’-discourse, in contrast to other uses of this term, such as in Hay 
(2008), Hay and Rosamond (2002), Hay and Smith (2005), and Rosamond 
(1999). Moving on from this and interpreting Nick Bisley’s overview of the 
development of the concept ‘globalisation’ (Bisley 2007), I sketch a picture 
of the ‘life’ of what I call the ‘globalisation’-discourse. Following this dia-
chronic sketch, I zoom in to provide a more detailed and nuanced picture of 
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the ‘globalisation’-discourse. In this context, I identify and discuss five fac-
ets that characterise it.  
One of these facets is that the idea ‘new world’ plays an important and, I 
argue, constitutive role in the life of this discourse. It was the notion that the 
breakdown of the bipolar bloc system at the end of the 1980s and beginning 
of the 1990s brought about a ‘new world’, which gave birth to the ‘globali-
sation’-discourse. I argue that it was the conceptual vacuum, which this 
event produced, that allowed the neologism globalisation to enter the lan-
guage and enabled idea/s called ‘globalisation’ to come to be “in the true” 
(Foucault 1981: 61). 
 This latter point serves as the ground for the argument that forms the 
centre of this chapter. I propose to understand the ‘globalisation’-discourse 
as the re-production of a web of meanings through utterances, which contain 
the word globalisation, that is usefully labelled ‘new world’. In other words, 
I argue that the use of the word globalisation, no matter in which context 
and in which sense it is used, constitutes the re-production of a web of 
meanings that brings out an object that is best called ‘new world’.   
 
 
CLARIFICATION OF THE WORD DISCOURSE 
 
As Helge Schalk (in Landwehr 2009: 16; my own translation) puts it, “the 
word discourse has come to be a vogue word, the enigmatic meaning of 
which makes it almost impossible to define it exhaustively”. Dealing with 
the word discourse is not made easier by the fact that it is not exclusively an 
academic concept but also appears in everyday language. In the English lan-
guage, there is a common understanding of discourse as ‘conversation’. In 
the German language, the noun Diskurs is usually associated with the idea 
of a publicly discussed issue, a specific chain of argumentation, or a state-
ment of a politician or other kind of official representative; it is rarely used 
in everyday language. In French and other Romanic languages, the word 
discourse is commonly associated with the idea of a lecture, an academic 
speech, or homily (for the above see Keller 2004).  
A prominent use of the word discourse in the political studies and IR 
scholarship are instances, in which Jürgen Habermas’ concept is denoted. 
Habermas’ concept ‘discourse’ plays a central role in theories of delibera-
tive politics and democracy (especially Habermas 1992). It is a normative 
concept, which is linked to a distinct form of communicative action, juxta-
posed with ‘ordinary communicative action’. As Martin Nonhoff (2004: 67) 
explains, in essence, ‘discourse’ is Habermas’ answer to the question of how 
moral statements need to be legitimised so that they are accepted as ‘good’ 
and ‘reasonable’ and, consequently, as ‘true’. For Habermas, ‘discourse’ 
stands for a rational and pre-conditioned way of communicating. It is a pro-
cess of regulated argumentation that opens the chance of tracing ‘truth’ and 
the ‘validity’ of statements. It is the institutionally secured spheres and pro-
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cedures of ‘discourses’ that are taken in his theory as providing the oppor-
tunity to reach rational (political) decisions.1   
In talking about the ‘globalisation’-discourse I do not use the word dis-
course in a Habermasian sense. Rather, I use it in the way, in which it is 
used in the social scientific scholarship that acknowledges, in one way or 
other, “that the relationship between human beings and the world are medi-
ated by means of collectively created symbolic meaning systems or orders 
of knowledge” (Keller 2013: 2). In this vein, I do not refer to an ontological 
object when I use the word discourse (see Keller quoted in Landwehr 2009: 
21). A ‘discourse’ does not exist as such, waiting to be unveiled through 
(textual) analysis of the right data corpus (see Landwehr 2009: 20). Rather, 
the word discourse, as it is used here, is to be understood as an analytic tool 
that is applied by a second order-observer. As Landwehr (ibid.) stresses, to 
apply the concept ‘discourse’ implies and expresses the presumption that a 
                                                    
1 At the core of this thinking is the assumption that the human communicative 
competence implies four validity claims (Geltungsansprüche) (see Habermas 
1976: 176). These validity claims are implicit in every speech act of communica-
tive action as they are mutually expected by the communicative partners of the 
speech act. Although the four validity claims are always mutually expected in 
ordinary communicative action, they are normally not explicit subjects of speech 
acts. As soon as they do become subject to the discussion, in other words, as 
soon as the communication becomes problematic in that the validity claims are 
questioned and the ordinary communicative action gets distorted, the level of 
‘discourse’ is entered. ‘Discourses’, accordingly, deal retrospectively (one can 
say as an interruption of ordinary communicative action) with the question of if 
and how the specific communicative action can be justified. Habermas distin-
guishes between two main forms of ‘discourses’: ‘theoretical discourse’ on the 
one hand, and ‘practical discourse’ on the other hand (see Habermas 1984a: esp. 
23). While the ‘theoretical discourse’ is understood as addressing questions of 
truth (Habermas 1981a: 39), the ‘practical discourse’ addresses social norms 
(ibid.). Both forms of ‘discourses’ aim to reach an intersubjective consensus ba-
sed on rational and reflexive argumentation. Like the communicative action, Ha-
bermas’ ‘discourses’ too are subject to an (presumed) idealization (see further 
Habermas 1984a: esp. 23). This idealization is what he conceptualises as the 
‘ideal speech situation’ which, to simplify the complexity of the issue, holds that 
there is equal opportunity for participating in the communication and that power 
relations that might exist outside the discourse are irrelevant; he speaks of a 
‘power free discourse’ (herrschaftsfreier Diskurs) (for a formulation of the four 
concrete conditions of the ‘ideale Sprechsituation’ see Habermas 1984: 177pp). 
Given these conditions, Habermas sees it as being guaranteed that, in a ‘power 
free discourse’, the better argument ‘succeeds’. For this brief overview I relied 
on my reading of Habermas‘ referenced original texts, as well as on Held (1980: 
espec. 247-350), Nonhoff (2004: 66-70), Strecker and Schaal (2001), and Krall-
mann and Ziemann (2001: 281-307). 
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network of meanings disciplines what is thinkable, sayable and doable in a 
distinct historical moment. In this sense, ‘discourse’ indicates a distinct ap-
proach to the social world, rather than constituting a pre-existing object of 
study.   
In the broadest sense, this meaning of the word discourse springs off 
Michel Foucault’s work and the many discussions and extensions of it that 
continue to proliferate in the social scientific literature (see, for instance, the 
many different contributions in Angermüller et al 2014; also in Kerchner 
and Schneider 2006).  
Foucault’s notion ‘discourse’ arises from his investigation of the devel-
opment of what he calls ‘human sciences’. By ‘human sciences’, he refers to 
all those sciences that are in one way or other concerned with human beings 
and their actions. As outlined in The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault 
(1972: 156) considers these sciences, firstly, as being situated in a specific 
historical context, and, secondly, as being a conglomerate of ‘statements’ 
which belong to one specific system. Based on these two general claims he 
develops his idea ‘discourse’.2 With the word discourse Foucault refers to, 
on the one side, concrete historical formations of the production of 
knowledge and meaning. On the other side, the word refers to specific struc-
tures and dynamics that can be described in an abstract way.  
As he points out, ‘discourses’ are constituted by linguistic signs. Yet, 
these signs are not to be understood as simply referring to any kind of refer-
ent (objects, subjects, relations etc). Rather, they have a discursive function, 
which means they ‘produce’ these referents. Producing references does not 
mean that a material referent is actually ‘produced’ – it means that the lin-
guistic signs within these formations of statements (in other words, within 
‘discourses’) ascribe meanings to these referents and with that make them 
accessible in the first place (see ibid. 74). Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rab-
inow (1982: 86pp) elaborate on this aspect of Foucault’s theory and point 
out that, consequently, his notion of ‘discourse’ must not be understood as 
an entity of signs. Rather, discourses are processes, in which the linkage be-
tween sequences of signs and referents leads to the actual production of the-
se referents – or, more precisely, to the production of the meanings of these 
referents. This is what I meant in the previous chapter when I spoke of the 
‘object’ that the ‘globalisation’-discourse produces.   
Building on this, and in the context of his interest in ‘human sciences’, 
Foucault intends to show that forms of knowledge are actually productions 
of discourses and not natural, a priori given entities. Discourses “systemati-
cally form the objects of which they speak”, he argues (Foucault 1972: 49). 
A discourse constitutes  
                                                    
2 In addition to my reading of the referenced works by Foucault, I build for the 
above and in the following on Andersen (2003), Dreyfuss and Rabinow (1982), 
Keller (2004, 2013), Kerchner and Schneider (2006), Landwehr (2009), Nonhoff 
(2004), and Nullmeier (2001). 
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“its object and work[s] it to the point of transforming it altogether. So that the prob-
lem arises of knowing whether the unity of a discourse is based not so much on the 
permanence and uniqueness of an object as on the space in which various objects 
emerge and are continuously transformed.” (ibid. 32) 
 
A closer look at Foucault’s differentiation between ‘statement’ and ‘utter-
ance’, and, what can be called, ‘referent’, helps to further grasp the essence 
of his understanding of ‘discourse’.3 ‘Statement’ differs from his idea of ‘ut-
terance’. An ‘utterance’ is a single event, in which linguistic signs are inter-
linked with each other. In other words, an ‘utterance’ takes place within a 
single, specific context. A ‘statement’, on the other side, stands, as it were, 
for a specific function of ‘utterances’. It can be detected in ‘utterances’ 
(Foucault 1972). This does not mean that one can automatically find a 
‘statement’ in every ‘utterance’. Rather, a ‘statement’ (in other words, a 
specific function of ‘utterance’) evolves when the respective connection of 
signs (in other words, ‘utterance’) is related to a ‘referent’. Again, as men-
tioned above and as Foucault explains in The Archaeology of Knowledge, a 
‘referent’ must not be misunderstood as a fixed, a priori existing ‘object’ or 
‘fact’. Rather, a ‘referent’ is the laws / orders / rules, which permit and re-
strict the ways in which ‘objects’ and ‘facts’ are related to each other, and, 
consequently, which ultimately permit and restrict the ways in which ‘ob-
jects’ and ‘facts’ are (‘allowed’ to be) understood in the first place. Every 
‘utterance’, then, the ‘statement’ of which does not confirm the rules, is au-
tomatically questioned, if not automatically rejected.  
By taking Gregor Mendel’s theory of hereditary traits as an example, 
Foucault (1981: 59-60) illustrates the nature of this rejection and the relation 
between ‘discourse’ and ‘truth’. While Gregor Mendel’s theory of heredi-
tary traits is today a well-accepted and well-established scientific insight, 
and, indeed, while one can wonder with Foucault (ibid. 60) “how the bota-
nists or biologists of the nineteenth century managed not to see that what 
Mendel was saying was true”, it was dismissed by biologists for a long time. 
This was due to the fact that although Mendel “spoke the truth, […] he was 
not ‘within the true’ of the biological discourse of his time” (ibid. 61).  
 
“It is always possible that one might speak the truth in the space of a wild exteriority, 
but one is ‘in the true’ only by obeying the rules of a discursive ‘policing’ which one 
has to reactivate in each of one’s discourses.” (ibid.) 
 
As Niels Akerstrom Andersen (2003: 3) puts it, with this understanding of 
‘utterance’ Foucault “challenges individual will and reason by showing how 
every utterance is an utterance within a specific discourse to which certain 
rules of acceptability apply”. These rules are being approved, questioned 
and / or changed at the level of ‘statements’. Yet, as soon as ‘objects’ and 
                                                    
3 For the following paragraph see Nonhoff (2004: 71-72). 
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‘facts’ are regularly reproduced within functions of ‘utterances’ (in other 
words, within ‘statements’) they are more and more readily confirmed. They 
establish and cement a distinct (view of an) ‘object’. More precisely, they 
establish a ‘legitimised’ stock of knowledge. These networks of ‘statements’ 
are what Foucault (1972: 31-39) calls ‘discursive formations’. Within ‘dis-
cursive formations’, legitimate knowledge comes into being, develops and 
becomes established. However, despite the fact that they produce what ap-
pears to be a stable constellation, ‘discursive formations’ are, of course, not 
stable or fixed entities as such. On the one side, as Martin Nonhoff (2004: 
72) notes, with reference to Michel Pecheux, it is surprising that the natural 
unpredictability of the flow of ‘statements’ enables the development of rela-
tively stable structures. On the other side, Foucault recognises this unpre-
dictability as the reason or foundation for social procedures that restrict the 
‘unhindered’ use of language. These are, for instance, manifest in the re-
striction of access to privileged, in the sense of discursively accepted speak-
ing positions, which he describes in The Order of Discourse (1981). These 
restricting procedures, in turn, help to stabilise the ‘discursive formations.’ 
They stabilise what is (perceived to be) ‘natural’ and ‘normal’ which, in 
turn, has disciplining effects because, clearly, “to question the normal and 
natural is to invite marginalisation, ridicule, condemnation, or even punish-
ment” (Hoffman and Knowles quoted in Nadoll 2000: 16).   
The above provides a general account of some of the premises, which 
underlie the concept ‘discourse’ that has come to be popular in parts of the 
social sciences. To be clear, there is no single research field on ‘discourse’. 
These premises have been amended, critically rewritten and translated by 
scholars into different research programmes, research agendas and method-
ologies (again, see, for instance, the diverse contributions in Angermüller et 
al 2014 and Kerchner and Schneider 2006; also Keller et al 2004, 2004a).  
In Chapter 6, I come back to these premises and amend them for my 
own purposes. For the time being, however, the above is sufficient to pro-
vide a general sense of the ideas and presumptions that surround my use of 
the word discourse. On this ground, I return to what I mean by ‘globalisa-
tion’-discourse.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, I use the term ‘globalisation’-
discourse to refer to the re-production of a distinct web of meanings through 
utterances, which contain the word globalisation. Referring to the above, 
this web of meanings that is re-produced through utterances, which contain 
the word globalisation, does not mirror but is social reality, in the sense that 
it brings out its ‘object’, namely in this case ‘globalisation’. Putting it the 
other way around, I conceptualise every use of the word globalisation, no 
matter in which thematic context, as a contribution to the re-production of a 
distinct web of meanings, that, for the time being, I call ‘globalisation’.   
Despite being generally committed to the above sketched ‘discourse’-
concept, in my phraseology that the ‘globalisation’-discourse is the re-
production of a distinct web of meanings through utterances which contain 
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the word globalisation, I initially take inspiration from Böke et al (2000). 
Yet, while they conceptualise the ‘migration’-discourse as a “web of the-
matically linked statements, which are manifest in texts” (ibid. 12; transla-
tion my own; emphasis added). I initially conceptualise the ‘globalisation’-
discourse not based on any thematic commonalities but based on a linguistic 
commonality, namely based on the appearance of the word globalisation. 
With that, my concept ‘globalisation’-discourse also differs from ideas, 
which those IR scholars hold, who speak explicitly, in one way or other, of 
‘globalisation discourses’, such as, Hay (2008), Hay and Marsh (2000), Hay 
and Rosamond (2002), Hay and Smith (2005), and Rosamond (1999). These 
scholars grasp distinct thematic debates with the term ‘globalisation dis-
course’. They identify these debates as ‘globalisation discourses’ based on 
their pre-set idea of the signified of the word globalisation. This is usually 
an idea of ‘globalisation’ as “heightened economic integration and interde-
pendence” (Hay and Smith 2005: 124).  
In comparison, my concept ‘globalisation’-discourse grasps more than 
that. As we will see in the following sections, my concept takes seriously 
that the word globalisation – just like the adjective global – is highly poly-
semic. Globalisation “means different things to different people” (van Aelst 
and Walgrave 2002: 467). Hence, conceptualising the ‘globalisation’-
discourse in the way I do here, allows me to capture all the different uses of 
the word globalisation with all its different meanings, and take these uses as 
constituting one web of meanings that brings out its object ‘globalisation’. 
What this object ‘globalisation’ is, then – i.e. what the web of meanings is 
about that is re-produced through utterances, which contain the word global-
isation – is not pre-set by me in a definitional move through the application 
of a pre-set definition, such as ‘heightened economic integration and inter-
dependence’. Rather, it is something to be analytically carved out from a 
study of these utterances that apply the word globalisation and from an 
analysis of the way they interact in bringing out this ‘object’ ‘globalisation’.  
As mentioned above, eventually, at the end of this chapter, I suggest that 
we label this symbolically produced object ‘globalisation’ with the term 
‘new world’. Before reaching this point, however, I provide a sketch of the 
‘globalisation’-discourse through a brief diachronic view at its ‘life’, as well 
as, a more nuanced account of its nature and five facets that I identify as 
shaping it.  
 
 
A BRIEF HISTORY
 OF THE
 
‘GLOBALISATION’- DISCOURSE  
 
“Globalization is an idea whose time has come” – this is how David Held 
and his colleagues open their study Global Transformations (Held, 
McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton 2003: 1). In his seminal work Agendas, Al-
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ternatives and Public Policies public policy analyst John Kingdon 
(2003[1984: 1) observes that  
 
“[t]he phrase ‘an idea whose time has come’ captures a fundamental reality about an 
irresistible movement that sweeps over our politics and society, pushing aside every-
thing that might stand in its path.” 
 
Although Kingdon writes in a different context and well before the neolo-
gism globalisation gained ground,4 his claim aptly captures the rise of the 
popularity of the word globalisation and the birth and rise to prominence of 
what I call the ‘globalisation’-discourse. As Scholte (2005: 14) puts it, “[i]t 
is today pretty much impossible to avoid the issue” of ‘globalisation’; it has 
reached a “status somewhat below that of motherhood and apple pie”, finds 
Ian Clark (1999: 35).  
Nick Bisley (2007: 12-16) provides a short and compelling overview of 
the life of what he understands as the concept ‘globalisation’. In the follow-
ing, I reformulate Bisley’s elaborations in a subtle but meaningful way as I 
read them as providing insights into the life and nature of what I take as the 
‘globalisation’-discourse. In particular, when Bisley speaks of ‘understand-
ings of globalisation’, I use expressions such as ‘the use of the word globali-
sation’ and ‘the signified of the word globalisation’. Arguably, this makes 
my account sound less smooth. Yet, it is an important measure because it 
acknowledges that there are various different ideas of social and political 
phenomena associated with the word globalisation. Referring to what I 
sketched above, ‘globalisation’ does not exist as such, despite the fact that it 
is common practice to take it as if it was simply a ‘thing’ ‘out there’. Rather, 
‘globalisation’ is the object that is produced in the ‘globalisation’-discourse.            
To begin with, following Bisley (2007: 11), we find that ideas, which 
are referred to with the word globalisation, “appeared to flower rather sud-
denly in the early 1990s” and it is only since then that – I am paraphrasing 
the above quoted Kingdon – they have ‘swept over our politics and society’, 
capturing the public, political and academic imagination with “a remarkable 
forcefulness”, as Bisley (ibid. 12) puts it.  
Building on Bisley’s account and re-interpreting it for my purposes here, 
the ‘globalisation’-discourse can be seen to have developed in five main 
phases.  
In the first phase, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, scholars, such as 
Anthony Giddens (1990) in sociology, Kenichi Ohmae (1990) in business 
studies and James N. Rosenau (1990) in International Relations, started to 
use the word globalisation to argue that the world was experiencing devel-
opments, which resulted in distinct socio- and economic-structural trans-
formations. As Bisley (2007: 12) explains, although “earlier work had iden-
                                                    
4 Kingdon investigates the question why certain public policy issues make it onto 
the US policy agenda and others not. 
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tified developments that we now associate with globalization”, it was this 
diverse group of scholars at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 
1990s that made the point explicit. The ‘globalisation’-discourse, as I under-
stand it, was born. Over the 1990s, the word globalisation became a “talis-
manic term, a seemingly unavoidable reference point for discussions about 
our contemporary situation” (Low and Barnett 2000: 54).5  
In the second phase of its development, which took place in the first half 
of the 1990s, the ‘globalisation’-discourse was subject to institutionalisation 
within the academy. “[I]mportant debates in core areas of concern (for ex-
ample, integration in economics, sovereignty and the state in IR, and mo-
dernity in sociology)” started to take place (Bisley 2007: 13). In this phase, 
the ‘globalisation’-discourse – the re-production of a distinct web of mean-
ings through utterances, which contain the word globalisation – came to be 
shaped in particular by economic interpretations of the world. As Bisley 
(ibid.) puts it, these interpretations “cemented the idea of a truly global eco-
nomic system that influences the success of the world’s states and societies 
in the popular imagination”. Furthermore, an understanding that “the social 
realm is in the midst of a broad-ranging transformation” (ibid.) was rein-
forced through a handful of works in this institutionalised context, such as 
the writings by the earlier mentioned Martin Albrow (1996) and the above 
discussed Scholte (1993). Notably, interpreting Bisley’s insights, it was at 
                                                    
5 This does not mean that the word globalisation was not used before the 1990s. In 
his Begriffsgeschichte of ‘globalisation’ Bach (2013: 93) finds that the sociolo-
gist Paul Meadow uses the word globalisation in a 1951-article on the “new cul-
ture pattern” that results from “industrialism” (Meadows 1951: 11). Bach (2013: 
94) also points to IR-scholar Trygve Mathisen, who applies the word in his 
Methodology in the Study of International Relations in 1959, and to Inis Claude’s 
1965-use of globalisation in an article, in which Claude characterises the UN as 
having “tended to reflect the steady globalization of international relations” 
(Claude 1965: 387). Nick Bisely (2007: 5) refers to George Modelski's 1972 The 
Principles of World Politics as “[o]ne of the earliest references to globalization”. 
And linguist Wolfgang Teubert highlights Theodore Levitt’s use of the word 
globalisation in a 1983-Harvard Business Review article (Levitt 1983) as a par-
ticularly influential, early application of the word (Teubert 2002: 157). As a 
study of the archive of the Public Papers of the US Presidents shows, the first US 
President who uses the word globalisation in his Public Papers was Ronald 
Reagan (1987) in 1987; and a look into the archive of The New York Times re-
veals that it appeared there for the first time in an article in 1974, was then uses 
once in 1981, not at all in 1982 and 1983, appeared again once in 1984. Thereaf-
ter, it experienced a sudden accelerating popularity, reaching a peak in 2000, in 
which 453 separate articles uses the word at least once. An examination of The 
Washington Post provides us with a similar picture, and so does a study of The 
Times (London) and The Guardian. Each of them shows a similar trend in the 
use of the word globalisation. 
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this time that the word globalisation moved from the vocabulary of a hand-
ful of specialists to the language of a wide-range of scholars, policy-makers, 
political commentators and the public. 
The third phase in the life of the ‘globalisation’-discourse was shaped by 
two noteworthy developments. To begin with, debates, in which the neolo-
gism globalisation was used, widened and diversified. Different kinds of 
scepticism were directed towards various arguments that were advanced 
with the help of the word globalisation; the group of these sceptics include 
Philip G. Cerny (1997), Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson (1996), and Mi-
chael Mann (1997). Furthermore, the re-production of the ‘globalisation’-
discourse widened with a shift away from mainly theoretical and conceptual 
contributions towards political arguments that utilised the word globalisa-
tion. “[A]ctivists and scholars began to associate [particular signifieds of the 
word globalisation] with malign forces and to question the motivation of 
those advocating [them]” (Bisley 2007: 15). At the same time, the institu-
tionalisation of the re-production of the ‘globalisation’-discourse moved 
forward through publications such as Global Transformations: Politics, 
Economics and Culture by David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt 
and Jonathan Perraton (2003). These publications were sufficiently influen-
tial as to ‘tame’ the ‘globalisation’-discourse. They were “particularly suc-
cessful in solidifying contemporary understandings of globalization”, as 
Bisley (2007: 15) puts it.  
The trend towards more activist contributions to the re-production of the 
‘globalisation’-discourse that started in the third phase significantly shaped 
the fourth phase in the life of the discourse in the early 2000s (see ibid. 16). 
In this fourth phase, public intellectuals and political activists, such as Jo-
seph Stieglitz and Naomi Klein, entered the re-production of the discourse. 
They used the word globalisation to express concern and critique about var-
ious established stances adopted regarding the interpretation of the state of 
the world. In particular, they voiced concern about the kind of signified of 
the word globalisation that they considered to be responsible for increasing 
global inequality and its consequence of “no space, no choice, no jobs” 
(Klein 2000). 
The current, fifth state of the ‘globalisation’-discourse is shaped by a 
situation, in which the various contributions to its re-production are ground-
ed in and committed to fixed positions. Current contributions to the ‘globali-
sation’-discourse are “less inclined to engage substantively with one anoth-
er”, observes Bisley (2007: 16). This lack of critical engagement with each 
other and across different interpretative stances is particularly remarkable 
because the ‘globalisation’-discourse constitutes an influential aspect of the 
construction of social reality today.  
In general, as John Tomlinson (1999: 2) puts it,  
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“[t]he idea of ‘globalization’ [...] is an extraordinarily fecund concept in its capacity 
to generate speculations, hypotheses and powerful social images and metaphors 
which reach far beyond the bare social facts.” 
 
In particular, the signified of the word globalisation is not only treated as an 
explanandum, i.e. as something that is to be explained, but as an explanans, 
i.e. something that explains all sorts of social phenomena. As such, it is 
closely inscribed in the production of (knowledge about) the contemporary 
world.  
A prime example of the signified of globalisation, understood as some-
thing that is to be explained, can be found in the above mentioned Global 
Transformation: Politics, Economics and Culture by Held, McGrew, Gold-
blatt and Perraton (2003). The authors provide a theoretical and empirical 
account of the various dimensions of what they associate with the word 
globalisation, which is a  
 
“process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organi-
zation of social relations and transactions – assessed in terms of their extensity, inten-
sity, velocity and impact – generating transcontinental or interregional flows and 
networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power.” (Held, McGrew, Gold-
blatt and Perraton 2003: 16) 
 
For an example of an understanding of the signified of globalisation as 
something that explains something, we can turn to Mary Kaldor’s work on 
‘new wars’ (2006[1999]) and her writings on ‘global civil society’ (2003). 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, Kaldor re-conceptualises ‘war’ and ‘civil socie-
ty’ because she understands them to have been changed due to ‘globalisa-
tion’; as quoted above, she argues “[w]hat is new about the concept of civil 
society since 1989 is globalization” (ibid. 1). The signified of the word 
globalisation is taken here as the explanation of changes in ‘war’ and ‘civil 
society’. Another, very different example, in which the signified of globali-
sation is imagined as an explanans, is US President George W. Bush’s 
(2008) understanding of the relationship between energy prices and the eco-
nomic development of China. Bush describes it as “a very interesting and 
important relationship made complex by globalization”. In each of these 
cases it is because of the respective signified of the word globalisation that a 
social phenomenon, such as ‘war’, ‘civil society’ and the relationship be-
tween energy prices and economic development, looks as it looks. As such, 
these examples demonstrate that the ‘globalisation’-discourse is now closely 
inscribed in and takes an influential position in relation to the knowledge-
production about social reality.  
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FOUR FACETS OF THE ‘GLOBALISATION’-DISCOURSE 
 
Above, grounded in an interpretation of Bisley’s history of the concept 
‘globalisation’, I sketched a broad overview of the life of the ‘globalisation’-
discourse, divided into five main phases. In the following, I zoom in and 
have a closer look at the discourse’s re-production. My aim is to provide a 
more nuanced picture of this discourse. I provide an account of the various 
positions, scholarly practices, as well as, understandings of the signified of 
the word globalisation that play into the ‘globalisation’-discourse; to remind 
us, with ‘globalisation’-discourse I mean the re-production of a distinct web 
of meanings through utterances, which contain the word globalisation.  
I suggest there are five facets of the ‘globalisation’-discourse. In this 
present section, I examine four of these five facets. The subsequent section 
focuses on the fifth facet, which is the relevance of the idea ‘new world’. 
This fifth facet is worthy of a deeper discussion; hence, I deal with it in its 
own section. Overall, though, the identified facets of the ‘globalisation’-
discourse are intimately interwoven.      
 
Economic and socio-political ideas of ‘globalisation’ 
To begin with, the ‘globalisation’-discourse, i.e. the re-production of a dis-
tinct web of meanings through utterances, which contain the word globali-
sation, is shaped by two broad understandings of the signified of the word 
globalisation. First, the signified of globalisation is understood as an eco-
nomic phenomenon. Second, it is understood as a socio-political phenome-
non (see Bisley 2007: 21-23).  
Economic conceptions of the signified of globalisation ascribe particular 
significance to the integration of markets and to the consequences of such 
market integration (e.g. Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2000; Wolf 2004). 
The socio-political conception of the signified of the word globalisation 
takes it as a process that changes “the fundamental structure of social life by 
recasting the role that territory plays in organizing social structures, such as 
political institutions or sovereignty” (Bisley 2007: 23). This process is un-
derstood as the result of a “complex interaction of changes in economic, po-
litical and cultural relations” (ibid.). The signified of the word globalisation 
is understood in this conception to be the driving force that changes practic-
es of governance, the nature of statehood and the notion of sovereignty (see 
further ibid.). Seminal works that fall into this second category are the above 
mentioned Held et al (2003), Albrow (1996), Giddens (1990), and Scholte 
(2005). In addition, and related, in this second category, the word globalisa-
tion is also associated with processes that lead to a “sense of cultural frag-
mentation and dislocation” (Featherstone 1995: 1).  
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Transference, transformation and transcendence 
Adding to the above, Jens Bartelson (2000) helps us to distinguish between 
three different kinds of conceptions of the signified of globalisation, which 
play out in the ‘globalisation’-discourse and which, together, constitute the 
second facet of the ‘globalisation’-discourse.  These are: 1. ‘globalisation’ 
understood as being about transference, 2. ‘globalisation’ understood as be-
ing about transformation, and 3. ‘globalisation’ understood as being about 
transcendence.  
In the first conception, the signified of the word globalisation is under-
stood as a process that is shaped by an “intensified transference or exchange 
of things between preconstituted units” (Bartelson 2000: 184). In other 
words, it is understood to be a development that is ‘different in degree’ from 
past developments. The majority of contributions to the ‘globalisation’-
discourse, i.e. the majority of uses of the word globalisation, fall into this 
first category. This is despite the explicit and strong critique that has been 
directed towards such a conception of ‘globalisation’. Critical voices argue 
that an understanding of the signified of globalisation as something that 
merely constitutes a ‘difference in degree’ from past developments makes 
the use of a neologism redundant. It is not clear, these critics argue, why es-
tablished nouns, such as internationalisation, liberalisation, universalisa-
tion, and westernisation, are not sufficient to capture the world in this sense. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Scholte is one of the critics of such a 
use of the word globalisation. He argues that it does not “open insights that 
are not available through pre-existent vocabulary” (Scholte 2005: 54). Go-
ing further, he sees such applications of the word globalisation as instances, 
which turn the word into a buzzword that does not provide any “distinct 
analytical value-added” (ibid.).  
The second of Bartelson’s conceptions refers to a conception of the sig-
nified of the word globalisation that implies the idea of “a process of trans-
formation that occurs at the systems level” (Bartelson 2000: 186; emphasis 
added). The above mentioned work by David Held et al (2003) falls into this 
category, as does Mary Kaldor’s rethinking of the nature of ‘war’ and ‘civil 
society’ (Kaldor 2006[1999], 2003). These works are based on an under-
standing of the signifed of the word globalisation as a contemporary pro-
cess, which implies some sort of transformation of socio-political reality (ei-
ther then taken and discussed as an explanans or explanandum).  
Finally, contributions to the ‘globalisation’-discourse, which fall within 
Bartelson’s third conception, understand the signified of the word globalisa-
tion as a process that accounts for  
 
“the transcendence of those distinctions that together condition unit, system and di-
mension identity. Globalisation is neither inside out nor outside in but rather a pro-
cess that dissolves the divide between inside and outside.” (Bartelson 2000: 189) 
 
82 | THE NEGOTIATION OF THE “NEW WORLD” 
 
Examples of scholarly conceptions of ‘globalisation’ that fall within this 
category include Morten Ougaard and Richard Higgott’s use of the word 
globalisation as an effort to conceptualise a ‘global polity’ (2002) and, in 
general, the various attempts of “pondering postinternationalism”, as they 
are collected in Heidi H. Hobbs (2000). Sociologist Ulrich Beck’s use of the 
word globalisation also falls into this third category (e.g. Beck 2004a).  
In contrast to the first, the latter two categories encode an idea of a world 
‘different in kind’ from the past. These latter two conceptions of the signi-
fied of the word globalisation capture and express the idea that contempo-
rary socio-political reality is subject to essentially innovative and innovating 
changes. As Bartelson (2009: 92) puts it, understood in these two latter 
senses,  
 
“the concept of globalisation has had a destabilizing impact upon the entire array of 
sociopolitical concepts that together constitute the main template of political moder-
nity making their meanings contestable and dissolving the distinctions upon which 
their coherent usage hitherto has rested.” 
 
‘Globalisation’ as a ‘thing’ ‘out there’ 
Despite fundamental differences in terms of the above sketched facets of 
the ‘globalisation’-discourse, the vast majority of contributions to this dis-
course, i.e. the vast majority of uses of the word globalisation, have some-
thing fundamental in common; they share a common approach: they take the 
signified of the word globalisation as a material-structural ‘thing’ ‘out 
there’. This is the third facet that I identify as constituting the ‘globalisa-
tion’-discourse.  
This third facet is readily apparent in common expressions such as “gov-
erning globalization” (e.g. Nayyar 2002; Held and McGrew 2003), “taming 
globalization” (Held and Koenig-Archibugi 2003), “responding to globaliza-
tion” (e.g. Hart and Prakash 2000) and “[h]as globalization gone too far?” 
(Rodrik 1997). These expressions reveal the idea that the signified of the 
word globalisation is something ‘material’ that could be ‘tamed’, ‘gov-
erned’ and ‘responded to’, and that is ‘out there’ to be analysed, grasped and 
investigated. The signified of the word globalisation is taken as something 
that people are confronted with, and, consequently, as something that poses 
the task for scholars to look at and dismantle it.6 Grounded in this premise, 
there are two different approaches to the ‘thing’ ‘globalisation’.  
                                                    
6 For some, like Mary Kaldor (2003), this ‘thing’ ‘globalisation’ is the product of 
social action, and, as such, can be shaped by social actors. For others, like Rich-
ard N. Haass, former Director of Policy Planning for the US Department of State, 
it is something like a second nature: “[G]lobalization is a reality, not a choice. 
‘You can run but you can’t hide’” (Haass and Litan 1988: 6). 
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First, there are those contributors to the ‘globalisation’-discourse, i.e. to 
the re-production of the web of meanings through utterances, which contain 
the word globalisation, who take the position of a ‘first order’-observer and 
investigate the socio-political processes that they associate with the word 
globalisation, such as economic integration, cultural fragmentation, changes 
in governance structures and regimes. These are the many scholars men-
tioned above, who, despite their diverse research interests and foci, repre-
sent the mainstream approach to the signified of the word globalisation.  
Second, there are contributors to the ‘globalisation’-discourse who set 
out to grasp first-order-observers’ ideas of the ‘thing’ ‘globalisation’. These 
commentators are inspired by the conviction that  
 
“[w]hile studies on globalization proliferate, we remain relatively under-informed 
about discourses of globalization and associated issues of power and knowledge.” 
(Hay and Rosamond 2002: 147) 
    
They are interested in the “sorts of knowledge about ‘globalization’” at 
work in policymaking, as Ben Rosamond (1999: 660) puts it. Contributions, 
which fall into this category, are part of a more general trend in the field of 
political studies and IR, in which scholars take seriously in the analysis of 
politics factors such as ideas, world-views and political culture. This trend 
has been labelled the ‘ideational turn’ (e.g. Blyth 2002; Schmidt and Ra-
daelli 2004; also Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). One of the key premises, on 
which this ‘ideational turn’ builds, is the conviction that  
 
“it is the ideas that actors hold about the context in which they find themselves rather 
than the context itself which informs the way in which actors behave” (Hay and Ros-
amond 2002: 148), 
    
or, as Alexander Wendt (1992: 396) famously put it,  
 
“people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that 
the objects have for them.”7 
    
Through their focus on ‘ideas’ these second kinds of contributions to the 
‘globalisation’-discourse constitute a critical counter-weight to the earlier 
sketched mainstream approaches. And, yet, they share with the mainstream 
that they, too, start based on a pre-set idea of the signified of the word glob-
alisation as a ‘thing’ ‘out there’ – except that they focus on idea/s of the re-
spective ‘thing’.  
For instance, as mentioned above, Colin Hay and Ben Rosamond (2002: 
147) are interested in “discourses of globalization and associated issues of 
power and knowledge”. Broadly speaking, they set out to understand  
                                                    
7 I come back to this theory in Chapter 6. 
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“[t]he interpretation of the opportunities and constraints associated with globalization 
and the consequent appeal, in political contexts, to the language of globalization”, 
    
as Colin Hay (2008: 317) puts it in another context (see also Hay 2007; 
Rosamond 1999; Hay and Marsh 2000). In doing this, these scholars pre-set 
the signifier of the word globalisation to be an economic (hyper)force ‘out 
there’ (see Hay 2008). Given that this is their preconception of the signified 
of the word globalisation, they critically explore “the interpretation of the 
opportunities and constraints associated” (ibid.) with the ‘thing’ global eco-
nomic integration and use the word globalisation for this.  
Another example of contributions that set out to analyse idea/s of the 
‘thing’ ‘globalisation’ are the studies in the edited collection Metaphors of 
Globalization (Kornprobst, Pouliot, Shah and Zaiotti 2008). Metaphors of 
Globalization is one of the few existing collections in the field of political 
studies and IR that is explicitly dedicated to an ‘ideational approach’ to 
‘globalisation’. As Jan Aart Scholte (2008: x) writes in his ‘Foreword’: 
 
“The notion that globalization is (at least partly) an ideational construction is not 
new, of course. Various scholars in anthropology, sociology and the humanities have 
always appreciated the global largely in these terms. However, the mainstream of in-
ternational studies has usually approached globalization with the methodological ma-
terialism that underpins most business studies, economics, geography and political 
science. Although constructivism and poststructuralism have over the past decade ac-
quired notable places in the theoretical repertoire of world politics, ideational anal-
yses thus far played relatively little part in international studies research on globaliza-
tion.” 
 
Metaphors of Globalization sets out to fill this gap, starting on the premise 
that “globalization exists through metaphors” (Kornprobst, Pouliot, Shah 
and Zaiotti 2008: 2). On this basis, the contributions in the volume ask “how 
specific metaphysics of meaning emerge through metaphors, and how they 
influence understandings of globalization” (ibid. 2008: 4). The formulation 
of this task, the introductory claim, “[a]s with any aspect of world politics, 
globalization is bound up in metaphors” (Scholte 2008: x; emphasis added), 
as well as the very title of the book ‘metaphors of globalization’ indicate 
that here, too, the signified of the word globalisation is understood as a par-
ticular (pre-set) ‘thing’ ‘out there’ that is wrapped up in metaphors and waits 
to be investigated.  
  
The globalisation-‘debate’ 
The fourth facet, which I identify as constituting the ‘globalisation’-
discourse, was already implied in the above. The word globalisation is used 
by commentators to refer to a wide spectrum of different ‘things’. Yet, de-
spite this diversity, the majority of commentators share the conviction that 
there is a debate about a well-defined phenomenon called ‘globalisation’. In 
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general, this conviction is implied in the very fact that commentators use the 
neologism globalisation to begin with. The use of the word clearly indicates 
that it is perceived to be useful, which, in turn, indicates the conviction that 
there is a common denominator that makes the talk about ‘globalisation’, i.e. 
the use of the word globalisation, meaningful as part of a broader debate. In 
particular, the conviction that there is an identifiable ‘globalisation’-
discourse is implied in the talk about a supposedly well-defined field of 
scholarship and “major new area of academic endeavour” (Scholte 2004: 1), 
called ‘globalisation studies’ (e.g. Appelbaum and Robinson 2005; Mittel-
man 2004; Rupert 2005; Scholte 2004; Taylor 2005), as well as in the argu-
ment that there was a “globalization debate” (Held et al 2003; also Held and 
McGrew 2007a; Busch 2000; Jones 2006; Rodrik 1997a). The argument that 
there was a ‘globalisation debate’ is, for instance, implied in claims that 
there are “[c]ontroversies about the demise of globalization”, as David Held 
and Anthony McGrew (2007b: 1) suggest. In their Globalization Theory 
Held and McGrew (2007a: 2) argue that ‘globalisation’ came to face “hard 
times” in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on the towers of the World 
Trade Center in New York City on 11 September 2001 (9/11). On the one 
side of what they present as ‘the globalisation debate’, Held and McGrew 
identify commentators like Justin Rosenberg (2005: 2), who argue that post-
9/11 socio-political reality is evidence that “‘the age of globalisation’ is un-
expectedly over” (Rosenberg 2005: 2) – it is unexpectedly over for Rosen-
berg because, as he argues, ‘globalisation’ was never more than a “craze”, 
the “zeitgeist of the 1990s” anyway. Consequently, it was only a matter of 
time until the “follies of Globalisation Theory” (Rosenberg 2000) were ex-
posed and the idea ‘globalisation’ was revealed as “the basis for a systemat-
ic misinterpretation of real-world events” (Rosenberg 2005: 10). This was 
finally realised, commentators like Rosenberg argue, in the face of post-9/11 
socio-political developments because, as political analyst John Gray (2001: 
27) declares, developments in post-9/11-world politics in general and in US 
(foreign) policy in particular are more of “an exercise in realpolitik in which 
ideas of global governance of the kind that have lately been fashionable on 
the left become largely irrelevant.” On the other side of this perceived 
‘globalisation debate’, Held and McGrew (2007b: 10) see commentators 
like themselves, who assert that “obituaries for globalization […] are […] 
somewhat premature.”   
On close scrutiny, these ‘globalisation debates’ and ‘controversies’ 
about the existence of ‘globalisation’ are everything but genuine ‘debates’ 
or ‘controversies’. This is simply because, as Colin Hay (2007: 723) puts it, 
“protagonists in the same globalization debate repeatedly talk past one an-
other.  They talk about different things” – while all using the same linguistic 
sign, namely globalisation.  
Consider the following: if we have a look at some of the claims in this 
supposed ‘controversy’ about ‘the demise of globalisation’ and set out to as-
sess them by understanding the signified of the word globalisation as (an 
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ideal existence of) global governance regimes and an increasing role of in-
ternational institutions, we might readily agree that ‘globalisation’ has suf-
fered after 9/11. Important post-9/11-decisions were taken outside the con-
fines of these global regimes and institutions. An obvious example is the 
way in which the United Nations (UN) was sidelined after 9/11. UN Resolu-
tion 1368, which was passed by the Security Council on 12 September 2001, 
triggered little attention. This was particularly apparent compared to the of-
ficial statements of US President George W. Bush at that time. In February 
2003, the position of the United Nations could have hardly been more sum-
marily dismissed and profoundly weakened than by the US-led military in-
tervention in Iraq, which UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (2004a) explic-
itly considered as “illegal” and “not in conformity with the UN Charter”. 
Indeed, in this context, sceptics have a point when they announce the ‘de-
mise’ of ‘globalisation’ based on the fact that – in the face of the 2003-
intervention in Iraq – claims, which are posed as indicators for and explana-
tions of ‘globalisation’, have become questionable, such as that the US “mil-
itary autonomy is decidedly compromised by the web of military commit-
ments and arrangements in which it has become entangled” (Held, McGrew, 
Goldblatt and Perraton 2003: 144). A look at the 2002 National Security 
Strategy of the United Nations of America (White House 2002), especially 
its Chapter V (the so-called ‘Bush Doctrine’), which institutionalised a spe-
cific approach to the pre-emptive use of force, as well as a look at public 
statements of representatives of the post-9/11 Bush Administration, such as 
the following one by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas Feith, 
support sceptics in that they provide evidence for the US administration’s 
post-9/11 goal to free “the American Gulliver from the ties of multilateral-
ism”, as Michael Cox (2003: 526) puts it, and to move (back) to realpolitik: 
 
“The United States strengthens its national security when it promotes a well-ordered 
world of sovereign states: a world in which states respect one another’s rights to 
choose how they want to live; a world in which states do not commit aggression and 
have governments that can and do control their own territory; a world in which states 
have governments that are responsible and obey, as it were, the rules of the road. The 
importance of promoting a well-ordered world of sovereign states was brought home 
to Americans by 9/11, when terrorists enjoying safe haven in remote Afghanistan ex-
ploited ‘globalization’ and the free and open nature of various Western countries to 
attack us disastrously here at home. Sovereignty means not just a country’s right to 
command respect for its independence, but also the duty to take responsibility for 
what occurs on one’s territory, and, in particular, to do what it takes to prevent one's 
territory from being used as a base for attacks against others.” (Feith quoted in 
Acharya 2007: 279) 
 
A political world based on power politics becomes also evident in a 2002-
speech delivered by then US National Security Advisor and later US Secre-
tary of State, Condoleezza Rice. In this speech Rice (2002) makes clear: 
THE ‘GLOBALISATION’-DISCOURSE AND THE ‘NEW WORLD’ | 87 
 
“when we were attacked on September 11th, it reinforced one of the rediscovered 
truths about today’s world: robust military power matters in international politics and 
in security.” 
 
So, if the signified of the word globalisation is taken as an undisputed glob-
al governance system and thick multilateralism, the evidence of post-9/11 
developments (especially the behaviour of the US) supports the claims of 
those who question it.  
At the same time, however, there is solid evidence for the claims of 
those who consider a “post-mortem” (Rosenberg 2005) of ‘globalisation’ to 
be too hasty – again, depending on what one considers to be the signified of 
the word globalisation. If one considers it to be the “widening, deepening 
and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness” (Held and McGrew 
2007b: 1) there is evidence that ‘globalisation’ is ‘alive’. Held and McGrew 
(2007b) demonstrate this in their Globalization/Anti-Globalization. More 
specifically, if one understands the signified of the word globalisation as 
world-wide economic integration, in general, and as the planetary spread of 
capitalism, in particular, claims that 9/11 brought it to an end do not hold 
because, as William J. Dobson (2006: 23) observes, 
 
“[t]he global economy offered the first sign that a new, darker day hadn’t dawned. 
On September 10, the Dow Jones Industrial Average closed at 9,605.51. Once mar-
kets reopened on September 17, it took only 40 days for the market to close above 
that level again. The value of the United States’ monthly exports has continued to rise 
steadily from $60 billion to more than $75 billion between 2001 and 2005. The value 
of global trade dipped slightly in 2001 from $8 trillion to $7.8 trillion. Then, once 
markets found their footing, they came racing back, increasing every subsequent 
year, topping $12 trillion in 2005. Hard-hit businesses such as the tourist industry 
bounced back remarkably fast.” 
 
If the word globalisation is taken to refer to the notion of an increasing mo-
bility of people and movements across the world, aviation figures support 
the position that ‘globalisation’ did not ‘die’ after 9/11 (see data appendix in 
the Global Civil Society Yearbooks URL). As Dobson (2006: 23) finds: 
 
“In 2001, more than 688 million tourists travelled abroad; by 2005, that number had 
climbed to 808 million-a 17 percent increase in four years.” 
 
And if the signified of the word globalisation is understood to be about 
communicative integration, then the ever growing innovative forms and in-
creasing popularity of web 2.0 and the ‘internet of things’, as well as, exam-
ples such as the North Korean case that is provided in Kaldor and 
Kostovicova’s 2008 study of what they call ‘involuntary pluralism’ in illib-
eral regimes, support the claim that ‘globalisation’ has not suffered a demise 
after 9/11 but, rather, that it is a force of (potentially) transforming dynamics 
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and power – following Kaldor and Kostovicova (2008) even in North Korea, 
one of the most isolated societies in the world.  
Above and beyond this, it is easy to argue that the terrorist attack of 9/11 
itself can be regarded as a manifestation of ‘globalisation’, if the signified of 
globalisation is understood to be the structures and means that facilitate the 
establishment of transnational networks. As Mary Kaldor and Diego Muro 
(2003) highlight, it was the ability to form a global network, just like (West-
ern) NGOs, that ‘made’ Al Qaeda (see also LaFeber 2002). Further, there is 
the important role that the contemporary ‘globalised’ media and communi-
cation systems played in the 9/11-attack. On the one side, as Kaldor and 
Muro (2003) argue, terror networks, such as Al Qaeda, fundamentally de-
pend on the internet and satellite TV in order to recruit followers around the 
world.8 On the other side, it was of course the ‘global media’ that made the 
event of 9/11 a “phenomenal sight that separates the violence of our televi-
sion era from all others”, as Caryn James (2001) wrote in The New York 
Times on 12 September. Nilüfer Göle (2002: 335) points out in her study of 
the interwoven relationship between Islam, Modernity and violence that 
9/11 was “performed in full recognition of the supremacy of the media”. In 
a similar vein, Heinz Steinert (2003: 654) speaks of terrorism, such as con-
ducted and fostered by Al Qaeda, as a “CNN-adapted political crime. […] 
Terrorists force their way into the field of politics through the public 
sphere”; he calls the TV images of the collapsing towers “the most im-
portant and effective ‘product’ of the terrorist attack” (ibid.  653). In fact, 
the awareness of the extraordinary role of the global media system in and 
for the attack of 9/11 is evident in a letter written by Osama Bin Laden to 
Emir Al-Momineen, in which Bin Laden highlights: 
 
“It is obvious that the media in this century is one of the strongest methods; in fact, 
its ratio may reach 90% of the total preparation for the battles.” (Bin Laden ND) 
 
Overall, argues Robert O. Keohane (2002: 81), the September 2001-terrorist 
attack in itself showed that the “barrier conception of geographical space 
[…] was finally obsolete”. So, if the word globalisation is taken to refer to 
transborder actions and interconnections, ‘globalisation’ is ‘alive’ and 
played a crucial role in the lead up to and on 11 September 2001. In fact, 
9/11 is a manifestation of ‘globalisation.’     
In sum, the discussions about the state and nature of the world after 
9/11, to which Held and McGrew (2007b) point, are rich and important. Yet, 
to label them a ‘controversy’ about the demise of a supposedly well-defined 
issue called ‘globalisation’ is peculiar. This is simply because commentators 
speak about different phenomena when they use the word globalisation.  
                                                    
8 For reports on how the terror network ISIS uses social media to recruit followers 
see for instance Callimachi (2015) and Gates and Podder (2015). 
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This fourth facet of the ‘globalisation’-discourse, the implicit or explicit 
conviction that there was a ‘globalisation debate’, is interesting in two re-
spects. First, this conviction, or scholarly practice, blocks focused, critical 
debates about the state and nature of the socio-political world. The word 
globalisation has come to step in-between scholars and the various socio-
political phenomena at which they look. This leads to a diversion and frag-
mentation of debates. The word globalisation has come to take the position 
of a shield, which blocks focused debates about distinct empirical phenome-
na.9    
At the same time, and second, the implicit or explicit conviction that 
there was a ‘globalisation debate’ is interesting because it brings out the 
‘globalisation’-discourse to begin with, i.e. the re-production of the web of 
meanings through utterances, which contain the word globalisation, and 
which gives it its complex nature. The above account of uses of the word 
globalisation makes us aware that the object ‘globalisation’, which is re-
produced in the ‘globalisation’-discourse through utterances, which contain 
the word globalisation, is highly complex. This is because it is the product 
of utterances, in which the word globalisation is associated with many dif-
ferent, in fact, sometimes fundamentally different signifieds. This is a note-
worthy observation. It requires us to acknowledge that the ‘globalisation’-
discourse must not be mistaken as revolving around a clearly set and con-
fined idea ‘globalisation’. Putting it differently, this observation requires us 
to acknowledge that it is not helpful to take the ‘globalisation’-discourse as 
being about a clearly set and confined idea ‘globalisation’, such as market 
integration or interconnectedness. It is not helpful because it would be a dis-
tinct position in the ‘globalisation’-discourse itself, rather than a critical take 
on it that holds a genuine chance of shedding new light on this very dis-
course. In fact, it would overlook a fundamental characteristic of the ‘glob-
alisation’-discourse.   
But if it is not helpful to take the ‘globalisation’-discourse as being 
about ‘globalisation’ what is the ‘globalisation’-discourse about? How is the 
object that is re-produced in the ‘globalisation’-discourse best understood 
and labelled? To answer these questions, it is worth considering the fifth 
facet that I identify as shaping the ‘globalisation’-discourse, i.e. the web of 
meanings that is re-produced through utterances, in which the word globali-
sation is used.    
 
                                                    
9 A similar observation seems to motivate Susan Strange to criticise that the word 
globalisation is “used by a lot of woolly thinkers who lump together all sorts of 
superficially converging trends in popular tastes for food and drink, clothes,  mu-
sic,  sports  and  entertainment  with  underlying  changes  in  the provision of fi-
nancial services and the directions of scientific research, and  call  it  all  globali-
zation  without  trying  to  distinguish  what  is  important from what is trivial, ei-
ther in causes or in consequences” (Strange in Busch 2000: 22). 
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FIFTH: THE ‘GLOBALISATION’-DISCOURSE AND THE 
IDEA ‘NEW WORLD’ 
 
The fifth facet, which I identify as constituting the ‘globalisation’-discourse, 
is the fact that the idea ‘new world’ plays a relevant role in it.  
We have seen above that it was in the 1990s that the neologism globali-
sation became popular. This was despite the fact that many of the phenome-
na that have come to be captured with the word globalisation existed well 
before the 1990s. As Amartya Sen (2001) observes: 
 
“[g]lobalization is not new […]: Over thousands of years, globalization has pro-
gressed through travel, trade, migration, spread of cultural influences and dissemina-
tion of knowledge (including of science and technology).” 
 
For instance, if we take the signified of the word globalisation to be about 
worldwide integration, the word globalisation could well have been in use 
since the 16th Century, namely since the 1582-introduction of the Gregorian 
calendar in Catholic European countries, which was gradually adopted 
across Europe and then almost worldwide in the 18th century and thereafter. 
Or, at least, it could have been used since the 19th century, when local time 
was erased by globally coordinated time in the form of time zones based 
upon Greenwich, England. Arguably, both developments were significant 
components in the emergence of what one could call a world culture and led 
to an unprecedented degree of worldwide integration. Yet, it was not in the 
16th century, nor in the 18th nor in the 19th century that the idea of ‘globali-
sation’ was perceived as “an idea whose time has come” – as the earlier 
quoted Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton (2003: 1) claim was the case 
at the end of the 20th century – and that the neologism globalisation was in-
vented and became popular. Nor did the word globalisation enter discourses 
in the period between 1870 and 1914, in which many scholars find process-
es of economic integration similar to the ones of the late 20th century (e.g. 
Nayyar 1995; Hirst and Thompson 1996, 2002). None of these develop-
ments was perceived as a development that required the invention of the 
new word globalisation.10  
On first sight, one might assume this was because these developments 
went, if not unnoticed, then, at least, not reflected upon. Yet, evidence sug-
gests that this assumption is misguided. Commentators in the past seem to 
have perceived developments of integration in remarkably similar ways to 
the ways contemporaries perceive current developments to which they at-
tribute the word globalisation. Just consider how The Times in London in 
1858 celebrated the first transatlantic telegraph cable in strikingly similar 
                                                    
10 For sporadic uses of the word globalisation before the 1990s refer back to fn 5 in 
this chapter and Bach’s Begriffsgeschichte of ‘globalisation’ (Bach 2013). 
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words as we read them today about technologies, such as the internet, which 
are widely understood as “a quintessential icon of globalization” (Capling 
and Nossal 2001: 444): 
 
“Distance as a ground of uncertainty will [now] be eliminated from the calculation of 
the statesman and the merchant. […] The distance between Canada and England is 
annihilated [and] the Atlantic is dried up […] we become in reality as well as in wish 
one country […] To the ties of a common blood, language, and religion, to the inti-
mate association in business and a complete sympathy on so many subjects, is now 
added the faculty of instantaneous communication, which must give to all these, 
tendencies to unity and intensity which they never before could possess.” (The Times 
quoted in Herod 2009: 68) 
 
So, why was it then in the 1990s that there was the perceived need for a ne-
ologism, globalisation, as the vocabulary necessary to grasp the state of the 
world? Putting it differently and with the earlier quoted Michel Foucault 
(1981: 61) we can ask what made ‘globalisation’ come to be “in the true” 
from the 1990s onwards, or what made the word globalisation a socially ac-
cepted and ratified way of talking about the world?  
As we saw above, answers to these questions, which point to the ‘actual 
existence’ of ‘globalisation’ ‘out there’, are not completely satisfying. Not 
only do they merely refer to a single, pre-defined signified of the word 
globalisation, they also overlook that, as we saw Foucault point out earlier 
with reference to Gregor Mendel, even if whatever the word globalisation is 
associated with was a ‘reality’, it does not mean that one is automatically ‘in 
the true’ in speaking of it.  
Without doubt, it is a complex set of factors that made ‘globalisation’ 
come to be ‘in the true’ and ensured that the neologism globalisation could 
enter debates as a socially accepted “talismanic term” (Low and Barnett 
2000: 54). 
In general, it was certainly the above mentioned practice of influential 
scholarly commentators and their established publication channels, who set 
out on the ‘natural’ premise that there was a well-defined ‘thing’ ‘globalisa-
tion’, a ‘globalisation debate’ and ‘globalisation studies’ that played an im-
portant role in the establishment of the ‘globalisation’-discourse.  
In particular, I argue, it was the conceptual vacuum that the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent breakdown of the bipolar bloc sys-
tem produced within the imagination of scholars in political studies and IR, 
and in the social sciences, more broadly, and, interlinked with this, the no-
tion that there was something ‘new’ about the world that ‘allowed’ the word 
globalisation to enter the scene.  
To the degree the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent 
breakdown of the bipolar bloc system shook up global power relations, it al-
so shook up scholarly imaginations in political studies and IR. The break-
down of the bipolar bloc system left “observers without any paradigms or 
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theories that adequately explain the course of events”, assessed IR theorist 
James N. Rosenau (1990: 5). After 1989, there was a widespread perception 
that “old truths had lost their validity” (Daase and Kessler 2007: 412), that 
“basic concepts of political discourses are contested [and that] epistemolog-
ical or diagnostic considerations need to be reconsidered” (ibid. 420).  
 
“The irruptions in the established order and traditional practices of statecraft have 
given many of international politics’ customary modes of analysis an air of nostal-
gia”, 
 
observed David Campbell (1998[1992]: ix). They were perceived as de-
manding a breakout from the “conceptual jails in which the study of world 
politics is deemed to be incarcerated”, as Rosenau (1990: 22) put it.  
All this was not least because, for specialised scholars the fall of the 
Berlin Wall came as much of a surprise as it did for many of those, who did 
not deal professionally with the analysis and prediction of world politics 
(see Leggewie 1994).  
Given the surprise with which the course of events caught large parts of 
the political studies and IR community, the end of the Cold War called into 
question nothing less than the very self-understanding of the academic prac-
tice of political analysis in general and of the IR scholarship in particular. It 
called into question the very conceptual and analytical frameworks and 
toolboxes of experts because these failed to grasp and predict what they 
were meant to grasp and predict, namely trends, developments and dynam-
ics in international politics.  
The fundamental failure of political studies and IR analyses at that time 
is particularly apparent if one realises that the ‘earthquake of international 
politics’, as IR theorist Thomas Risse (2003a) perceived the events, was not 
actually entirely unpredicted. Although it hit IR specialists in 1989 widely 
by surprise, already in 1982 British historian E. P. Thompson wrote: 
 
“The Cold War road show, which each year enlarges, is now lurching towards its 
terminus. But in this moment changes have arisen in our continent, of scarcely more 
than one year’s growth, which signify a challenge to the Cold War itself. These are 
not ‘political’ changes in the usual sense. They cut through the flesh of politics down 
to the human bone.” (Quoted in Kaldor 2003: 70) 
 
Thompson’s assessment is not only astonishing in terms of its foresight, it 
also shows why most of political studies and IR experts failed to properly 
assess and interpret the historical developments that were unfolding during 
the 1980s: they simply looked in the ‘wrong place’ and started their assess-
ments based on the ‘wrong’ presumptions about where political changes 
might appear. While Thompson took seriously developments which were, as 
he critically reflects, ‘not ‘political’ changes in the usual sense’ in that they 
took place outside the realm of formal politics, the mainstream of political 
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studies and IR specialists overlooked them because their traditional concep-
tual frame constrained their view to the realm of nation-state governments 
and formal interactions. As Mary Kaldor (2003: 70) puts it, “[t]hose who 
studied Eastern Europe ‘from above’, who studied economic trends or the 
composition of politburos, failed to foresee the 1989 revolutions” in that 
they missed what Thompson observed and predicted, namely 
 
“a détente of peoples rather than states – a movement of peoples which sometimes 
dislodges states from their blocs and brings them into a new diplomacy of concilia-
tion, which sometimes runs beneath state structures, and which sometimes defies the 
ideological and security structures of particular states.” (Quoted in Kaldor 2003: 70) 
 
Consequently, the political changes in 1989 prompted a reflection by many 
political studies and IR specialists on nothing less profound than the guiding 
categories of their academic discipline. At the same time, the unexpected 
changes made it ‘normal’ to see the world as a ‘new world’ that was sudden-
ly unfolding in front of their eyes.  
In Chapter 5, I zoom in on the idea ‘new world’ and discuss what it 
means to ‘proclaim’ that the world is ‘new’. At this point, it suffices to high-
light that this perceived ‘new world’ stands for the vacuum in the scholarly 
approach/es to the world that the neologism globalisation (with its many 
different signifieds) came to fill. In other words, as much as it might have 
been ‘real’ developments that made ‘globalisation’ come to be “an idea 
whose time has come” (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton 2003: 1), as 
much it was the failure of previously guiding scholarly conceptions in the 
face of a perceived ‘new world’ that opened the path for the word globalisa-
tion to enter the scene as an acceptable term to grasp the world after 1989. It 
was this vacuum that allowed concept/s of ‘globalisation’ to come to be ‘in 
the true’ and the neologism globalisation to enter the language.   
In this sense, the idea (that there was a) ‘new world’ played a crucial 
role in the establishment of the neologism globalisation and, consequently 
in the birth and rise of the ‘globalisation’-discourse. The idea (that there was 
a) ‘new world’ is constitutive of the ‘globalisation’-discourse.   
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In Chapters 2 and 3, I established the adjective global as a popular, free, 
complex and, in particular, as a ‘new word’. What is ‘new’ about the con-
temporary global, I argued in Chapter 3, is that it springs off the ‘globalisa-
tion’-discourse. It is interlinked inextricably with the ‘globalisation’-
discourse.  
In this chapter, I elaborated on the ‘globalisation’-discourse, which I de-
fined as the re-production of the web of meanings through utterances, which 
contain the word globalisation. In doing this, I referred to Foucault and 
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sketched some of the presumptions and premises that underlie the way in 
which I use the word discourse. Among them was the understanding that 
‘discourses’ bring out their ‘objects’. They produce the world of which they 
speak. Following from this brief theoretical overview, I stressed the differ-
ence between my idea of ‘globalisation’-discourse and other uses of this 
term, such as by Hay and Smith (2005). Importantly, I stressed that in my 
conception, the ‘globalisation’-discourse is about the re-production of a dis-
tinct web of meanings through utterances, which have a linguistic, rather 
than a thematic commonality. This linguistic commonality is the word glob-
alisation. With that, as I explained above, I acknowledge the polysemic na-
ture of the word globalisation, i.e. I acknowledge that there are many differ-
ent signifieds associated with this word globalisation, which, together, bring 
out the object ‘globalisation’, which is the web of meanings that is re-
produced in the ‘globalisation’-discourse. A look at the life of the ‘globali-
sation’-discourse and, especially, at the five facets that I identify as consti-
tuting this discourse, made us aware of the complex nature of this discourse. 
More precisely, it made us aware of the complexity of the object ‘globalisa-
tion’, which is re-produced in the ‘globalisation’-discourse through utter-
ances, which contain the word globalisation.  
As a consequence, it became clear that it is not helpful to take the ‘glob-
alisation’-discourse as being about a clearly set and confined idea ‘globali-
sation’. I stressed that such a practice would be an instance in the re-
production of the ‘globalisation’-discourse, rather than a critical move that 
holds a genuine chance of shedding new light on the ‘globalisation’-
discourse.  
Taken together, these observations brought up the questions: What is the 
‘globalisation’-discourse actually about? How is the object that is re-
produced in the ‘globalisation’-discourse best be understood and labelled?   
In a separate, final section, I outlined the fifth facet that I identify as 
constituting the ‘globalisation’-discourse. This is the importance of the idea 
‘new world’ in and for this discourse. Triggered by the question why ‘glob-
alisation’ came to be ‘in the true’ at the end of the 1980s and beginning of 
the 1990s, I identified the fall of the Berlin Wall and the breakdown of the 
bipolar bloc system as moments that opened the way for the idea/s ‘globali-
sation’ and the neologism globalisation to enter the stage. Given the per-
ceived failure of established theoretical and conceptual tools to predict and 
grasp the course of events and the ‘earthquake of international politics’ 
(Risse 2003a) at the end of the 1980s, perceptions of the advent of a ‘new 
world’ came up. I argued that this idea, the idea that there was a ‘new 
world’ unfolding produced a vacuum in the political studies and IR scholar-
ship that allowed the idea/s ‘globalisation’ and the neologism globalisation 
to become socially accepted. In this sense, I argued, the idea (that there was 
a) ‘new world’ is constitutive of the ‘globalisation’-discourse; it made the 
re-production of the web of meanings through utterances, which contain the 
word globalisation, ‘possible’ to begin with.    
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Taking the above together, brings out my concluding argument of this 
chapter and an answer to the questions: What is the ‘globalisation’-discourse 
about? How is the object that is re-produced in the ‘globalisation’-discourse 
best understood and labelled? Grounded in the above – and especially in the 
fifth above outlined facet that constitutes the ‘globalisation’-discourse – I 
propose that the ‘globalisation’-discourse is to be understood as a discourse 
that re-produces a web of meanings through utterances, which contain the 
word globalisation, that is best labelled ‘new world’. In other words, I con-
ceptualise the use of the word globalisation, no matter in which context and 
in which sense it is used, as a moment in the re-production of a web of 
meanings that brings out an ‘object’, which I call ‘new world’.   
 

  
 
5 The Proclamation of the ‘New World’ 
 
And I said – so I said, ‘There’s a new world 
here.’ After September the 11th, we must 
take threats seriously.  
GEORGE W. BUSH (2004) 
 
We live in a world […] different from the 
one in which we think.  
STEPHEN E. BRONNER (1995: 68) 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I advocated labelling the ‘object’ that is re-produced 
in the ‘globalisation’-discourse ‘new world’. This move was grounded in the 
observation that the idea that there was a ‘new world’ is constitutive of the 
‘globalisation’-discourse, i.e. of the re-production of a distinct web of mean-
ings through utterances, which contain the word globalisation. I supported 
my argument by demonstrating that the idea/s ‘globalisation’ came to be ‘in 
the true’, and the neologism globalisation was able to enter the language, in 
the face of a post-1989 reality that was perceived as ‘new’, in the sense of 
no longer graspable with the help of established theoretical and conceptual 
tools. 
In this pesent chapter, I take another step away from the adjective global 
and follow a path that arises from the main insight in Chapter 4. I reflect on 
the issue of the ‘new world’. I carve out what is distinct and interesting 
about it. To do this, I discuss implicit and explicit proclamations of the ‘new 
world’.  
I make two analytical moves in this present chapter. First, I reflect on 
what it means when social and political actors ‘proclaim’ (implicitly or ex-
plicitly) that there is something ‘new’ about the world or about social and 
political phenomena. In order to carve out the specificity of this kind of 
proclamation of the ‘new’, I contrast it with another kind of proclamation of 
the ‘new’. This other kind of proclamation of the ‘new’ is a familiar compo-
nent of modern politics. It is the proclamation of a ‘new world’ to come as a 
result of progressive, active, confident and targeted action. It is a kind of 
proclamation of the ‘new’ that is grounded in the modern fondness (for the 
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striving) for the ‘new’, which is perceived as a central, in fact, foundational 
aspect of societal progress and development. In contrast with this (modern) 
proclamation of the ‘new’ to come, I carve out the main characteristics of 
the kind of proclamation of the ‘new’ that is manifest in the above sketched 
reaction to the post-1989 reality. I call this second kind of proclamation a 
proclamation of the ‘new’ that came. I point out that this second kind of 
proclamation of the ‘new’ implies a passive speaking position of an observ-
er, who is confronted with a ‘new’ reality and whose task it is to grasp this 
reality, rather than to actively shape it and its future development. In con-
trast with the proclamation of a ‘new world’ to come as a product of an 
agent’s action, the proclamation of the ‘new’ that came appears to be an ob-
jective observation of the world as it is. Yet, despite its supposed ‘natural-
ness’, it is, of course, also enmeshed in existing discourses. It is as much a 
political act to proclaim the (supposed) ‘newness’ of the world that came, 
i.e. that ‘is’, as it is to proclaim the ‘new’ to come. In this sense, in this first 
analytical move, I frame the proclamation of the ‘newness’ of the world as 
an aspect of political actors’ struggle to legitimise past and future decisions 
and actions.   
While the proclamation of the ‘new’ to come is a manifestation of the 
modern and optimistic fondness for innovation, progress and development, I 
argue that the proclamation of the ‘new’ that came is a manifestation of an 
‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, which is consti-
tuted by the “internal cosmopolitisation” (Beck 2006: 2) of national socie-
ties, the existence of “global risk” (Beck 1992, 1999, also 2009a), and the 
“return of uncertainty” (Beck 1994: 8; Bonß 1996). I substantiate this prop-
osition in the second analytical move that I take in this chapter.  
My conceptualisation of the proclamation of the ‘new’ that came as a 
manifestation of an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisa-
tion is grounded in an understanding of social reality that follows sociologist 
Ulrich Beck (especially 1994, 2004, 2006). According to this understanding, 
contemporary social reality is shaped by two aspects and their interplay. 
First, it is shaped by the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of the process of modernisa-
tion. As just mentioned, this ‘backfiring’ is constituted by the ‘internal cos-
mopolitisation’ of national societies, the existence of ‘global risk’ and the 
‘return of uncertainty’. Second, social reality is shaped by the prevalence of 
what Beck (2006) calls “the national perspective” and “methodological na-
tionalism”. This is a political perspective and a scholarly take on the world 
that is grounded in “nationalstaatlich normierte […] Kategorien des Wirk-
lichkeitsverständnisses” (Beck 2004: 114), that is, “categories in terms of 
which we understand reality that take the nation-state as the norm” (Beck 
2006: 73).1 The ‘national perspective’2 is a perspective that obscures the 
                                                    
1 I provide the original German quote here in addition to the official English trans-
lation of this quote because the English version does not capture fully the sense 
of the original.   
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view at social reality; more precisely, it obscures the view at the reflexive 
‘backfiring’ of modernisation, especially the internal cosmopolitisation of 
national societies, which is, according to Beck, a social reality.  
Given the relevance that is accorded to the interplay of the above two 
aspects in this conception of social reality, I use the term ‘reflexive modern’ 
to label the nature of contemporary social reality, in general, and national 
societies, in particular.       
To be clear, my understanding of the proclamation of the ‘new world’ 
that came as a manifestation of an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ 
of modernisation is a conceptual move. It is not an observation of how so-
cial and political actors actually grasp the perceived ‘newness’ of the world, 
in the sense of how they label and conceptualise it. As we saw in the previ-
ous chapter, through the word globalisation the world is grasped in diverse 
ways and not necessarily consciously and explicitly as being shaped by the 
‘internal cosmopolitisation of national societies’, ‘global risk’ and the ‘re-
turn of uncertainty’, let alone through the use of this precise vocabulary. 
Hence, to understand the proclamation of the ‘new world’ that came as a 
manifestation of an ‘awareness’ of the ‘internal cosmopolitisation of nation-
al societies’, ‘global risk’ and the ‘return of uncertainty’ is an interpretation 
that presupposes the above mentioned Beck-inspired conception of social 
reality – this presupposition is quasi a “pre-theoretical commitment” (Moore 
2004: 75).  
Consequently, it is a central task of the second part of this present chap-
ter to outline this distinct conception of the ‘reflexive modern’ social reality, 
i.e. to elaborate on what I mean when I speak of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of 
the process of modernisation, the ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of national so-
cieties, the existence of ‘global risk’ and the ‘return of uncertainty’, as well 
as the prevalence of the ‘national perspective’. In doing this, I conceptualise 
events, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the terrorist attack on 
the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001, as events that make the 
complexity of the ‘reflexive modern’ world – or, more precisely, the reflex-
ive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation – come to the surface and become visible 
to social and political observers.  
Building on these theoretical elaborations, I conclude the second move 
presented in this chapter by pointing to the analytical frame that arises from 
such a Beck-inspired conception of social reality. Notably, through this 
frame the various conceptions of the ‘newness’ of the world, which are 
manifest in the re-production of the ‘globalisation’-discourse, are to be seen 
as ways, in which the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, that is, the 
‘internal cosmopolitisation of national societies’, the existence of ‘global 
risk’ and the ‘return of uncertainty’, are dealt with and negotiated. As such, 
                                                    
2 To make the text more readable from now on, I use the term ‘national perspec-
tive’ to include also scholarly takes on the world that follow ‘methodological na-
tionalism’.   
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in the vein of my pre-supposed conception of ‘reflexive modern’ social real-
ity, their study facilitates nothing less but insights into the nature of the ‘na-
tional perspective’ in distinct historical moments.   
 
 
PROCLAMATIONS OF THE ‘NEW WORLD’  
 
As outlined in the previous chapter, the breakdown of the bipolar bloc sys-
tem in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse 
of the Soviet Union in 1991 were widely taken to mark the advent of a 
‘new’ era. They were regarded as heralding the advent of a ‘new world’ that 
came. This is manifest in the fact that new concepts were perceived to be 
necessary and new theories were thought to be required to grasp the world. 
As outlined in Chapter 4, it was this conviction that a ‘new world’ had 
come, which opened the path for the idea/s ‘globalisation’ to come to be ‘in 
the true’ and for the neologism globalisation to enter the language as a so-
cially ratified word.  
In the previous chapter, I pointed to manifestations of perceptions of the 
post-1989 world as a ‘new world’ in the scholarly discourse. I referred to 
various instances, in which scholars expressed the conviction that estab-
lished theories and concepts were not equipped any longer to grasp the post-
1989 social reality. But perceptions that there was a ‘new world’ after 1989 
were not exclusive to scholarly commentators. We find expressions of the 
‘new world’ also beyond academic circles; here, such expressions are even 
more explicit. Take, for instance, US President George Bush’s public com-
munication in the aftermath of 9 November 1989. Bush (1990a; emphasis 
added) saw after 1989 an “amazing new world of freedom” arising, ex-
plained that “to remain competitive, government must also reflect the new 
world emerging around us” (Bush 1990b; emphasis added), and cautioned 
US voters in 1992:  
 
“So when you vote, you’ve got to understand the new world, the world after the cold 
war.” (Bush 1992; emphasis added) 
 
But the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent breakdown of the bipolar 
bloc system is not the only relatively recent event that triggered perceptions 
and public proclamations of the advent of a ‘new world’. The most promi-
nent other event, which had the same effect, was the terrorist attack on the 
World Trade Centre in New York City on 11 September 2001 (9/11). 9/11, 
too, moved commentators to speak explicitly of a ‘new world’.  
 
“In an instant and without warning on a fine fall morning, the known world had been 
jerked aside like a mere slide in a projector, and a new world had been rammed into 
its place”, 
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writes Jonathan Schell (2001; emphasis added) on 12 September 2001 in 
The Nation. The ‘new world’ is also a prominent feature of US President 
George W. Bush’s Public Papers (for the following see also Selchow 2011 
and 2013):  
 
“On the morning of September the 11th, 2001, our Nation awoke to a nightmare at-
tack. Nineteen men armed with box cutters took control of airplanes and turned them 
into missiles. They used them to kill nearly 3,000 innocent people. We watched the 
Twin Towers collapse before our eyes, and it became instantly clear that we’d en-
tered a new world and a dangerous new war.” (Bush 2006; emphasis added) 
 
“The last choice of any President ought to be to commit troops into combat. We 
ought to try everything possible before we commit one soul into combat, and that’s 
why I went to the United Nations. I said, ‘We see a threat. How about you?’ You’ve 
passed resolutions before – resolution after resolution after resolution. And I said – so 
I said, ‘There’s a new world here.’ After September the 11th, we must take threats se-
riously.” (Bush 2004; emphasis added) 
 
“The attacks of September the 11th, 2001, [...] revealed the outlines of a new world.” 
(Bush 2005; emphasis added) 
 
“In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of 
action.” (Bush 2002; emphasis added) 
 
More generally, after 9/11 the adjective new came to be used to modify all 
sorts of nouns, from struggle, terrorism and threats to war, dangers and en-
emies, indicating that there was something different in kind about these phe-
nomena. For instance, a 2002 fact sheet of the U.S. Department of Home-
land Security on border security concludes, “[t]he new threats and opportu-
nities of the 21st century demand a new approach to border management” 
(US Department of Homeland Security 2002; emphasis added). George W. 
Bush (2001c) suggests to NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, “[w]e 
stand shoulder to shoulder in a new kind of struggle”, fighting a “new kind 
of war” (Bush 2001d; emphasis added). In other contexts, he reminds ad-
dressees that this war was fought against a “new kind of enemy” (Bush 
2001e; emphasis added) and, as he explains to High School students in Wis-
consin, in the face of a “new kind of threat”: 
 
“You’re graduating in a time of war, right here in America, but a war that your text-
books really haven’t been able to describe before. It’s a new kind of threat to our 
country.” (Bush 2002b; emphasis added) 
 
In the following section, I reflect on what is implied in this kind of ‘procla-
mation’ of the ‘new world’. However, in order to carve out its characteris-
tics, I first look at another kind of proclamation of the ‘new’ and draw a 
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contrast with it. This other kind of proclamation of the ‘new’ is about a ‘new 
world’ to come, rather than about a ‘new’ nature and constitution of the 
world that came. This other kind of proclamation of the ‘new world’, name-
ly of the ‘new world’ to come, is a familiar feature of past and contemporary 
political discourses. It is intimately interwoven with modern premises and 
with a distinct idea of the temporal category ‘future’.  
  
The modern proclamation of the ‘new’ to come 
In modernity the ‘new’ is valued for its own sake. It is something that is to 
be actively, systematically and consciously promoted and reproduced (Leg-
gewie 1996: 4). Both, the striving for the ‘new’ and innovation are seen as 
the engine of societal development and progress.3 The ‘new’ and innovation 
serve as symbols for national power, associated with economic growth and 
rising living standards.4 At the same time, however, as Claus Leggewie 
(ibid.) stresses, it is not transcendentally fixed what the ‘new’ and innova-
tion are. The ‘new’ is and always has been subject to questioning and inno-
vation. It is a historical product. 
In his discussion of political creativity, renewal and the ‘new’ Leggewie 
(1994) refers to Hannah Arendt (1986[1963]) and presents politics as the 
domain of innovation. He distinguishes between four political agencies of 
innovation: bureaucracy, movements, leaders (charisma) and intellectuals 
(Leggewie 1994: 8). Analysing each of these four agencies in their contem-
porary form and regarding their contemporary potential to (politically) in-
novate, Leggewie argues that each of them suffers from an epochal exhaus-
tion of their innovating potential (ibid. 11). This does not mean, however, 
that the ‘new’ in politics has disappeared (ibid. 14). Rather, Leggewie (ibid.) 
argues, the ‘new’ arises these days less as the result of planned intellectual 
endeavours and collective action, and more as the product of external, unex-
pected and incisive events – like the fall of the Berlin Wall or, as I would 
add, 9/11.  
Yet, despite the importance of incisive mega-events relative to the actual 
innovative power of political agencies today, the striving for the ‘new’ re-
mains to be a central feature of political practices and discourses. It remains 
highly valued. Doing politics remains to be about (the proclamation of) the 
explicit striving for the ‘new’ and the commitment to innovate.   
One of the most prominent and remarkable historical examples of the 
striving for the ‘new’ is captured in the narrative of the US as the ‘New 
World’, which is nothing less than one of the founding “myths that made 
                                                    
3 For a comprehensive overview and discussion of the ‘new’ in philosophy, see 
Norbert Rath (1984).    
4 With reference to the first World Exhibition, the ‘Great Exhibition of the Works 
of Industry of all Nations’ in 1851 in London, Kendra Briken (2006: 22) points 
to the important role that the ‘new’ and innovation play in national narratives.   
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America” (Paul 2014). This ‘New World’-narrative is inscribed in US cul-
ture in fundamental ways. Most obviously it is captured in the narrative of 
Christopher Columbus’ landing on an island in the Caribbean in 1492. Co-
lumbus’ landing was officially commemorated for the first time in 1792, 
when the USA was established. It was glorified in this context as “the great-
est event in the history of mankind since the death of our Savior” (de Lanc-
ey quoted in Schuman, Schwartz and d’Arcy 2005: 6). It was further glori-
fied and ‘translated’ into the metaphor ‘Columbia’. “[R]epresenting the new 
land, the exotic wilderness of North America”, Columbia did not only serve 
as the feminine “symbolic counterpart to George Washington, who was seen 
as imposing order and reason upon the land through republican govern-
ment”, as Cynthia Koch (1996: 32) observes,5 it also helped to symbolically 
demarcate the ‘New World’ against the ‘Old World’. The renaming of 
King's College in New York City after the American Revolution in 1784 in-
to Columbia College and eventually (in 1912) into Columbia University is 
just one example of the explicit break with the ‘old’.  
The narrative of America as the ‘New World’ is an example of the striv-
ing for the ‘new’ to come because it is only symbolically linked to Colum-
bus’ actual travel in 1492. The vision of a ‘new world’ was already in the 
European mind before Columbus even started his journey and accidentally 
landed on an island off the coast of what is now Venezuela.6 The ex post 
                                                    
5 Just think of the name that was chosen for the new nation’s capital: Washington, 
District of Columbia. In this name the ‘exotic’ and ‘wild’ feminine and the ‘ra-
tional’ and ‘reasonable’ masculine are juxtaposed and at the same time symboli-
cally united. A problematic feminization of the ‘New World’ is also apparent in 
Samuel E. Morison’s Pulitzer Prize-winning Columbus biography from 1942, in 
which he glorifies Columbus’ landing as a capturing of ‘the pure’ and ‘the un-
touched’ when he writes, “never again may mortal men hope to recapture the 
amazement, the wonder, the delight of those October days in 1492 when the New 
World gracefully yielded her virginity to the conquering Castilians” (quoted in 
O’Gorman 1961: 44).    
6 In various respects it is obvious that Columbus did not actually ‘discover’ the 
‘New World’. There is clearly something problematic about the idea that a man 
is said to have ‘discovered’ a land as ‘new’, which was already inhabited by peo-
ple with century-old civilisations. As Russell Thornton (1987: xv) stresses in his 
account of what he calls the “American Indian Holocaust”: “Columbus did not 
[…] discover the ‘New World’. It was already old when he came to it.” The 
common perception that Columbus ‘discovered’ America as the ‘New World’ 
makes us aware of the particular, namely European perspective implied in this 
notion; obviously the ‘discovered’ continent was ‘new’ only from the perspective 
of the Old World, which, in turn, was ‘old’ only in the face of the ‘new’. But 
even if we accept the European exploration of the Western hemisphere including 
Columbus’ landfall on one of the islands in the Caribbean Sea in 1492 and the 
eventual landing of his men on the coast of what is now called Venezuela in 
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understanding of his actual landing as the ‘discovery’ of the ‘New World’ 
was just “the actualization of a fiction, the founding of a world that had its 
origins in books before it became a concrete and tangible terra firma”, as 
Roberto Gonzalez Echevarria points out (quoted in Dash 1998: 22). In this 
sense, it was in retrospect that Columbus’ journey came to be utilised as the 
opening chapter in a narrative of the ‘new’, that is, of a break with ‘old Eu-
rope’ that had already long been imagined as a story of an inexorable “‘pro-
gress of civilization’ leading directly from Columbus to Washington” (Koch 
1996: 32). As we can see in Michael Berliner’s (1999) (suspect) defence of 
“Western civilization” as the “objectively superior culture”, the ‘new world’ 
was already there before it was literally ‘discovered’; it existed independent-
ly of Columbus and the ‘discovery’ of America:  
 
“Did Columbus ‘discover’ America? Yes – in every important respect. This does not 
mean that no human eye had been cast on America before Columbus arrived. It does 
mean that Columbus brought America to the attention of the civilized world, i.e., to 
the growing, scientific civilizations of Western Europe. The result, ultimately, was 
the United States of America.” 
 
In a similar vein, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1941) explains in 
1941: 
 
“America has been the New World in all tongues, and to all peoples, not because this 
continent was a new-found land, but because all those who came here believed they 
could create upon this continent a new life – a life that should be new in freedom.” 
 
The case of the narrative of America as the ‘New World’ is one of the most 
prominent and obvious examples for the striving for the ‘new’ to come.7 
                                                    
1498 as a ‘discovery’ of the ‘New World’, it is still not natural that Columbus 
was accredited with its ‘discovery’. Apart from the fact that forebears of the Na-
tive Americans came from the Asian continent and that there are suggestions of 
an African ‘discovery’ of America some 3,000 years ago (see Cohen URL), Co-
lumbus was not even the first European, who explored the Western hemisphere; 
there were Scandinavian-lead explorations some 500 years before Columbus 
reached the shore of South America. These Scandinavian explorations led fa-
mously to Leif Ericson’s settlement ‘Vinland’ on what is now called Newfound-
land (see further Quinn 1977). And, of course, Columbus actually never con-
ceived his ‘discovery’ as the ‘discovery’ of the ‘New World’ to begin with; he 
thought he arrived in India. Arguably, it was Amerigo Vespucci who ‘discov-
ered’ the ‘discovered’ land as a ‘New World’, in that he realised that this was a 
continent that was unknown to the ‘Old World’.    
7 In the context of the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 it was played out by then-
US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (2003), who called Germany and 
France (both countries were opposing a war in Iraq) a “problem” and labelled 
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However, we do not need to search far to also find contemporary manifesta-
tions of the fondness for the ‘new’ and the striving for it. They are manifest 
in everyday political rhetoric. The proclamation of the ‘new’ to come as the 
result of the doing of an entrepreneurial agent is a popular and, in fact, es-
sential move in political rhetoric. No matter if ‘conservative’ or ‘progres-
sive’, no one can afford not to allude to the ‘new’ in their fight for political 
support and the legitimation of their power.  
Take, for instance, UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown (2008; emphasis 
added), who declares that “[w]e have got to have the new thinking that is 
necessary for the future”. In their 2010 government programmes, Brown’s 
successors David Cameron and Nick Clegg, too, assure the public that they 
“are both committed to turning old thinking on its head and developing new 
approaches to government” (Cameron and Clegg 2010: 7; emphasis added). 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy (2007) took office as a self-proclaimed 
inventor of “un nouveau modèle français”. In a 1990 address to the United 
Nations General Assembly, US President George Bush (1990; emphasis 
added) stresses that  
 
“[i]t is in our hands […] to press forward to cap a historic movement towards a new 
world order and a long era of peace. We have a vision of a new partnership of nations 
that transcends the Cold War.” 
 
In her 2009 government declaration (Regierungserklärung), German Chan-
cellor Angela Merkel (2009) promises that her government would lead 
Germany on the right path to develop a ‘new strength’.8 And in their respec-
                                                    
and dismissed them as “old Europe”, that is, as a Europe which is backwards 
looking and has no sense of the spirit of the time. The ‘old Europe’-expression 
was taken up in political discourses since then in various ways. Given the strong 
public opinion opposing a war in Iraq, in Germany Rumsfeld’s ‘old Europe’-
dismissal was immediately taken as a compliment and filled with positive no-
tions; the Gesellschaft für deutsche Sprache (URL) elected the German transla-
tion (‘altes Europa’) as the ‘word of the year’ in 2003. French Foreign Minister 
Dominique de Villepin (2003), in his speech to the UN Security Council on 14 
February 2003, also referred to it and re-wrote the ‘old Europe’-phrase by using 
it to remind of the wealth of Europe’s (old) experience: “This message comes to 
you today from an old country, France, from a continent like mine, Europe, that 
has known wars, occupation and barbarity”. And UK Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown (2009b) took up the phrase in a speech to the US Congress, stressing: 
“There is no old Europe, no new Europe, there is only your friend Europe.” 
8 At the same time, however, Angela Merkel’s 2009 election campaign ran under 
the motto ‘Keine Experimente’ (‘No experiments’), which is a slogan that is pre-
serving and conservative, rather than shaped by the promise of innovation and 
radical renewal. As Ketterer (2007) explains, the ‘Keine Experimente’-slogan is 
a motto that her conservative party, CDU, already used in the 1957 election cam-
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tive Inaugural Addresses US Presidents Barack Obama (2009; emphasis 
added) announces “a new way forward”, and Ronald Reagan (1985; empha-
sis added) states that  
 
“[w]e must think anew and move with a new boldness. […] The time has come for a 
new American emancipation. […] From new freedom will spring new opportunities.” 
 
George Bush (1989; emphasis added) commences his term on the basis that 
“[t]here is new ground to be broken and new action to be taken”; Jimmy 
Carter (1977; emphasis added) makes clear: “This inauguration ceremony 
marks a new beginning, a new dedication within our Government, and a new 
spirit among us all”; and Bill Clinton (1997; emphasis added) stresses:  
 
“We need a new Government for a new century. […] With a new vision of Govern-
ment, a new sense of responsibility, a new spirit of community, we will sustain 
America’s journey. […] The promise we sought in a new land, we will find again in a 
land of new promise. In this new land, education will be every citizen’s most prized 
possession. […] Yes, let us build our bridge, a bridge wide enough and strong 
enough for every American to cross over to a blessed land of new promise.” 
 
These examples – especially the repeated proclamations of the ‘new’ in the 
Inaugural Addresses of the US Presidents – show us that no matter what 
kind of a political vision is implied, reassurance about a striving for the 
‘new’ and the proclamation of the ‘new’ to come are key components of po-
litical rhetoric. In fact, the ‘new’ is not only invoked in instances, in which 
actors promise ‘new deals’, ‘new agendas’, ‘new beginnings’ and ‘new vi-
sions’, but also in the context of regressions to the ‘old’. It is not infrequent 
that references to and conservations of the past are framed as acts of renew-
al: “Let us renew our determination, our courage, and our strength. And let 
us renew our faith and our hope”, demands Ronald Reagan in 1981 – and 
what Jimmy Carter (1977; emphasis added) actually means when he refers 
to “the new national spirit of unity and trust” is, as he makes clear, “a fresh 
faith in the old dream.”  
                                                    
paign to promote Konrad Adenauer. The CDU won the 1957 elections with an 
absolute majority. In fact, 1957 was the only time in the history of the Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG) that a party won the aboslute majority of votes. 
With the slogan ‘Keine Experimente’, the CDU campaigned for its re-election by 
targeting plans of the Social Democrats (SPD), such as the idea for the FRG to 
leave NATO. The CDU argued in 1957 that a victory of the SPD would lead to a 
state of uncertainty, which the Federal Republic of Germany could not afford in 
times of the Cold War; as Adenauer dramatically and famously warned: “Ein 
Sieg der SPD bedeutet den Untergang Deutschlands” (‘A victory of the SPD 
would mean the downfall of Germany’); for the above see Ketterer (2007). 
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If we take the above quoted Brown’s and his successors Cameron and 
Clegg’s promises of a “new thinking” and acknowledge that, arguably, they 
had different ideas in mind as to what this ‘new thinking’ would and should 
look like, we become aware that in these kinds of invocations of the ‘new’ 
the ‘new’ is valuable in itself, and above and beyond the way, in which it is 
actually filled with meaning. To promise the ‘new’ is a discursively required 
and widely shared practice that political actors seem to feel motivated to 
participate in because, referring back to the above referenced Briken and 
Leggewie, the ‘new’ is valued for its own sake. It is a modern paradigm, 
which generates meanings that are then spread through discourse, as Briken 
(2006: 24) explains. As a central component in and product of the discourse 
of modernity, the ‘new’ implies and evokes the key modern premises of de-
velopment and progress. As famously inscribed in and promoted by Joseph 
A. Schumpeter (1912), innovation and entrepreneurship are considered to 
play a central part in economic development. With that, the ‘new’ is accred-
ited with the role of the driver of progress. This means, simultaneously, that 
the ‘new’ is never simply the ‘new’ but always also an ‘improvement’ on the 
past, that is, on what has been or will be ‘renewed’ (see Briken 2006: 27). 
Following from the above, the ‘new’ – as well as the innovator, as the 
one, who promises and pushes for the ‘new’, who sets out to explore ‘new 
directions’, is dedicated to ‘new thinking’ and is, like David Cameron and 
Nick Clegg (2010), “committed to turning old thinking on its head” – is at-
tributed with intrinsic positive value. In their study “Innovation and the 
Post-Original: On Moral Stances and Reproduction”, Alf Rehn and Sheena 
Vachhani (2006: 310) find that, given the central role of the idea of innova-
tion and entrepreneurship and the positive value that is attributed to these 
phenomena within the modern(-economic) discourse, the innovator takes the 
position of “a heroic figure, one who opposes old regimes and creates a rift 
in the weave of economic time, ushering in the new”. This positive value 
and the positive, if not at times, even ecstatic language of the ‘new’ and the 
entrepreneur is, for instance, apparent in the following extract from a policy 
paper of the UK Institute for Public Policy Research on “The Entrepreneuri-
al Society” (Gavron, Cowling, Holtham and Westall 1998: i):  
 
“If we can make Britain ‘a country of enterprises’ we will as a consequence advance 
and progress in new technology and we will reduce unemployment as well as increas-
ing self-employment. A society in which entrepreneurship is valued and encouraged 
is a dynamic society. Entrepreneurs bring new ideas and new life to old industries, 
they create new industries, they look at established practices with new eyes, they 
question everything, they shake up old comfortable habits and customs, they eschew 
complacency, they make fortunes for themselves and others and they spend them, 
thus recirculating the money for the good of the economy.” 
 
In political discourses, this intrinsic positive value of the ‘new’ and the in-
novator means that alternative perspectives and suggestions are rendered 
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unacceptable a priori. As a consequence, the position of the innovator is 
discursively legitimised, and critique of and political alternatives to their 
‘new’ approaches are discredited. For instance, once Nicolas Sarkozy man-
aged to symbolically capture the role as innovator, he was in a discursive 
position to demonize “opposition to change” as having never “been so dan-
gerous for France” (Sarkozy 2007).  
Yet, as we learn from Leggewie (1964: 4), what the ‘new’ is and should 
be, does not stand beyond debate, and is itself subject to steady innovation. 
It is historical and, with that, it is political, subject to power and subject to 
change.  
 
Proclaiming the ‘new world’ that came 
The above sketched striving for the ‘new’ and the proclamation of the ‘new’ 
to come are a familiar component of modern life. They are a valued expres-
sion of progress and are perceived as necessary for modern civilisation and 
development. This lifts the proclaimer of the ‘new’ into a powerful position, 
loaded with positive value.  
The perception that the world is a ‘new world’, i.e. the proclamation of a 
‘new world’ that came, differs significantly from the striving for the ‘new’ 
to come that I sketched above. The acknowledgment that there is a “new 
world emerging around us” (Bush 1990b), that “[t]here’s a new world here” 
(Bush 2004), as, for instance, both Presidents Bush proclaim in their respec-
tive historical socio-political contexts, is not about a vision for a ‘new 
world’ to come. It constitutes a statement about the world as it is. It is a 
statement about the constitution of the world in and of itself. As a conse-
quence, this kind of proclamation of the ‘new’ implies a particular speaking 
position, one which is different from the ‘modern’ proclamation of the 
‘new’ that I sketched above.  
This speaking position has a number of features. Most significantly, it is 
a less active position. The one, who proclaims the ‘new’ that came, takes the 
position of an ‘observer’, rather than a shaper and innovator in and of this 
world. The proclamation of the ‘new’ that came renders the proclaimer, the 
decision maker, as a passive person, merely reacting to a world that is ‘out 
there’, one with which they are suddenly confronted and that has changed 
all of the sudden, triggered by incisive events, such as the fall of the Berlin 
Wall or 9/11, without the person doing anything. The task and challenge that 
this (supposed) ‘new world’ poses to the observer (due to its ‘newness’) is 
not so much to shape it but to understand it correctly and to adapt to it. This 
requires a distinct expertise of analytic skill and, crucially, and in a some-
what self-reinforcing way, the ability and ‘willingness’ to see that the world 
is ‘new’ to begin with. 
Drawing on the above, first of all, there is a sense of ‘objectivity’ insinu-
ated in this proclamation of the ‘newness’ of the world. While the an-
nouncement of a ‘new thinking’, a ‘new agenda’ or a ‘new vision’ to be 
brought forward by an agent is unmistakably a political claim, the proclama-
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tion that it is the world ‘out there’ that is (suddenly) ‘new’, appears more 
‘innocent’, neutral, and descriptive, that is, it appears to be less politically 
loaded or, indeed, not politically loaded at all. Consequently, political deci-
sions, which are taken in the face (of a supposedly neutral observation) of a 
‘new world’, appear as if they ‘naturally’ flow from, and are ‘naturally’ jus-
tified by reference to the very existence of the ‘new’ state of affairs. These 
political decisions readily take the form of inevitable and natural re-actions, 
rather than particular political moves and pro-actions. 
But, of course, the proclamation of the ‘new’ that came is no more a 
neutral observation of a world ‘out there’ than the announcement and prom-
ise of a ‘new world’ to come. To begin with, and referring to my discussion 
in Chapter 4, it requires a distinct discursive opening for something to be 
‘allowed’ to be seen as ‘new’, i.e. for the claim that something is ‘new’, to 
be ‘in the true’. In this sense, acknowledging the ‘new’ that came is always 
already a product of the discursive environment, from within which it is 
‘observed’. It is not a context-free observation. Furthermore, as we saw in 
the brief overview of the various ideas that have come to be associated with 
the word globalisation, the ‘new world’ is inevitably filled with conceptions 
that are grounded in both, distinct lived realities and existing webs of mean-
ings.   
Pushing this point further, the proclamation of the ‘new’ that came can 
be seen as a promising strategic move in the constant struggle over the legit-
imation of past and future decisions and the presentation of one (understand-
ing of the) world as more ‘real’ than another. The following quote by US 
President George W. Bush, already extracted above, is an excellent illustra-
tion of the potential power and use of the proclamation of the ‘newness’ of 
the world as a means to legitimise decisions and actions. The quote shows 
how the supposed ‘newness’ of the world is used to legitimise and ‘natural-
ise’, in this case ex post, a particular decision, namely the US-led military 
intervention in Iraq in 2003: 
 
“The last choice of any President ought to be to commit troops into combat. We 
ought to try everything possible before we commit one soul into combat, and that’s 
why I went to the United Nations. I said, ‘We see a threat. How about you?’ You’ve 
passed resolutions before – resolution after resolution after resolution. And I said – so 
I said, ‘There’s a new world here.’ After September the 11th, we must take threats se-
riously.” (Bush 2004) 
 
As these words suggest, it is because ‘there is a new world here’ that the de-
cision to intervene militarily in Iraq is presented as justified. Another apt 
example on the same lines is the following claim, made in the Introduction 
to the 2002 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 
(NSS 2002):  
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“In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of 
action.” 
 
Again, it is the (proclaimed) existence of the ‘new world’ that ‘naturalises’ 
the decision to adopt an ‘active’ approach to ‘peace and security’. This 
quote illustrates that the proclamation of the ‘newness’ of the world is a par-
ticularly promising move in efforts to legitimise past and future decisions 
precisely because it camouflages a political move under a cloak of obvious-
ness, innocence and objectivity. In the particular case of the NSS 2002, it 
‘naturalises’ a pro-active and, in fact, pre-emptive approach to security.9 
In addition, the proclamation of the ‘new’ that came evokes a historical 
caesura. The ‘observation’ that we are confronted with a ‘new world’, ‘new 
enemies’, ‘new threats’ and ‘new challenges’, in the sense of new kinds of 
threats, new kinds of enemies and new kinds of challenges insinuates an on-
tological uncertainty. This ontological uncertainty implies a state of episte-
mological uncertainty. It symbolically produces a state, in which – given the 
supposed ‘newness’ of the world – we have lost the ability to readily under-
stand the very nature of the present. To proclaim that the world, in which we 
live, has come to be ‘new’, as a result of an event like the fall of the Berlin 
Wall or 9/11, establishes a historical divide into a ‘before’ and ‘after’, 
carves historical time neatly and decisively, and defines the relationship be-
tween the temporal categories ‘past’ and ‘present’ in a particular way. It im-
plies that experiences of the past no longer hold in the ‘new’ reality, which 
has supplanted the familiar, the known world. As such, it fuels a notion of 
and legitimises a state of exception, in which constant adaption to an ‘un-
known’ world is necessary. In this ‘new world’, it is no longer just the future 
that must be predicted but the present itself. This prediction, however, must 
do without (experiences of) the past because the past is no longer a trustwor-
thy basis for such an endeavour (see further Selchow 2013). This is precise-
ly what is implied in President George W. Bush’s earlier quoted post-9/11 
address to US High School students, in which he explains: 
 
“You’re graduating in a time of war, right here in America, but a war that your text-
books really haven’t been able to describe before. It’s a new kind of threat to our 
country.” (Bush 2002b) 
 
These words insinuate that, in the ‘new (post-9/11) world’, existing text-
books and, by extension, existing analyses have lost their value. The past 
does not provide the ground for decisions to be taken in the present. It does 
not provide guidance for action in the ‘new world’. This means, while the 
proclamation of the ‘new’ that came implies a speaking position that is less 
active than the one implied in the proclamation of the ‘new’ to come, it 
                                                    
9 For a discussion of the pre-emptive turn in security practices, see for instance de 
Goede (2008) and Stockdale (2013).    
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opens a distinct space for actors to move on in this ‘new world’. It paves the 
path for potential moves, which are made independent of historical 
knowledge and past experiences.10 
I will pick up these points and refine them in Chapter 6, in which I con-
ceptualise the ‘new world’ as a distinct mode of the temporal category ‘pre-
sent’ and position it in line with the categories ‘past’ and ‘future’. For now, 
we take from the above the distinction between the proclamation of the ‘new 
world’ to come, as an expression of the modern fondness for the striving for 
the ‘new world’, and the proclamation of the ‘new’ that came. The latter is 
the kind of ‘new world’ that is implied in the reaction to the breakdown of 
the bipolar bloc system, which, as I discussed in Chapter 3, allowed ‘global-
isation’ to come to be ‘in the true.’    
 
 
THE PROCLAMATION OF THE ‘NEW WORLD’ AS A 
MANIFESTATION OF AN ‘AWARENESS’ OF THE 
REFLEXIVE ‘BACKFIRING’ OF MODERNISATION  
 
In the previous section, I reflected on what it means when social actors ‘pro-
claim’ that there is something ‘new’ about the world. In this section, I make 
a move in a different direction. While I stay with the issue of the ‘new 
world’, I take up a different scholarly position and suggest that we under-
stand the proclamation of the ‘new’ that came as a manifestation of an 
‘awareness’ of the complexity of the ‘reflexive modern’ social world, in 
general, and, in particular, as a manifestation of the ‘reflexive ‘backfiring’ 
of modernisation’; the latter being constituted by three aspects: the “internal 
cosmopolitisation” (Beck 2006: 2) of national societies, the existence of 
                                                    
10 Taking the above together, it can be argued that the proclamation of a ‘new’ post-
9/11 world played a significant role in the construction of 9/11 and the narrative 
of the ‘global war on terror’. It helped to open the path for the US-led military in-
tervention in Iraq in 2003 and the removal of Saddam Hussein. This interpreta-
tion is supported by the observation that plans to remove Saddam Hussein from 
power were not just developed in the aftermath of and in direct reaction to 9/11. 
A public letter to President Bill Clinton in 1998 illustrates that the idea has been 
there before. In this letter, prominent US public commentators, among them 
Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, demanded “a willingness to undertake 
military action as diplomacy is clearly failing. In the long term, it means remov-
ing Saddam Hussein and his regime from power” (Project for the New America 
1998). It was not only a change in administration that this plan was followed 
through. The distinct construction of 9/11 and, as I argue, the construction of the 
world as ‘new’, that is, as different in kind and demanding radically new moves, 
opened the possibility for such a move and helped to put the 1998-plan into ac-
tion.   
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“global risk” (Beck 1992, 1999, also 2009a), and the “return of uncertainty” 
(Beck 1994: 8; also Bonß 1996).  
To put forward such a suggestion presupposes a particular conception of 
the world, one which is grounded in an interpretation of sociologist Ulrich 
Beck’s work. According to this conception, social reality is shaped by (the 
interplay of) the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of the process of modernisation, con-
stituted by the just mentioned ‘internal cosmopolitisation’11 of national soci-
eties, ‘global risk’ and ‘return of uncertainty’, on the one side, and the prev-
alence of the “national perspective” and “methodological nationalism” 
(Beck 2006), on the other side.  
In what follows, I provide an account of this conception of social reality. 
I start by elaborating on each of the two aspects that shape social reality. I 
do this by building on Beck (especially 1994, 2004, 2006), as well as, my 
own interpretation of his theory, as outlined elsewhere (see Selchow 2015a, 
2016a). Having sketched this conception, I then move to elaborate on my 
claim that the proclamation of the ‘new world’ that came is a manifestation 
of an ‘awareness’ for this kind of social reality.    
  
Beck’s ‘provisional’ project of rethinking how we think 
about social reality 
In his rich and extensive scholarship, sociologist Ulrich Beck paints a com-
plex picture of the state and nature of contemporary national societies.12 Be-
yond the bounds of his home discipline sociology, it is especially his ‘risk 
society’-thesis (see Beck 1986, 1992, 1999a, 2009a) that has attracted atten-
tion and that has inspired not only scholarly but also public imaginations. 
Yet, ‘risk society’ is only one component of Beck’s social theory. It is just 
one of three theorems that constitute his theory of social reality, the other 
two being “cosmopolitisation” (especially Beck 2004, 2006) and “individu-
alisation” (e.g. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1994). In this sense, it is unpro-
ductive to take Beck as a ‘risk’-scholar, as it has been done by many in the 
political studies and IR discourse. Such a conception of Beck distracts from 
what is at the heart of his scholarship and from the key drivers of his intel-
lectual endeavour. Beck is not a ‘risk’-scholar, narrowly understood, and his 
‘risk society’-thesis is not a theory of ‘risk’ as such. Rather, it is an attempt 
to question and deconstruct the usefulness of the modern idea ‘risk’ in its 
political function and applications. In this sense, the invented German word 
Risikogesellschaft (‘risk society’) is not a term that refers to a society with 
                                                    
11 The German word Kosmopolitisierung in Beck’s work is sometimes translated 
into English as cosmopolitanisation’ (e.g. Beck 2006; Beck and Sznaider 2006) 
and sometimes as cosmopolitisation (e.g. Beck 2011, 2014). In his most recent 
work, it is consistently the latter. Both terms mean the same. I use the word cos-
mopolitisation.   
12 The following elaborations and interpretation of Beck build on Selchow (2016a).    
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more ‘risks’, as it is sometimes understood (e.g. Krahmann 2011). On the 
contrary, the word serves to signal that ‘risk’ and ‘society’ no longer work 
as concepts to grasp social reality (see Bayerischer Rundfunk 2014).  
Beck’s overarching aim and main scholarly passion was to trigger an 
epistemological shift in sociology, in particular, and in the social sciences, 
more generally. Most recently, he uses the word metamorphosis to capture 
the kind of change that, he holds, modern societies are subject to, a change 
that warrants a new approach, in fact, a new epistemology (Beck 2016; also 
Beck 2015). As Bronner (1995: 68) puts it, Beck’s main conviction is that 
“[w]e live in a world […] different from the one in which we think.” This 
striving for a radically different way of approaching and understanding so-
cial reality is grounded in Beck’s particular conception of this reality as a 
‘new’ reality.  
As I put it elsewhere (Selchow 2016a), the ambitious goal to completely 
rethink how we see and think about society – namely, by moving beyond the 
(modern) language of ‘development’, ‘change’ and ‘(social) transfor-
mation’, and away from the (naturalised) focus on the nation-state as the 
guiding social and political category – accounts for the kind of ‘provision-
ality’ that shapes Beck’s work. This provisionality is manifest in his writ-
ings in two ways. First, it is manifest in the sometimes loose and what ap-
pears to be inconsistent use of words and, arguably, even concepts through-
out Beck’s texts: is it “cosmopolitanisation” (e.g. Beck 2006) or “cosmopo-
litisation” (e.g. Beck 2011)? Is there a difference between “imagined cos-
mopolitan risk communities” (Beck and Grande 2010), “imagined commu-
nities of global risk” (Beck 2011) and “cosmopolitan communities of cli-
mate risk” (Beck, Blok, Tyfield and Zhang 2013)? And where exactly is the 
dividing line between his idea of ‘risk’, ‘danger’ and ‘catastrophe’? Beck 
sometimes uses these words and concepts interchangeably. Second, the pro-
visionality is manifest in his theory itself, which does not always unfold in a 
strictly consistent way across his various publications. Most obviously, as he 
himself acknowledges, there are two interpretations of ‘reflexive modernisa-
tion’ in his writings, where only one fully captures the essence of his main 
thesis (see Beck 2013).13  
And yet, this ‘provisionality’ is not a shortcoming in Beck’s writing. It is 
something that lies in the nature of the exercise in which he was involved 
and to which he was committed. The provisionality mirrors “the ambivalent 
character of the world [Beck] describes”, argues Bronner (1995: 67). “In the 
state of total change we try to think this change. This is difficult”, Beck ex-
plains, self-reflectively adding, “hence, we cannot appear with full confi-
dence”, implying the imperative of constant adjustment and rewriting along 
the path of discovery and theorisation (Beck 2013; my own translation). In 
this sense, as I also suggest elsewhere (see Selchow 2016a), Beck’s lan-
guage use and theory development was, and had to be, about the invention, 
                                                    
13 I return to this point in due course.    
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testing and rewriting of concepts and frameworks – ‘provisional’, playful, 
sweeping and somewhat provocative, but at the same time, inviting and 
open to critique, by virtue of the nature of the task he set himself. 
Taking into account these general comments on Beck’s oeuvre, what fol-
lows is not a comprehensive account of Beck’s theory but a conception of 
contemporary social reality that is grounded in a purposeful and selective 
reading and interpretation of his writings. In this conception, social reality is 
shaped by two aspects and their interplay. As mentioned above, these two 
aspects are, on the one side, the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of the process of 
modernisation and, on the other side, the prevalence of the ‘national per-
spective’ and ‘methodological nationalism’. In the following, I elaborate on 
each of these two aspects in turn.  
 
The reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, comprising the 
‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of national societies, ‘global 
risk’ and the ‘return of uncertainty’ 
With the term ‘reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation’ I capture three as-
pects that together shape contemporary social reality: the ‘internal cosmopo-
litisation’ of national societies, the existence of ‘global risk’ and the ‘return 
of uncertainty’. These aspects are intimately interwoven in, both, empirical 
reality and Beck’s writings. They determine each other but are not of the 
same order. Yet, in order to reduce complexity, I present each of them side 
by side, separately from each other, and as if they belonged to the same 
class of phenomena.  
First, in the conception of contemporary social reality that constitutes 
the ‘pre-theoretical commitment’, which shapes my take on the omnipres-
ence of global, national societies and their institutions are shaped by a pro-
cess called “cosmopolitisation” (especially Beck 2004, 2006).14 The term 
cosmopolitisation refers to the unfolding enmeshment of lived realities, that 
is, of cultures and horizons of experience (Erfahrungshorizonte) and hori-
zons of expectation (Erwartungshorizonte). Cosmopolitisation is, as Beck 
(2006: 19) stresses, a “really existing” process that shapes modern national 
societies. He invents the German word Wirklichkeitskosmopolitismus15 to 
stress this important point (Beck 2004: 31). This term is used to make sure 
that ‘cosmopolitisation’ is not misunderstood as a normative project that so-
cial agents choose to advance (or not). Cosmopolitisation is not to be con-
fused with what is usually referred to with the word cosmopolitanism.16 The 
process cosmopolitisation, this enmeshment of lived realities, of cultures, 
horizons of experience and horizons of expectation, is not a conscious and 
                                                    
14 The following builds on Selchow (2016a).    
15 The word Wirklichkeit is to be tanslated as reality.   
16 For a short elaboration of the distinction between cosmopolitanism and cosmopo-
litisation in Beck’s own words, see Beck (2009: 13).   
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intended process that is triggered and guided by the normative ideals of the 
(elite) project of cosmopolitanism. Rather, in Beck’s conception, the internal 
cosmopolitisation of social reality and national societies unfolds and shapes 
lived realities, societies and institutions, regardless of whether there is an 
awareness and appreciation of it, and regardless of whether this is wanted 
and/or intended. The internal cosmopolitisation of national societies unfolds 
as a side effect of actions.  
It is crucial to appreciate the significance of the idea of cosmopolitisa-
tion being a side effect because it captures the important point that the inter-
nal cosmopolitisation of social reality unfolds in the process of actions and 
decisions that are actually targeted at other ends – not at a cosmopolitisation 
of lived reality, in general, and national societies, in particular. What is 
meant by the internal cosmopolitisation of social reality and national socie-
ties is not a process that is voluntarily, let alone, strategically set into gear 
under the label ‘cosmopolitisation’; rather, it is a process that inevitably, un-
intentionally and ‘accidentally’ happens to be set into gear by actions of so-
cial actors, which go under different labels and which are motivated by dif-
ferent intentions. As Beck puts it, the internal cosmopolitisation of national 
societies is an  
 
“unwanted [in the sense of unintended] and unobserved [in the sense of unseen] side 
effect of actions that are not intended as ‘cosmopolitan’ in the normative sense.” 
(Beck 2006: 18)  
 
It is  
 
“an unforeseen social effect of actions directed to other ends performed by human be-
ings operating within a network of global interdependence risks.” (ibid. 48)  
  
It is worth taking up Beck’s example of the hiring practice of the German 
football club 1. FC Bayern München to illustrate this point (ibid. 11). The 
practice of hiring football players from around the world as a strategic prac-
tice undertaken by the managers of the club in order to create a world class 
football team has the unintended side effect of setting into gear a process of 
internal cosmopolitisation of Bavaria, because, as Beck (ibid.) puts it, it 
produces  
 
“a profane cosmopolitan ‘We’ in which the boundaries between internal and external, 
between the national and the international, have long since been transcended. Bayern 
Munich symbolizes a cosmopolitan Bavaria that officially cannot and must not exist 
in Bavaria, but […] exists. Indeed, without this taken-for-granted cosmopolitanism 
Bayern Munich […] would not exist.”17 
                                                    
17 In the original this reads: “Ich lebe in München. Wenn es richtig ist, daß der 
kosmopolitische Blick die kosmopolitischen Potenzen der Provinz aufdeckt, 
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But the idea that the cosmopolitisation of social reality is a side effect also 
means that even explicitly exclusive actions entail a cosmopolitisation. This 
makes it an “irreversible” (Beck 2006: 74) and long-term process. As a con-
sequence, as Beck argues,  
 
“consciousness and politics are for that very reason fundamentally ambivalent. But 
the converse also holds: because consciousness and politics are fundamentally am-
bivalent, the cosmopolitanization of reality is advancing. For example, all ‘opponents 
of globalization’ share with their ‘opponents’ the global communications media 
(thereby enhancing their utility for promoting and organizing transnational protest 
movements).” (ibid. 74) 
 
This means that even actions, which can be seen to have been actively and 
consciously taken against a reality of enmeshed lives, inevitably fuel the 
process of the internal cosmopolitisation of social reality and of national so-
cieties. Anti-European parties, such as the UK Independence Party (UKIP), 
constitute another helpful example to illustrate this point (Beck 2014a). 
They follow an exclusionary and anti-Europe(an integration) doctrine but, in 
order to be ‘successful’ as anti-EU parties, their representatives sit in the 
European parliament. In fact, they have to sit in the European parliament in 
order to succeed. In doing so, they ‘accidentally’ but inevitably fuel the pro-
cess of the internal cosmopolitisation of social reality and of national socie-
ties, as a(n unintended) side effect of their active striving for exclusion. In 
this sense, the cosmopolitisation of national societies does not necessarily 
lead to a normatively ‘cosmopolitan’ reality:  
                                                    
dann muß sich das auch am Beispiel Münchens zeigen lassen: Was meint kos-
mopolitisches München? Zunächst – im Sinne des banalen Kosmopolitismus – 
Bayern München. Thomas Mann schreibt: ‘München leuchtet.’ Vielleicht darf 
man Thomas Mann trivialisieren: Bayern München leuchtet – jedenfalls dann, 
wenn die Fußball-Profis dieses weltberühmten Clubs schöne Tore schießen. Steht 
Bayern München, stehen DIE Bayern für Bayern? Ohne jeden Zweifel. Stehen 
DIE Bayern für ‘wir sind wir’ oder – wie es auf Bayerisch heißt – ‘mir san mir’? 
Niemals! Ausgeschlossen! Wer schießt die Tore? Oft genug ein Brasilianer, des-
sen Ballzauber dem Münchner Fussball-Club Weltklasse verleiht. Bayern-Spieler 
sind selbstverständlich ursprünglich weder Bayern noch Münchner, sondern 
vielfältigen nationalen Ursprungs, sprechen mit vielen Zungen, haben viele 
Pässe. Worauf manche in Bayern so großen Wert legen: Mir san mir und die An-
deren die Anderen, gilt dort nicht, wo das Bayerische Herz schlägt. Bayern Mün-
chen steht für ein profan-kosmopolitisches Wir, in dem die Grenzen von innen 
und außen, von national und international längst ueberwunden sind. Bayern 
München symbolisiert ein kosmopolitisches Bayern, das es in Bayern offiziell 
weder geben darf noch geben kann, nur gibt. Mehr noch: Ohne diesen 
selbstverständlichen Kosmopolitismus gäbe es DIE Bayern, also Bayern, nicht” 
(Beck 2004: 20-21).   
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“There is no necessary relation between the internal cosmopolitanization of national 
societies and the emergence of a cosmopolitan consciousness, subject or agent”, 
 
writes Beck (2006: 74).   
A third and final example not only further illustrates the above point but 
also builds a bridge between this first and the second aspect that constitutes 
the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation and shapes contemporary nation-
al societies, namely the existence of ‘global risk’. Following the above con-
ception of the internal cosmopolitisation of social reality and of national so-
cieties as a side effect of actions that are targeted at other ends, the exclu-
sive, in the sense of explicitly national decisions and actions to increase the 
German GDP by, for instance, promoting the production of automobiles 
through German companies, have to be seen as ‘accidentally’ setting into 
gear the process of the internal cosmopolitisation of Germany. This is be-
cause these exclusive, national decisions inevitably link Germany and, say, 
Tuvalu. They enmesh German (national) lived reality with Tuvaluan (na-
tional) lived reality through the (potential) consequences of Germany’s ex-
clusive, national decisions, i.e. consequences such as rising sea levels and 
the warming of the climate beyond 2ºC due to a (possible) increase in car-
bon emissions. In this sense, as Beck and Grande (2010: 417) put it, cos-
mopolitisation is a process that ‘accidentally’ brings the “global other” into 
the midst of other “global others” – the internal cosmopolitisation of social 
reality unfolds accidentally and, in this case, as the product of exclusive na-
tional actions and decisions.  
But there is more to this example than that it further illustrates what has 
been said above. The issue of ‘unintended consequences’ brings us to the 
second aspect that shapes contemporary social reality and national societies. 
This is the existence of what Beck calls “global risk” (Beck 1992, 1999, also 
2009a). To understand what is meant by ‘global risk’, it is necessary to start 
with a brief look at the idea ‘risk’.  
‘Risk’ is a child of modernity.18 It is a modern way of dealing with the 
uncertainty of the future. Generally speaking, notions of uncertainty and the 
unknown are central components in socio-political life. The way a society 
perceives and deals with uncertainty and the unknown, more broadly, how it 
understands and deals with the future, affects its political action in the pre-
sent.19 Perceptions of uncertainty and the unknown impact on the way polit-
ical decisions are made in that they shape what decisions are perceived so-
cially acceptable, that is, legitimate. As Brian Wynne and Kerstin Dressel 
(2001) show in their comparative study of German and UK perceptions of 
and reactions to the (potential) danger of bovine spongiform encephalopathy 
                                                    
18 For the following paragraphs, see Selchow (2014: 69-70); also Loughnan and 
Selchow (2013: 274-282).  
19 In Chapter 6, I elaborate in more detail on the relationship between the temporal 
categories ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’.  
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(BSE), which became an issue in Europe in the late 1990s, there are cultural 
differences in perceptions of uncertainty and the unknown, leading to fun-
damentally different political decisions.20 These different political decisions 
are, however, each perceived as ‘reasonable’ and legitimate in their respec-
tive cultural contexts. Over and above this, the criteria for legitimate deci-
sions are not only culturally specific but of course also historical – they are 
valid at a specific moment but might change over time.  
Yet, despite their cultural specificities, what modern societies, like the 
UK and Germany, share is an approach to uncertainty and the unknown that 
is ‘active’ and ‘optimistic’; in this respect they stand in contrast to tradition-
al societies. The modern approach to uncertainty and the unknown is ‘ac-
tive’ in that it is grounded in the idea that humans have their future in their 
hands. This is one of the significant characteristics of modernity. Modernity 
is about the active “colonization of the future” (Giddens 1994: 7).  
Besides being ‘active’, the modern approach to uncertainty and the un-
known is ‘optimistic’ in the sense that it understands the unknown as some-
thing that could be known, either by overcoming (lay) ignorance or through 
further scientific exploration and advanced/advancing knowledge produc-
tion (Wehling 2010: 265). This is an ‘optimistic’ approach to the unknown 
and to uncertainty, in the sense that it takes it as something that is not yet 
known. In this context, ‘risk’ is a prominent modern way of dealing with the 
unknown and the uncertainty of the future. More precisely, it is a way of 
dealing with the uncertainty that human actions (or inactions) entail. ‘Risk’ 
is about assessing the probability of the future occurrence of an unintended 
                                                    
20 Wynne and Dressel (2001) compare perceptions of what they call “actionable 
uncertainty” in Britain and Germany as expressed by the respective govern-
ments’ chief veterinary officers. They identify in the attitude of the British offi-
cial “the taken-for-granted UK policy view of effective scientific certainty about 
the lack of species transferability of the BSE agent, and hence the lack of risk to 
humans” (ibid. 148). In contrast, the Germans held a very different understanding 
of the nature of non-knowledge and its role in policy-making. Whereas the UK 
officials’ “German counterparts saw that the abstract possibility of such species 
crossing represented a serious, that is, ‘policy-actionable’, scientific uncertainty. 
The UK policy-scientists frequently talked of the ‘lack of evidence’ for this pos-
sibility, hence, the ‘unscientific’ nature of the German position” (ibid.). Wynne 
and Dressel’s comparative investigation of perceptions of uncertainty and non-
knowledge does not only explain the widespread public fury in Britain, claiming 
that the EU in general and Germany in particular acted ‘irrationally’ when they 
banned British beef, it also reveals the fundamentally different understandings of 
the phenomena of non-knowledge and uncertainty and their different role in and 
impact on policy-decisions: in contrast to the British, the German notion of non-
knowledge and its perceived relevance lead to a more pro-active policy formation 
(ibid. 122).  
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consequence of an action in the present. An assessment of such kind is un-
dertaken on the basis of past experiences.  
Taking these brief points on ‘risk’ together, we see why it makes sense 
to call the tool ‘risk’ a ‘child of modernity’. ‘Risk’ only makes sense within 
a modern cultural context, in which we have human agency and in which the 
future is imagined as able to be shaped by agents, rather than pre-
determined by a higher force (such as deity). Again, with Anthony Giddens 
(2002: 24) we can understand ‘risk’ as  
 
“the mobilising dynamic of a society bent on change, that wants to determine its own 
future rather than leaving it to religion, tradition, or the vagaries of nature.” 
 
This does not mean that the future can ever actually be determined through 
the logic of ‘risk’ or that uncertainty can actually be overcome. As Gerda 
Reith (2004: 396) explains, ‘risk’  
 
“cannot make the future predictable or the world certain, [but] it can create the means 
for acting as though it were.” 
 
Ultimately, ‘risk’ is a fiction; it is an imagination of potential unintended, 
future consequences of decisions in the present. In Beck’s words, it is 
“something non-existent, constructed or fictitious” (Beck 1999: 100). In this 
sense, ‘risk’  “exist[s…] as a feature of knowing, not as an aspect of being” 
(Reith 2004: 387). Pushing this further, Niklas Luhmann (quoted in ibid. 
385-6) explains,  
 
“[t]he outside world itself knows no risks, for it knows neither distinctions, nor ex-
pectations, nor evaluations, nor probabilities.” 
 
Having outlined what ‘risk’ is makes it now possible to demonstrate that 
Beck’s concept ‘global risk’ captures something entirely different from the 
modern notion ‘risk’. In fact, Beck uses the term ‘global risk’ to question 
the modern notion ‘risk’.21 The adjective global in the term ‘global risk’ 
does not refer to the (geographical) reach of unintended consequences of de-
cisions, but serves as a ‘question mark’ that casts a shadow of doubt over 
the idea of ‘risk’ as a (modern) technology to be applied ‘naturally’ in deal-
ing with the uncertainty of the world and the unintended, potential conse-
quences of decisions made in the present. It points to “the arrogant assump-
tion of controllability” that underpins the modern notion ‘risk’ (Beck 2009a: 
5). Let me unravel this.     
To begin with, the term ‘global risk’ refers to a distinct kind of uncer-
tainty, namely to the potential consequences of “industrial, that is, techno-
economic decisions and considerations of utility” (Beck 2009a: 98). These 
                                                    
21 For the following paragraphs, see Selchow (2014: 77-81, 2016a).  
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decisions must be understood as being grounded in modern institutions and 
basic modern principles. They have, as Beck (2009a: 98) puts it, their 
“peaceful origin in the centres of rationality and prosperity with the bless-
ings of the guarantors of law and order.” The concept ‘global risk’ high-
lights the fact that the potential unintended consequences of these decisions 
cannot be imagined or dealt with through the modern tool ‘risk’. The tech-
nological advancements brought about by industrialisation, the progress of 
modernisation and the modern sciences require a different handling of the 
potential unintended consequences of these decisions and, consequently, of 
how these decisions are made.  
This different handling of potential unintended consequences of deci-
sions made in the present is necessary because of three dimensions of such 
decisions. First, ‘industrial, that is, techno-economic decisions and consider-
ations of utility’ need to be imagined as potentially having consequences 
that might stand and remain beyond knowledge. Second, these decisions 
must be imagined as potentially producing Nichtwissen (non-knowledge) 
(Beck 2009a; see also Wehling 2006, 2010, 2012). Third, and finally, they 
need to be imagined as potentially producing unintended consequences that 
are “socially delimited in space and time” (Beck and Grande 2010: 418) – 
all of which we see supported in empirical cases, such as the accident in the 
Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant on 26 April 1986, or climate change as an 
unintended consequence of past industrialisation and past decisions that lead 
to CO2 emissions.  
Taken together, all this means that ‘techno-economic decisions’ can no 
longer be grounded in an assessment of their potential unintended conse-
quences that is shaped by a national container-thinking and based on the 
modern belief in progress through scientific knowledge production. On the 
contrary, as Beck stresses, potential consequences of ‘techno-economic de-
cisions and considerations of utility’, i.e. ‘global risks’, need to be under-
stood as “a result of more knowledge” (Beck 2009, 5; emphasis added), as 
opposed to something that could be ‘tamed’ and dealt with through more 
(modern scientific) knowledge production. In this sense, they are to be un-
derstood as the ‘fruits’, that is, the very success of the process of modernisa-
tion, and not as the dark side effects of it, something that could be dealt with 
based on the same premises that informed and legitimised the actions and 
decisions that produced them in the first place. For instance, as I put it else-
where (Selchow 2014: 79), ‘global risks’ are the outcome of our very under-
standing of the low toxicity, low reactivity and low flammability of Chloro-
fluorocarbons (CFCs) that made these gases attractive for use in refrigera-
tors, or of our ability to genetically modify organisms, or of the scientific 
sophistication that enables us to enrich uranium, or of our achievements that 
make it possible to be mobile and travel the globe by plane. In this vein, 
“[c]limate change, for example, is a product of successful industrialization 
which systematically disregards its consequences for nature and humanity”, 
as Beck (2009: 8; emphasis added) puts it.  
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The above is just a small but significant shift in the understanding of the 
potential consequences of ‘industrial, techno-economic decisions and con-
siderations of utility’, i.e. ‘global risks’. It implies that these ‘risks’ cannot 
be conceptualised as the (as yet ‘untamed’) shortcomings of the process of 
modernisation and industrialisation. Rather, they have to be acknowledged 
as the very realisation, indeed, the triumph and success of modernisation 
and industrialisation. In this sense, what is imagined as ‘global risk’ is dif-
ferent in kind from the modern imagination ‘risk’. Ultimately, it is exactly 
this distinct different in kind-nature of what is imagined under the label 
‘global risk’ that justifies conceptualising ‘global risks’ as having a funda-
mental impact on modern national societies. ‘Global risks’ produce a social 
reality that is subject to a ‘borderless’ necessity to cooperate (Koopera-
tionszwang), as well as an interrelation of responsibility (Verantwortung-
szusammenhang) (Beck and Grande 2010: 417), whether or not this is 
acknowledged by actors.22   
This brings us back to the above sketched reality of cosmopolitisation, in 
which the ‘global other’ is implicated in the decisions and actions of other 
‘global others’. My elaboration on ‘global risk’ now advances our under-
standing of cosmopolitisation, as it makes us aware that the internal cos-
mopolitisation of national societies is actually best understood as a product 
of ‘global risk’. This also helps us now to better understand the above pro-
vided quote, in which Beck describes cosmopolitisation as an  
 
“unforeseen social effect of actions directed to other ends performed by human be-
ings operating within a network of global interdependence risks.” (Beck 2006: 48; 
emphasis added) 
 
What he calls ‘global interdependence risks’ here are, in essence, what I de-
scribed above as ‘global risks’.23 Furthermore, my brief reflection on ‘global 
risk’ makes us aware that, as I mentioned at the beginning of this section, 
the three aspects that constitute the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation – 
the internal cosmopolitisation of national societies, the existence of global 
risks, and the return of uncertainty – are not only difficult to separate from 
each other, as they are intimately enmeshed, but that they are also not neces-
sarily of the same order. However, as suggested above, for my purposes 
here, a ‘compartmentalised’ view at them is sufficient and ‘acceptable’ in 
order to provide a picture of the presupposed conception of social reality 
that informs my move of taking the proclamation of the ‘newness’ of the 
                                                    
22 Again, it is worth reminding us that ‘risk’ is not about actual unintended conse-
quences but the imagination of possible future consequences, which serves as the 
ground for decisions.  
23 This is an example of the ealier mentioned challenge that Beck does not always 
use language coherently across his writings.  
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world as a manifestation of the ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of 
modernisation.  
To finalise this picture, I now turn to the third aspect that constitutes the 
reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, which is the ‘return of uncertainty’. 
Generally speaking, the term ‘return of uncertainty’ refers to the dubious-
ness of the above sketched ‘optimistic’ modern approach to uncertainty and 
the unknown. In the vein of my elaborations above, it implies that non-
knowledge can no longer simply be understood as something that could be 
unlocked through (further) scientific knowledge production (see in detail 
Wehling 2010: 260-262). It can no longer simply be taken as  
 
“the given ‘primitive or native state’ […] from which the scientific endeavor departs 
to replace it, sooner or later, with complete and reliable knowledge.” (Böschen, 
Kastenhofer, Rust, Soentgen and Wehling 2010: 785) 
 
In this sense, the expression ‘return of uncertainty’ refers to the fact that sci-
entific knowledge produces non-knowledge (which was also already indi-
cated in my reflection on ‘global risk’ above).  
We will see in more detail in my elaboration on the ‘national perspec-
tive’, below, that the word return does not suggest that there was ever a time 
when ‘uncertainty’ had vanished. Rather, the word indicates that, as sug-
gested above, the modern optimistic narrative of scientific progress and the 
belief in advanced and advancing knowledge production, which is encapsu-
lated in the notion ‘risk’, enabled and enables an approach to the world and 
the potential unintended consequences of actions and decisions in the pre-
sent, as if uncertainty could be ‘tamed’, and as if it had ‘vanished’ (at least 
for the purposes of making (national) ‘techno-economic decisions’). As cit-
ed above, Beck (2009a: 5) calls this an “arrogant assumption of controllabil-
ity.”  
Moving further, the fact that scientific knowledge produces non-
knowledge does not simply refer to the common adage that the more we 
know the more we realise we do not know, that is, the more we are aware of 
known unknowns. Rather, it captures the idea that increasing scientific 
knowledge production leads to an increase in ‘unknown unknowns’, that is, 
things that we do not know we do not know – and, furthermore, that it (po-
tentially) leads to things that we are actually not able to know. In other 
words, scientific knowledge produces non-knowledge and uncertainty that 
would not exist without scientific knowledge production and, on top of 
things, that might remain beyond human grasp (Wehling 2010: 266-7; also 
especially Beck 1992).24  
To this point, I have captured one aspect of the ‘return of uncertainty’. 
But there is more to it. As I also explain elsewhere (see Selchow 2016a), the 
                                                    
24 The word might is important here. The claim is not that it remains beyond human 
grasp but that it might.  
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term ‘return of uncertainty’ also points to and captures an inherent uncer-
tainty, which is due to the ‘ambivalence’, as Beck (2006: 74; also Beck 
2013) calls it, that arises between contemporary horizons of experience 
(Erfahrungshorizonte) and horizons of expectation (Erwartungshorizonte), 
on the one side, and modern principles and institutions, on the other. Again, 
this is closely enmeshed with the two aspects discussed above, namely the 
‘internal cosmopolitisation’ and ‘global risk’. It can best be explained with 
reference to what is meant by “reflexive modernisation” (e.g. Beck 1994; al-
so Beck, Bonß and Lau 2003).  
As mentioned in the first part of this section, there are two interpreta-
tions of the theory ‘reflexive modernisation’ in Beck’s work. The dominant 
interpretation, which was developed by Beck and his colleagues in the 10-
year-collaborative research programme “Reflexive Moderne” at Ludwig-
Maximilians-Universität München (1999-2009), is less radical than the 
more marginal one, as Beck (2013) himself suggests. At the heart of both in-
terpretations is the distinction between the basic principles of modernity, on 
the one side, and basic modern institutions, such as the nation-state, family 
etc, on the other side. Basic principles of modernity are, for instance, free-
dom, market dependence, rationality, progress, statehood, the obligation to 
give reasons, as well as principles of equality. In a nutshell, the first, less 
radical interpretation of reflexive modernisation holds that the radicalisation 
of these basic modern principles, which has taken place in the course of in-
dustrial modernisation, produces side effects, which lead to a crisis of mod-
ern institutions. These side effects are, for instance, actually (in contrast to 
potentially) occurring unintended consequences of ‘industrial’ or ‘techno-
economic decisions and considerations of utility’, which have not been ac-
counted for in the ‘risk’ assessments that guided past decisions. A good ex-
ample of this sort of side effect is climate change as an actually occurring, 
unintended consequence of past ‘techno-economic decisions’. New kinds of 
family constellations that arise from advances in reproductive health or in 
the context of new communication technologies also fall into this category 
(e.g. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2013); this latter example shows that these 
side effects are, of course, not necessarily negative, or, better, that they are 
not necessarily ‘catastrophic’.   
Overall, these side effects can be grasped as a ‘backfiring’ of modernisa-
tion. They confront modern institutions with the progress of modernisation 
itself. Consequently, these institutions no longer measure up to social reali-
ty, where the central point is that this social reality is the very product of 
modernity’s own radicalised principles. This is where the adjective reflexive 
comes in.  
In this first interpretation of ‘reflexive modernisation’, institutions are 
variable. They take different forms at different times, in response to various 
aspects of modernisation that ‘backfires’. In the scholarship, this has been 
translated into ideas about new governance constellations and new govern-
ance experiments (see Grande 2013). 
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The second interpretation of ‘reflexive modernisation’ builds on the first 
one but goes further. In this interpretation, it is not only the institutions that 
are set as variable but also the basic modern principles. This interpretation 
holds that, through rapid contemporary developments, a process of change is 
set into gear, which takes on a life of its own and generates a social reality 
that is qualitatively ‘new’, precisely because it is not only modern institu-
tions that are challenged by modernity’s ‘backfiring’ but also basic modern 
principles. “Modernity in this sense is a sub-political ‘revolutionary system’ 
without a revolutionary program or goal”, explains Beck (1995: 41). In this 
process of reflexive modernisation, both, modern institutions and modern 
principles are confronted with the consequences of the progress of moderni-
sation itself, which ‘reflexively’ overturns its own foundations, its institu-
tions and principles. This means that lived reality – the horizons of experi-
ence and horizons of expectation – no longer correlates with the institutions 
of modern national societies or with their principles. As a consequence, con-
temporary individuals enter a “Nicht-Koordinatensystem ihrer Erfahrung-
en”, as Beck (2013) puts it, ‘a non-coordinate system of their experiences’, 
which lies outside existing categories. This implies an ‘inherent uncertainty’ 
that shapes social reality. One of the consequences of this is what Beck and 
Lau (2004; see also Beck and Grande 2010) capture with the word ‘politici-
sation’. ‘Reflexive modernisation’ implies a ‘politicisation’ in the sense that 
even things that used to be perceived as anthropological constants, such as 
aspects of reproductive health, are now in the realm of choice and decisions, 
i.e. are ‘political’. 
 
The prevalence of the ‘national perspective’ and 
‘methodological nationalism’ 
The previous section sketched one side of the Beck-grounded conception of 
social reality that serves as the presupposition for my suggestion that the 
proclamation of the ‘newness’ of the world constitutes a manifestation of an 
‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation. I outlined what I 
mean by the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, which includes the ‘in-
ternal cosmopolitisation’ of national societies, the existence of ‘global risk’ 
and the ‘return of uncertainty’. 
In this present section, I turn to the second aspect. This is the prevalence 
of “the national perspective” and “methodological nationalism” (especially 
Beck 2006). More precisely, it is the prevalence of the tradition of ‘the na-
tional perspective’ and ‘methodological nationalism.’25  
 The prevalence of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’ and ‘meth-
odological nationalism’ is more straightforwardly explained than the reflex-
ive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation. The ‘national perspective’26 is a way of 
                                                    
25  For the following paragraphs, see Selchow (2016a, 2015a).  
26  Refer back to fn 2 in this chapter.  
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looking at the world that is grounded in “the equation of the nation-state 
with national society”, as Beck (2006: 48) puts it – “one of the most power-
ful convictions concerning society and politics” (ibid. 24). In a nutshell, the 
tradition of the ‘national perspective’ is the tradition that brings out a view 
on the world that is blind to the reality of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of mod-
ernisation, including the ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of national societies. 
Simultaneously, it re-produces “the categories in terms of which we under-
stand reality that take the nation-state as the norm” (ibid. 73). The ‘national 
perspective’ is grounded in modern conceptions of the world that do not 
acknowledge the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation. It does not 
acknowledge the above sketched nature of contemporary reality, which is 
shaped by the ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of national societies, the exist-
ence of ‘global risks’ and the ‘return of uncertainty’.   
Consequently, the ‘national perspective’ and ‘methodological national-
ism’ produce an ideational and conceptual layer that makes possible the es-
tablishment of institutions, which are not only ‘inadequate’ in the face of the 
nature of the social reality that is shaped by the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of 
modernisation but which actually produce ‘ambivalence’.  
 
“The national outlook [perspective], together with its associated grammar, is becom-
ing false. It fails to grasp that political, economic and cultural actions and their (in-
tended and unintended) consequences know no borders, indeed, it is completely blind 
to the fact that, even when nationalism is reignited by the collision with globality, 
this can only be conceptualized” (ibid. 18)  
 
as an ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of societies, and as the result of the reflex-
ive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation. In short, referring back to the above quot-
ed Stephen Bronner, in the conceptualisation of the world, which I present 
here, the social reality in which modernisation reflexively ‘backfires’ is the 
world, in which we live, and the tradition of the ‘national perspective’ and 
‘methodological nationalism’ shapes the world, in which we, i.e. social and 
political actors and scholars, think.  
 
The ‘reflexive modern’ social reality of ‘both/and’ 
To this point in this subsection of the present chapter, I have sketched the 
two aspects that shape social reality in the conception that underlies my ar-
gument that the proclamation of the ‘new’ that came is a manifestation of an 
‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation. These are, on the 
one hand, the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, constituted by the ‘in-
ternal cosmopolitisation’ of national societies, the existence of ‘global risk’, 
and the ‘return of uncertainty’, and, on the other hand, the tradition of the 
‘national perspective’ and ‘methodological nationalism’. To be precise, it is 
actually the interplay of these two aspects that shapes social reality. Even 
more precisely, their interplay brings out historical actualisations of each of 
these two aspects, which shape social reality.  
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In order to indicate the significance of the interplay of the above two as-
pects for the nature of social reality, it is worth giving it a distinct name: ‘re-
flexive modern’. Hence, according to the above sketched conceptualisation, 
social reality and national societies are best labelled ‘reflexive modern’.       
Moving forward from here, and following Beck further, the interplay of 
the two aspects – reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation and the tradition of 
the ‘national perspective’ – and, consequently, the path of societies are not 
to be imagined as leading into a particular direction. Putting it the other way 
around, it would be misguided and, in fact, an analytical strategy shaped by 
‘methodological nationalism’ to presuppose that the ‘development’ of ‘re-
flexive modern’ societies follows a distinct trajectory, against which it could 
be assessed (especially Beck 2016). In general, the ‘development’ of ‘reflex-
ive modern’ societies should not be seen as linear. In particular, as men-
tioned, it should not be seen as a process that leads to a (normative) cosmo-
politan consciousness, or cosmopolitan subjects or actors (e.g. Beck 2004: 
115). Reality might or might not ‘develop’, or as Beck recently put it, “met-
amorphose” (Beck 2016) into a normative cosmopolitan reality; or, societies 
might or might not ‘metamorphose’ into an explicitly exclusive and ‘nation-
al’ state, leaving perspectives deeply shaped by an expressly exclusive actu-
alisation of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’. In any case, none of 
these developments can be seen as either/or-developments (entweder-oder). 
Social reality, as it is conceptualised above, needs to be treated as a 
both/and-place (sowohl-als-auch), where the ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of 
national societies does not constitute the opposite of the ‘national’ reality, 
and ‘the cosmopolitised’ is not to be understood as the opposite of ‘the na-
tional’ (e.g. Beck 2016; also Beck and Lau 2004). Rather, one is an integral 
part of the other – as we saw in the above mentioned example of UKIP. In 
this respect, the internal cosmopolitisation of national societies is to be un-
derstood as an integral part of the redefinition of ‘the national’ (Beck 2004: 
15), and of distinct actualisations of the tradition of the ‘national perspec-
tive’. As such, similar to imaginations of the world as, for instance, ad-
vanced by IR scholars, such as James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro 
(1989) and David Campbell (1998[1992]), the conceptualised ‘reflexive 
modern’ social reality is one that can no longer be grasped through comfort-
able (modern) dichotomies of inside/outside, national/international, politi-
cal/non-political, etc. Yet, the either/or is not simply obsolete and decon-
structed in Beck’s conception of the ‘reflexive modern’ world but replaced 
with a both/and. This both/and is the historical product of the interplay of 
the two above sketched aspects, namely of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of 
modernisation and the tradition of the ‘national perspective’.  
Discussing the difference between this conceptualisation of the world 
and postmodern conceptions, Beck, Bonß and Lau (2003) stress that there 
are many aspects, in which both overlap, but that, at their core, 
“[p]ostmodernists are interested in deconstruction without reconstruction, 
second modernity [the word they use for the above sketched conception of 
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social reality] is about deconstruction and reconstruction.” This makes this 
Beck-inspired conception of social reality so productive. It is not ‘just’ a de-
construction of the modern (imagination of the) world, but replaces it with a 
fundamentally different conception, in which the deconstruction of modern 
dichotomies is ‘built in’. The problem with grasping this newly conceptual-
ised world, however, is that there is no established language yet that we 
could use to do so. 
 
The proclamation of the ‘new world’ that came as a 
manifestation of an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ 
of modernisation 
In the first section of this chapter, I suggested that the proclamation of the 
‘new world’ to come is a manifestation of the modern fondness for innova-
tion, progress and development. I proposed that, by contrast, the proclama-
tion of the ‘new world’ that came is a manifestation of an ‘awareness’ of the 
complexity of the ‘reflexive modern’ world and, in particular, the reflexive 
‘backfiring’ of modernisation. My elaborations above give meaning to this 
proposition. I suggest, events, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall or the ter-
rorist attack of 9/11, are moments, in which this complexity and the reflex-
ive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation surface, that is, in which they become vis-
ible, almost unmissable for social and political observers. As I stressed 
above, the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation shapes contemporary so-
cial reality with or without these events. What is interesting about these 
events, however, is that, in them this unfolding “really existing” (Beck 
2006: 19) reality ‘bubbles up’, in the sense that the fundamental shortcom-
ings of existing (modern) institutions and principles and of existing ‘national 
perspective’-narratives becomes readily apparent to observers. It is this, I 
argue, that is evident in the fact that there is the proclamation of the ‘new-
ness’ of the world, which, as we saw above in the context of the fall of the 
Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, encapsulates the perception that 
existing concepts are no longer adequate to grasp the supposedly ‘new’ 
world. Putting it the other way around, given my presupposed conception of 
social reality as being a ‘reflexive modern’ world, this explicit ‘awareness’ 
of the shortcomings in existing conceptions of the world, which is evident in 
the proclamation that there is something ‘new’ about the world, can be con-
ceptualised as an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation.  
To be clear, I use the word awareness in inverted commas to signal that 
I do not mean to suggest that there is/was a conscious recognition of this re-
flexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, in particular, or the ‘reflexive mod-
ern’ social reality, in general. As I suggested above, it is a conceptual move 
that I take the proclamation of the ‘new world’ that came as an ‘awareness’ 
of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation; it is grounded in the above 
sketched distinct conception of social reality that presupposes this move.  
Following this presupposed idea of social reality, there is something ex-
citing about the recognition of the proclamation that there was something 
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‘new’ about the world as an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of 
modernisation. What makes it exciting is that this insight provides the 
ground to explore empirically distinct historical actualisations of one of the 
two aspects that brings out social reality, namely the tradition of the ‘nation-
al perspective’. In other words, grounded in my theorisation above, the 
study of the proclamation of the ‘new world’ that came, i.e. the study of 
how the (supposed) ‘new world’ that came is imagined, how it is symboli-
cally dealt with and negotiated, to what extent it is shaking up existing 
(modern) conceptions of un-certainty, ‘risk’, inside/outside, agency, as well 
as institutions and guiding principles etc, enables nothing less than insights 
into the historical actualisation of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’ 
and ‘methodological nationalism’. Given that the tradition of the ‘national 
perspective’ is a central aspect which, in its interplay with the reflexive 
‘backfiring’ of modernisation, brings out the ‘reflexive modern’ social reali-
ty, its analysis can only be a valuable endeavour toward an understanding of 
nothing less than a crucial aspect of contemporary social reality.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I picked up the argument from Chapter 4 that the ‘object’, 
which is re-produced in the ‘globalisation’-discourse, can be called ‘new 
world’. The aim of this present chapter was to elaborate on the issue ‘new 
world’ by shedding light on proclamations of the ‘new world’. In doing this, 
I firstly reflected on what it means to (implicitly or explicitly) ‘proclaim’ the 
‘new world’, i.e. to suggest that there was something ‘new’ about the world. 
I distinguished between two kinds of ‘proclamations’ of the ‘new’. First, the 
proclamation of the ‘new’ to come and, second, the proclamation of the 
‘new’ that came. The latter proclamation is the one that is implied in the 
‘globalisation’-discourse.  
In comparing these two proclamations, I conceptualised the proclama-
tion of the ‘new world’ that came as a distinct dimension of political actors’ 
struggle to legitimise past and future decisions and actions. I also highlight-
ed the distinct speaking position that such a proclamation implies. In this 
kind of proclamation, the speaking position is a more ‘passive’ position than 
the one implied in the proclamation of the ‘new world’ to come. While it in-
sinuates a kind of ‘objectivity’, it is, however, not less politically loaded 
than the proclamation of the world to come. Furthermore, I suggested that, 
while the proclamation of the ‘new’ to come is a manifestation of the mod-
ern and optimistic fondness for the striving for innovation, progress and de-
velopment, the proclamation of the ‘new’ that came is a manifestation of an 
‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation.  
In a second move, I elaborated on the conception of social reality that 
underpins my claim that the proclamation of the ‘new’ that came is a mani-
festation of an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation. 
This conception is grounded in Ulrich Beck’s work. According to this con-
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ception, contemporary social reality is shaped by two aspects and their in-
terplay.  
First, it is shaped by the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of the process of modern-
isation. This ‘backfiring’ is constituted by the ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of 
national societies, the existence of ‘global risk’ and the ‘return of uncertain-
ty’. I explored it by looking at each of these three aspects in turn and at their 
inextricable enmeshment. Of particular importance was that the reflexive 
‘backfiring’ of modernisation (including the ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of 
national societies) is an ‘irreversible’ process, a reality that, generally speak-
ing, is the success of the process of modernisation. At the same time, it is its 
‘accidental’ side effect, in that it is the product of decisions and actions tar-
geted at other ends. Furthermore, I highlighted that the reflexive ‘backfiring’ 
of modernisation is a phenomenon, a process that brings with it a fundamen-
tal ‘uncertainty’. This uncertainty is grounded in the fact that it is not only 
modern institutions that are confronted with a ‘radicalisation’ of modernity, 
but also modern principles, which are overturned.  
Second, social reality is shaped by the prevalence of the tradition of the 
‘national perspective’ and ‘methodological nationalism’. This is a political 
perspective and a particular scholarly take on the world that obscures the 
view at the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, especially at the social 
reality of the ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of national societies.  
I stressed that it is the interplay of these two aspects, i.e. the historical 
actualisation of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation and the tradition 
of the ‘national perspective’, that shapes contemporary social reality. I la-
belled this reality ‘reflexive modern’, which is a reality that cannot be 
grasped through the (modern) dichotomies of inside/outside, nation-
al/international, national/cosmopolitan. In fact, it is a reality that cannot be 
captured with familiar concepts such as ‘development’, ‘progress’ or ‘trans-
formation’. I stressed that the interplay of the two aspects – reflexive ‘back-
firing’ of modernisation and the tradition of the ‘national perspective’ – and, 
consequently, the path of societies are not to be imagined as leading into a 
particular direction, on a distinct trajectory or, importantly, proceeding in a 
linear way. The familiar either/or-logic (‘entweder-oder’) does not grasp the 
‘reflexive modern’ world. This world is a both/and-place (‘sowohl-als-
auch’), in which, for instance, the ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of national 
societies does not constitute the opposite of the ‘national’ reality, and ‘the 
cosmopolitised’ is not to be understood as the opposite of ‘the national’. Ra-
ther, one is an integral part of the other, and of distinct actualisations of the 
tradition of the ‘national perspective’.   
Grounded in this conception of social reality, I grasped the proclamation 
of the ‘new world’ that came as a manifestation of an ‘awareness’ of the re-
flexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation. I stressed that this was not an obser-
vation of how social and political actors actually grasp the perceived ‘new-
ness’ of the world, in the sense of how they label and conceptualise it. Ra-
ther, it is a conceptual move, which I took, that presupposes the above 
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sketched conception of social reality as ‘reflexive modern’. In this context, I 
explained that events, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall or the terrorist at-
tacks of 9/11 are moments, in which the complexity of the ‘reflexive mod-
ern’ world surfaces and becomes visible to social and political observers. 
This visibility is manifest in the talk about the ‘new world’ that came. In 
these events, the fundamental shortcomings of existing (modern) institutions 
and principles and existing ‘national perspective’-narratives becomes readi-
ly apparent to observers. In this sense, the proclamation of the ‘new world’ 
that came is a manifestation of an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ 
of modernisation, where I use the word ‘awareness’ not to refer to a con-
scious recognition of this reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation. It is an, in 
fact, it is the empirical question, precisely how the reflexive modern reality 
is symbolically dealt with and filled with meaning in these proclamations of 
the ‘new’ that came, and, in particular, how the actualisation of the tradition 
of the ‘national perspective’ looks, e.g. how much or how little the distinct 
‘awareness’ of the ‘reflexive modern’ reality is actually shaking up the tra-
dition of the ‘national perspective’, that is, existing (modern) conceptions of 
un-certainty, ‘risk’, inside/outside, agency, as well as institutions and guid-
ing principles. 
Bringing the above together, this present chapter framed the proclama-
tion of the ‘new world’ that came as an interesting phenomenon in two re-
spects. First, it is an interesting phenomenon in that it is a distinct way, in 
which political actors legitimise past and present decisions and actions. For 
instance, George W. Bush’s quote from the very beginning of this chapter27 
shows how the proclamation of, i.e. the reference to the supposedly ‘new 
world’ is used to legitimise nothing less than a preemptive national security-
approach, in this specific case, translated into the US-led military interven-
tion in Iraq in 2003. Second, the proclamation of the ‘new world’ that came 
is an interesting phenomenon in that its analysis enables insights into noth-
ing less than the distinct historical actualisations of the tradition of the ‘na-
tional perspective’ and ‘methodological nationalism’, i.e. one of the two as-
pects that brings out social reality. It enables the generation of insights into 
how the ‘reflexive modern’ world is imagined, how it is symbolically dealt 
with and negotiated, to what extent it is shaking up the tradition of the ‘na-
tional perspective’, and what possibilities are implied in these imaginations. 
Yet, to conclude this present chapter and, at the same time, pave the way 
to the next chapter, it is to point out that as much as such as an analysis of 
the actualisation of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’ is valuable, as 
much it is challenging and, in fact, ‘uncomfortable’. It is uncomfortable be-
cause it takes place in a both/and-world. Consequently, it is not only uncom-
fortable because, as Nina Degele (2010: 177; my own translation) puts it, 
“serious social scientists do not like the idea of ‘both/and’”, but because 
                                                    
27 “And I said – so I said, ‘There’s a new world here.’ After September the 11th, we 
must take threats seriously.” (Bush 2004) 
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there is no clear, pre-established language that could be used to capture the 
both/and-world (see also Selchow 2016a). This brings us back to the point 
about the inherent ‘provisionality’ of Beck’s scholarly endeavour that I 
highlighted earlier in this chapter. Inevitably, a scholarly project that builds 
on a conception of the world, as it is sketched above, must embrace and ac-
cept a form of ‘provisionality’ and, not least, demands a good degree of tol-
erance for (linguistic) experimentation.  
 
 

  
 
6 The Omnipresence of Global as a Political 
Phenomenon and ‘Unconventional’ 
Object of Study 
 
Constructions of reality and codes of intel-
ligibility out of which they are produced 
provide both conditions of possibility and 
limits on possibility; that is, they make it 
possible to act in the world while simulta-
neously defining the ‘horizon of the taken-
for-granted’ (Hall 1988: 44) that marks the 
boundaries of common sense and accepta-
ble knowledge.  
JUTTA WELDES ET AL (1999: 17) 
 
 
In this chapter, I return to the adjective global. The aim of the chapter is to 
develop the central argument of this book. I argue that the omnipresence of 
the adjective global is a political phenomenon. It is a re-production of a web 
of meanings called ‘new world’. As such, the omnipresence of the adjective 
global constitutes an object worthy of study by scholars in the political stud-
ies and IR discourses – or, as we will see, at least by scholars at the margins 
of these discourses.  
My strategy in developing my argument is twofold. On the one hand, I 
bring together and re-assemble the insights that I generated in the previous 
chapters and theoretically synthesise them. The previous four chapters pro-
vide the ground that enables me to conceptualise the omnipresence of the 
adjective global as a re-production of the web of meanings ‘new world’. On 
the other hand, I broaden my perspective and bring in a distinct theory of the 
relationship between language, meaning and social reality. This allows me 
to conceptualise the omnipresence of global as a political phenomenon. 
The chapter is divided into three main parts. The first part is about the  
synthesis of the previous chapters and my conceptualisation of the omni-
presence of global as a re-production of a web of meanings ‘new world’. 
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Two insights, which I developed in the previous chapters, are particularly 
important in that they provide the ground for this conceptual move.  
The first insight is the empirically grounded understanding that the con-
temporary adjective global is closely enmeshed with the talk about ‘globali-
sation.’ I developed this understanding in Chapter 3 when I demonstrated 
that the contemporary global has come to be used in the sense of ‘outcome 
of globalisation’. This insight allowed me to conceptualise global as a ‘new 
word’; as I argued at the end of Chpater 3, what is ‘new’ about the contem-
porary adjective global is that it implies ‘globalisation’.  
The second central insight that provides the ground for my conceptional-
isation of the omnipresence of global as a re-production of a web of mean-
ings ‘new world’ is the realisation that all utterances, in which the word 
globalisation is applied, can be seen as constituting a discursive re-
production of an object that is best labelled ‘new world’; I developed this 
argument in Chapter 4.  
Bringing these two insights together allows me to conclude in the first 
part of this chapter that the use of the word global, like the use of the word 
globalisation, constitutes a re-production of the web of meanings ‘new 
world’. Still synthesising previous insights, I demonstrate that the influential 
but unnoticed existence of the contemporary adjective global, which I 
worked out in Chapters 2 and 3, and the finding that the proclamation of the 
‘new world’ implies an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of the pro-
cess of modernisation, which I developed in Chapter 5, mean that the omni-
presence of global, this discursive re-production of a web of meanings ‘new 
world’, is a relevant and interesting phenomenon that is worthy of critical 
exploration. 
In the second main part of this chapter, I go beyond the synthesis of in-
sights that I developed in previous chapters. I take my conceptualisation of 
the phenomenon of the omnipresence of the adjective global a step further 
and argue that the omnipresence of global is not only a relevant and inter-
esting phenomenon but also a political phenomenon; this makes it an – albe-
it ‘unconventional’ – object of study for those, who are interested in the po-
litical world.  
My conceptualisation of the omnipresence of the adjective global as a 
political phenomenon is a theoretical exercise. It is grounded in a distinct 
theory of the relationship between language, meaning and social reality. I 
introduce this theory by extending and refining the discussion of the concept 
‘discourse’, which I presented in Chapter 4, as well as, my excursus on lan-
guage and meaning in Chapter 2. In particular, I reflect on the ideas of ‘poli-
tics’ and ‘power’, which are implied in this conception of the relationship 
between language, meaning and social reality. It is these distinct ideas of 
‘politics’ and ‘power’ that make the phenomenon of the omnipresence of 
global a political phenomenon.  
Part of my theoretical elaboration is a juxtaposition of my conception of 
the relationship between language, meaning and social reality with similar 
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but, nonetheless, meaningfully different theories, which are well established 
in political practice and the political studies and IR scholarship. I do this in 
order to be able to situate the political phenomenon of the omnipresence of 
the adjective global in the broader scholarly discourse. More precisely, I do 
this to situate it at the ‘unconventional’ margins of the political studies and 
IR scholarship.  
Finally, in the third main part of this chapter, I outline what it means to 
approach empirically the omnipresence of the adjective global as an ‘un-
conventional’ object of study. I introduce the empirical study of the phe-
nomenon of the omnipresence of global as an ‘unconventional’, experi-
mental, interpretative and ‘provisional’ endeavour.  
   
 
SYNTHESIS: THE OMNIPRESENCE OF THE 
CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL AS A PHENOMENON THAT 
BRINGS OUT THE ‘NEW WORLD’   
 
The adjective global has been around for some time. Yet, there is something 
special about the contemporary global. It is not only an ever more popular 
word, it is also a ‘new word’. Today global has a “hitherto unnoted” (Har-
graves 2004: viii) meaning, which, as I argued in Chapter 3, is sufficiently 
significant as to acknowledge the contemporary adjective as ‘new’.  
It is not the first time in its life that global has been ‘discovered’ as a 
‘new word’. As I observed in Chapter 3, the first time global became a ‘new 
word’ was in 1954, the second time in 1955, and the third time in 1991. The 
‘new’ meaning, which justifies taking the adjective global in 2016 once 
again as ‘new’ is ‘outcome of globalisation’. This ‘new’ meaning becomes 
apparent when we look at the many actual uses of the word today. What 
many of them share is that the adjective refers to an attribute of something 
that has this attribute because of something that is called ‘globalisation’ – 
this is despite of and in addition to the various other meanings that are at-
tached to global in the diverse contexts, in which the adjective is used today. 
In Chapter 3, I provided a selection of examples from across discourses that 
illustrate this point, such as Kofi Annan’s claim:  
 
“This system worked, and made it possible for globalization to emerge. As a result 
we now live in a global world.” (Annan 2000) 
 
To propose acknowledging the contemporary global as a ‘new word’ is not 
to suggest that the ‘new’ meaning of the word is the meaning of it, or, for 
that matter, that social actors, such as Kofi Annan, apply the word with the 
intention of meaning ‘outcome of globalisation’. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
words do not carry one clear and fixed meaning. Linguistic signs constantly 
lose and gain meanings. They are like chameleons which adjust to their en-
vironment and take on different meanings. In fact, meanings themselves are 
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not static but only ever constitute a shadow that runs through language. 
Meaning is a “constant flickering of presence and absence together”, ex-
plains Terry Eagleton (1983: 128). There is never any ‘the meaning’ of a 
word to begin with – this also applies to the adjective global. In this sense, 
highlighting the ‘new’ meaning of the contemporary global – that is appar-
ent, once one looks at contemporary uses of the word, guided by the ques-
tion what they have in common – is a scholarly move to highlight a particu-
larly noteworthy ‘new’ meaning, and not a claim about the meaning of 
global, let alone, about what social actors intent to mean when they use the 
word global.  
The ‘new’ meaning of the contemporary global is noteworthy, hence, 
worth being acknowledged as ‘new’ and significant, not only because it has 
been “hitherto unnoted in dictionaries”, which, as I suggested in Chapter 2, 
lexicographer Hargraves (2004: viii) identifies as a criterion that justifies 
taking a word as ‘new’, but also because this ‘new’ meaning points to the 
distinct enmeshment of the contemporary adjective global with the talk 
about ‘globalisation’. Acknowledging the ‘new’ meaning of the contempo-
rary global makes us aware that global can hardly be thought of inde-
pendently from ‘globalisation’ any longer – at least not when it comes to 
public, political, and social and political scientific applications of the adjec-
tive. It is this distinct relationship between global and ‘globalisation’ that is 
interesting. 
In Chapter 3, I showed that it is not a novel move to acknowledge that 
there is a link between the adjective global and the idea ‘globalisation’. The 
idea that there is a relationship between both is often implied or even made 
explicit in scholarly approaches to ideas of ‘globalisation’. As discussed in 
detail in Chapter 3, it is not uncommon for ‘globalisation’-scholars to devel-
op their conception of ‘globalisation’ with reference to a supposed link be-
tween ‘globalisation’ and the adjective global. In these instances, whatever 
is associated with the word global is taken as foundational for whatever is 
associated with the word globalisation. In fact, as seen in Scholte (2005), 
the meaning of the word globalisation is sometimes even explicitly derived 
from what is understood to be an ‘etymological tracing’ that goes back to 
the supposed ‘true’ meaning of the adjective global. However, I mean some-
thing different when I point to the link between ‘globalisation’ and global 
than these scholars do. My empirical exploration of actual uses of the con-
temporary adjective global (including by Scholte) brought me into a posi-
tion to understand that the contemporary global gets its meaning from 
‘globalisation’; global encapsulates ‘globalisation’, rather than the other 
way around.      
This insight into the contemporary relationship between the word global 
and the idea/s ‘globalisation’ is intriguing once we look at the talk about 
‘globalisation’ not through a predetermined idea of what ‘globalisation’ ‘is’, 
hence, through an understanding of it as a distinct thematic issue (such as 
market integration), but acknowledge the polysemy of the word globalisa-
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tion and take utterances, which contain this word, as a re-production of a 
distinct web of meanings, in other words, as a ‘discourse’ that produces the 
object it speaks of. Starting from such an alternative position, which, as I 
sketched in Chapter 4, asks what kind of web of meanings is actually re-
produced through uses of the word globalisation, brings to light the ‘new 
world’. 
I discussed in Chapter 4 that what I label the ‘globalisation’-discourse 
was born in the face of the breakdown of the bipolar bloc system at the end 
of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. I argued that the ‘globalisa-
tion’-discourse is a manifestation of the fact that there was a widespread 
conviction that the (perceived) ‘new’ reality needed new concepts to grasp 
it.  
 
“The irruptions in the established order and traditional practices of statecraft have 
given many of international politics’ customary modes of analysis an air of nostal-
gia”, 
 
observed David Campbell (1998[1992]: ix). They were perceived as de-
manding a breakout from the “conceptual jails in which the study of world 
politics is deemed to be incarcerated”, argued the earlier quoted Rosenau 
(1990: 22). In one way or other, existing concepts, theories and categories 
were perceived by many as no longer being fully adequate to capture the 
‘new’ social reality. It was in this context that a concept called ‘globalisa-
tion’ stepped in, being praised and naturalised by some as “an idea whose 
time has come” (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton 2003: 1).  
As I pointed out in Chapter 4, it is undisputable that many of the devel-
opments, which have come to be captured with the word globalisation, are 
not ‘new’ but have existed before the word globalisation entered public, po-
litical and, importantly, scholarly debates. The earlier quoted Amartya Sen 
(2001) is one of many scholars, who make us aware of this fact. Yet, it was 
only at the end of the 1980s and in the course of the 1990s that the neolo-
gism globalisation came up and that the concept ‘globalisation’ fully cap-
tured discourses.1 As I suggested in Chapter 4, Michel Foucault provides us 
with a useful language to grasp this phenomenon; with Foucault we can say 
that at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s ‘globalisation’ 
came to be “in the true” (Foucault 1981: 60), meaning that it became social-
ly acceptable to speak of a thing called ‘globalisation’, to assume and pro-
claim that ‘globalisation’ was a truth.2 Hence, amending Held et al’s quote 
                                                    
1 Refer back to Chapter 4, fn 5.   
2 Of course, this does not mean that there was and is an agreement about how this 
‘truth’ ‘globalisation’ looks. My overview of the life of the ‘globalisation’-
discourse in Chapter 4 illustrates the many different takes on the ‘truth’ ‘globali-
sation’. 
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from above, it was not that ‘globalisation’ was an idea whose time had come 
after the end of the Cold War because of a distinct socio-political reality that 
was ‘globalisation’, but that the time had come for a new concept to grasp 
the world of the 1990s – and that idea/s of ‘globalisation’ and the word 
globalisation were apparently perceived as appropriate to serve this purpose.  
The difference between the suggestion that the time had come for ‘the’ 
concept ‘globalisation’ because of an external reality and the suggestion that 
the time had come for a new concept (which happened to be ‘globalisation’) 
because of a perceived external reality is only slight but significant, in that 
the second assessment acknowledges that there is nothing inherent in empir-
ical reality that prescribes the use of the word globalisation and the applica-
tion of a particular concept ‘globalisation’ to grasp this reality. The claim 
“globalisation is an idea whose time has come” is a claim not a commonsen-
sical observation of empirical reality. While there might be good reasons to 
address the contemporary world and its distinct developments with a neolo-
gism, such as globalisation, the crucial point is that this is not inscribed in 
social reality as such. There needs to be the space for such a move to be ac-
cepted and acceptable. To refer back to Foucault’s quote above:  
 
“It is always possible that one might speak the truth in the space of a wild exteriority, 
but one is ‘in the true’ only by obeying the rules of a discursive ‘policing’ which one 
has to reactivate in each of one’s discourses” (Foucault 1981: 60) 
 
As I discussed in Chapter 4, in the case of the neologism globalisation and 
(the various ideas captured in) conceptions called ‘globalisation’, the space 
that allowed them to be ‘in the true’, i.e. to enter discourses and to become a 
“talismanic term, a seemingly unavoidable reference point for discussions 
about our contemporary situation” (Low and Barnett 2000: 54), was the 
conceptual vacuum that the breakdown of the bipolar bloc system and the 
end of the Cold War constituted in the eyes of many commentators. It was 
the perception that there was a ‘brave new’ (post-Cold War) world that 
made it possible for a new term, namely globalisation, and the various 
idea/s ‘globalisation’ to become centre-stage in attempts to make the social 
world meaningful, i.e. that made it acceptable to claim that ‘globalisation’ 
was ‘an idea whose time had come’.  
Grounded in the above insights, I argued in Chapter 4 that the idea of a 
‘new world’ is at the heart of the talk about ‘globalisation’. Turning this in-
sight around, I argued that what all uses of the word globalisation share is 
that they make claims about a (supposedly) ‘new world’ – whether or not 
this is explicitly intended by the sign users and whether or not sign users are 
aware of it. This insight motivated me to suggest in Chapter 4 that the web 
of meanings that is re-produced through utterances, which contain the word 
globalisation, is best called ‘new world’. Putting it differently, I suggested 
that utterances, which contain the word globalisation, form the ‘globalisa-
tion’-discourse, which is the re-production of a web of meanings, in other 
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words, the re-production of an object, which is “systematically form[ed]” 
(Foucault 1972: 49) in the use of language, that is best labelled ‘new world’.      
This brings me back to the adjective global. The above developed 
ground allows me now to conceptualise the omnipresence of the adjective 
global as a distinct phenomenon. Echoing my take on the ‘globalisation’-
discourse, I understand utterances, which contain the word global, as a ‘dis-
course’, i.e. as the re-production of a distinct web of meanings. Given the 
particular relationship between the contemporary adjective global and the 
‘globalisation’-discourse, which I described above and conceptualised in 
Chapter 4, this web of meanings can be called ‘new world’. In other words, 
this web is the same object that is re-produced in utterances, which contain 
the world globalisation. In short, synthesising the insights that I generated in 
the previous chapters, I am now in a position to argue that the omnipresence 
of the contemporary word global constitutes the re-production of the object 
‘new world’, a distinct web of meanings.  
Having established this conception of the omnipresence of global, I now 
go a step further. Still synthesising insights from previous chapters, I sug-
gest that this re-production of the web of meanings called ‘new world’ is 
worthy of being acknowledged as a phenomenon that is ‘relevant’ and ‘in-
teresting’. It is relevant and interesting in two different ways. First, it is rel-
evant and interesting by virtue of its wide spread but ‘untroubled’ existence, 
which I sketched out in Chapter 2 when I reflected on the popular and ‘free’ 
nature of the contemporary adjective global. The contemporary global has 
become an important, in the sense of ‘normal’, aspect of contemporary ap-
proaches to the world. My overview in Chapter 2 of the various enthusiastic 
uses of global these days, such as in high profile publications like the Hu-
man Development Report 2014, where it is applied 513 times across 239 
pages, or in the World Development Report 2014, in which it appears 278 
times across 286 pages, made this apparent. The relevance of global is fur-
ther apparent in the observation that the adjective plays a central role in the 
conceptualisation of ideas of ‘globalisation’, which, in turn, are an influen-
tial component of the contemporary knowledge production; I elaborated on 
this point in Chapter 3. Furthermore, if we look back at the conclusion of 
Chapter 2, which explored the use of the adjective global in US President 
George W. Bush’s public post-9/11 communication, we see that political 
practitioners even seem to use the adjective global strategically. As I dis-
cussed in Chapter 2, what is remarkable about this wide-spread, enthusiastic 
and ‘normalised’ use of global is that it happens off the radar of critical en-
gagement and scrutiny. I believe that already this ‘influential’ but ‘unno-
ticed’ existence of the contemporary global, captured in Chapters 2 and 3, 
justifies scholarly attention and a critical take on the phenomenon of the 
omnipresence of the contemporary adjective global.   
Second, the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective global, under-
stood as a re-production of an object called ‘new world’, is worthy of being 
acknowledged as a relevant and interesting phenomenon because the proc-
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lamation of the ‘new world’, which is implied in the object that the dis-
course brings out, can be seen as indicating an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive 
‘backfiring’ of the process of modernisation. I developed this point in Chap-
ter 5 by distinguishing between the proclamation of a ‘new world’ to come 
and the proclamation of the ‘new world’ that came. The proclamation of a 
‘new world’ to come is grounded in the modern fondness (for the striving) 
for the ‘new’ as a central, in fact, foundational aspect of societal progress 
and development. In Chapter 5, I provided a set of examples to illustrate 
what I mean by ‘new world’ to come, such as Barack Obama’s (2009) prom-
ise of a “a new way forward”. I then stressed that the idea of the ‘new 
world’ that is implied in the use of the words globalisation and global dif-
fers from the (modern) idea of the ‘new world’ to come. As I elaborated in 
Chapter 5, it is about a ‘new world’ that came. This ‘new world’ that came, 
in comparison to the ‘new world’ to come, implies a passive speaking posi-
tion of an observer, who is confronted with a ‘new’ reality ‘out there’, a re-
ality that does not match established conceptions and understandings.   
As I explained in Chapter 5, the fact that I take the proclamation of the 
‘new world’ that came as a manifestation of an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive 
‘backfiring’ of modernisation is grounded in a distinct understanding of the 
social world. This is an understanding of social reality that is informed by 
the work of sociologist Ulrich Beck. According to such an understanding, 
contemporary social reality is shaped by two aspects and their interplay. On 
the one side, it is the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of the process of modernisation. 
On the other side, this is the prevalence of the tradition of what Beck (2006) 
calls “the national perspective” and “methodological nationalism”. The term 
‘reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation’ captures three aspects that together 
shape contemporary social reality: the ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of na-
tional societies, the existence of ‘global risk’ and the ‘return of uncertainty’. 
I explained each of these aspects in detail in Chapter 5. In sum, the reflexive 
‘backfiring’ of modernisation brings out a social reality, in which not only 
modern institutions but also modern principles are challenged, outmoded 
and, in fact, rendered obsolete through the process of modernisation itself. 
They are radicalised as a side effect of modernisation, its institutions and 
principles, and the actions shaped by them. Importantly, this side effect is 
not the dark side of modernisation but the manifestation of the very success 
of modernisation. The second aspect of the ‘reflexive modern’ world, the 
tradition of the ‘national perspective’, is a political perspective and a schol-
arly take on the world that is grounded in “categories […] that take the na-
tion-state as the norm” (Beck 2006: 73). It obscures the look at (the reality 
of) the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, especially the ‘internal cos-
mopolitisation’ of national societies, which is, as I stressed in Chapter 5, a 
social reality.  
Grounded in such an understanding of the world, the omnipresence of 
the contemporary adjective global, understood as a discursive re-production 
of an object called ‘new world’, is to be seen as a manifestation of an 
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‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation. This is simply 
because it implies a questioning of the (modern) world (grounded in a tradi-
tional actualisation of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’) as we know 
it.  
I made clear in Chapter 5 that this conceptual move is, indeed, a concep-
tual move and not an observation of how social and political actors actually 
grasp the perceived ‘newness’ of the world, in the sense of how they label 
and conceptualise it. My engagement with the adjective global in Chapter 2 
brought out that the world is grasped in diverse ways through utterances, 
which contain the adjective global – as we saw, the adjective is used with a 
myriad of different meanings. Hence, when I use the word ‘awareness’ I do 
not mean to suggest that the ‘new world’ that came is consciously and ex-
plicitly ‘grasped’ as being shaped by the ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ of na-
tional societies, ‘global risk’ and the ‘return of uncertainty’. When I take the 
phenomenon of the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective global as a 
manifestation of an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisa-
tion, I make a conceptual move, which presupposes the above mentioned 
Beck-inspired conception of social reality; as I put it in Chapter 5, it is 
grounded in a ‘pre-theoretical commitment’ to a conception of the world as 
being ‘reflexive modern’.  
It is in such a ‘reflexive modern’ world that the omnipresence of the ad-
jective global becomes a relevant and interesting phenomenon that is worthy 
of scholarly attention because, as something that implies an ‘awareness’ of 
the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, its study is always a study of an 
actualisation of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’, which, as I ex-
plained in Chapter 5, constitutes a central aspect of social reality. 
 
 
THE SYMBOLIC PRODUCTION OF THE WORLD, AND 
THE ‘NEW WORLD’ AS A DISTINCT MODE OF  
THE PRESENT 
 
In the previous section, I conceptualised the omnipresence of the contempo-
rary adjective global as a discursive re-production of a web of meanings 
called ‘new world’ and presented it as a relevant and interesting phenome-
non that is worthy of being acknowledged by scholars. I did this by synthe-
sising various insights that I generated over the course of the previous chap-
ters.    
In this second main part of this chapter, I move a step further; I go be-
yond synthesising previous insights. I argue that, in addition to it being rele-
vant and interesting, the re-production of the web of meanings through ut-
terances, which contain the adjective global, is a political phenomenon, i.e. 
it is something the study of which enables insights into the political world. I 
propose that the omnipresence of global can be seen as a political phenome-
non because it constitutes a dimension of the symbolic construction of social 
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reality, in general, and, in particular, because it makes meaningful an im-
portant conceptual space and temporal category, namely the ‘present’. In 
this sense, I argue, the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective global is 
a particular and noteworthy part of the perpetual contestation over the mean-
ing of the world, which does not simply mirror a world that exists ‘outside’ 
of language but constitutes, in the sense of symbolically produces, this 
world. Symbolic productions of the world make some things possible, in the 
sense of imaginable, and others impossible, i.e. unimaginable – this relates 
to socially binding decisions, like ‘political’ decisions in a narrow sense, 
and beyond.    
I substantiate my argument that the omnipresence of global is a political 
phenomenon in two steps. I start by returning to the discussion of the con-
cept ‘discourse’ that I presented in Chapter 4, as well as to my excursus on 
language and meaning in Chapter 2. I extend and refine some of the insights 
from these previous chapters and carve out what I mean when I say that the 
omnipresence of global is a dimension of the symbolic production of social 
reality. This includes a reflection on the ideas of ‘politics’ and ‘power’ that 
are implied in such a conception of the world. To be clear, substantiating 
that the omnipresence of the adjective global is not just a relevant and inter-
esting but also a political phenomenon, because it is a dimension of the con-
testation over the meaning of the world, is a theoretical exercise. Contrary 
to the above mentioned two aspects that make the omnipresence of global a 
relevant and interesting phenomenon, it is not grounded in something that is 
distinct about the word global or about the object that is brought out by ut-
terances with the word global. Rather, it is grounded in a particular theory 
of the relationship between language, meaning and social reality. I already 
touched on this theory in previous chapters because it informs the concept 
‘discourse’ that I introduced in Chapter 4, as well as, the work of the schol-
ars to whom I referred in Chapter 2 in my discussion of poststructuralist un-
derstandings of language and meaning.  
The aim of this following section is to highlight the hallmarks of this 
theory of the relationship between language, meaning and social reality. I do 
this by embedding these hallmarks into the context of other understandings 
of the relationship between language, meaning and social reality that are in 
some respect similar to this theory but differ in other respects fundamental-
ly. This is, for instance, the theoretical ground, on which the scholarship 
builds that looks at how words ‘do’ things, as well as, the theoretical foun-
dations of the IR social constructivist literature. I provide this excursus on 
these seemingly similar but meaningfully different approaches to clarify my 
own ground and its theoretical specificities. It also helps me to situate the 
understanding of the world, which informs my conception of the omnipres-
ence of global, in the broader scholarship. Such a strategy seems to be par-
ticularly appropriate as the idea of the relationship between language, mean-
ing and social reality that I follow here is marginalised in the mainstream of 
the political studies and IR scholarship. Consequently, as I point out, as an 
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object of study, the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective global is a 
phenomenon of interest to scholars at the margins of academic explorations 
of the political world; paraphrasing David Campbell (1998[1992]: ix), it is a 
phenomenon of interest for an “unconventional analysis”.            
This first step in this second part of this chapter is of general nature. I 
frame the omnipresence of the adjective global as a dimension of the contest 
over the meaning of the world. It is then followed by a more particular se-
cond step. Here, I take up insights from my discussion of the proclamation 
of the ‘new world’ in Chapter 5 and frame the ‘new world’, i.e. the object 
that is re-produced through utterances, which contain the word global, as a 
special dimension of the contest over the meaning of the world. I argue that 
it is special because the ‘new world’ constitutes a mode of the temporal cat-
egory ‘present’. The aim of the second step in this part of the present chap-
ter is to put forward that historical appearances of the ‘new world’, i.e. dis-
tinct actualisations of the object that is re-produced through utterances, 
which contain the word global, constitute ways, in which the conceptual 
space ‘present’ is filled with meaning.  
      
The symbolic production of reality 
Social reality does not exist ‘as such’ and ‘out there’. It is produced, in the 
sense that it is made meaningful. Language is an important dimension of 
this production of social reality.3 In Chapter 2, we saw that the practice of 
making the world meaningful through language is not straightforward be-
cause language and meaning are not straightforward. The excursus on Fer-
dinand de Saussure’s philosophy of structural linguists showed that meaning 
is the product of differences between signs rather than natural references to 
an external world. This means that it is misguided to consider language as a 
tool that objectively mirrors a reality external to itself. But this is not all. De 
Saussure and, ultimately, the various poststructuralist thinkers to whom I re-
ferred in Chapter 2, make us aware that it is not only that meanings are not 
naturally inscribed in the world, they are also not simply inherent in words. 
Meaning is the product of endless plays of signifiers. As such, language 
must not be understood  
 
“as a transparent, reflective form of communication, but as a situated, interpretable 
phenomenon that serves to construct social reality.” (Ainsworth and Hardy 2004: 
155) 
 
                                                    
3 Of course, language is not the only dimension of the construction of social reali-
ty. Linguistic interventions play an important role but so do all sorts of practices. 
It is only my specific interest in the word global in this project that makes me 
stress and focus exclusively on the role of language in the social production of 
the world.      
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This brings me back to Foucault (1972: 49) and his explanation that lan-
guage and texts “systematically form the objects of which they speak.” Ra-
ther than mirroring the world, language and texts produce the world. In this 
sense, as Jutta Weldes et al (1999: 16) put it, language and texts have “con-
crete and significant, material effects. They allocate social capacities and re-
sources and make practices possible.” There is an intimately interwoven re-
lationship between language and politics.  
The relationship between language and politics has been subject to di-
verse debates and theorisations. Aristotle in his Ars Rhetorica (1959[350 
B.C.E]) famously points to the persuasive nature of language and the signif-
icance of rhetoric for the conduct of politics, which has inspired much re-
search on rhetoric, persuasion and propaganda. Jürgen Habermas and Han-
nah Arendt, each in their own ways, stress that the nature of human exist-
ence, politics and language are interlinked in fundamental ways. Habermas’ 
entire social theory, significant parts of which have found their way into the 
political studies and IR scholarship on (deliberative) democracy, is based on 
a communication paradigm;4 and Arendt (1958: 4, 25-6, 175) points out that 
one of the guiding concepts in political theory and philosophy, namely Aris-
tole’s zoon politikon, 
 
“can [only] be fully understood if one adds his second famous definition of man as a 
zoon logon ekhon (‘a living being capable of speech’).” 
 
Accordingly, she concludes,  
 
“wherever the relevance of speech is at stake, matters become political by definition, 
for speech is what makes man a political being.” (ibid. 3) 
 
Arendt’s colleague Hans-Georg Gadamer (1976: 59) argues in a similar way 
when he writes,  
 
“Aristotle established the classical definition of the nature of man, according to 
which man is the living being who has logos. In the tradition of the West, this defini-
tion became canonical in a form which stated that man is the animal rationale, the ra-
tional being, distinguished from all other animals by his capacity for thought. Thus it 
rendered the Greek word logos as reason or thought. In truth, however, the primary 
meaning of this word is language. [...] To men alone is the logos given [...], so that 
they can make manifest to each other what is useful and harmful, and therefore also 
what is right and wrong. [...] Man, as an individual, has logos. He can think and he 
can speak. He can make what is not present manifest through his speaking, so that 
another person sees it before him.” 
 
                                                    
4 Refer back to Chapter 4, fn 1.   
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Political linguist Heiko Girnth (2002: 1) stresses the role of language as a 
means of politics, in fact, he stresses that language is not just any kind of 
means of politics but the very condition of the possibility of politics. This is 
because unless physical force is used, politics is about symbolic action. Po-
litical goals have to be explained and opponents’ visions have to be criti-
cised and deconstructed in an attempt to secure public approval (Bergsdorf 
1991: 19). This is done through persuasion, argumentation and an appeal to 
the audience’s emotions. It is done through the use of some and the avoid-
ance of other words.   
The theory that language ‘does’ something is well established not only 
in the scholarship but also in political practice. “[W]ords have consequences 
as much as actions do”, acknowledges US President Bill Clinton (quoted in 
Washington Post 2010). An understanding of the ‘doing’ of language is also 
apparent in the following exchange between a journalist and US President 
George W. Bush’s spokesman Scott McClellan at a press conference about 
the abuses of prisoners in US-led prisons in Iraq and in the Guantanamo Bay 
detention camp:         
 
“Journalist: You call it a war. They’re prisoners of war. Why do you make a distinc-
tion, which has led to so many abuses by not abiding by the rule of law?  
Scott McClellan: Well, I don’t know, when you say ‘so many’, what exactly you’re 
referring to.” (Bush 2004f) 
 
The above exchange is not so much about (the fate of) ‘prisoners of war’ but 
about language. It is about what something is called or not called; it is about 
the expression ‘so many’ and the question of what a sign user, namely the 
journalist, means when they use it. Linguists such as Joseph Klein (1991) 
and Martin Wengeler (2005) provide comprehensive accounts of the various 
forms of this kind of ‘self-reflection’ on language in daily political practice. 
With self-reflection they mean the explicit problematisation of language, 
such as in instances in which the supposed or actual linguistic (in)com- 
petency of sign users are questioned, 5 or in instances in which there are ex- 
plicit disputes about single words and their meanings, such as is seen above 
in the question “what do you mean by ‘so many’?”  
The theory that language matters and that it ‘does’ something is apparent 
in political practice in two respects. First, practitioners are aware that the use 
of a specific word in a specific situation implies actual consequences. This 
is expressed in the above provided quote by President Clinton. It is most ob-
                                                    
5 The critique of George W. Bush as being unable to pronounce foreign countries 
and names, and like the (alleged) lack of English skills of former German Chan-
cellor Helmut Kohl, with reference to which his political opponents aimed to dis-
credit his (foreign) policy competency, are also prominent examples of this kind 
of self-reflection on or problematisation of language in political practice.   
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viously manifest in the many instances, in which words that are associated 
with (international) law are explicitly applied or avoided. For example, in 
1956, then British Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden was eager to stress to 
the House of Commons: “We are not at war with Egypt. We are in an armed 
conflict” (Eden 1956). In recent public debates in Germany, government 
representatives avoid using and explicitly reject the term Kampfeinsatz 
(combat mission), as well as, Krieg (war), when it comes to the engagement 
of the German Federal Armed Forces (Bundeswehr), for instance recently, 
in Afghanistan.6 Similar examples include the application or avoidance of 
the word genocide in various contexts, or, the use or avoidance of the term 
prisoners of war for specific detainees in the debate about the US detention 
camp in Guantanamo Bay – we saw this in the above quoted exchange be-
tween the journalist and President Bush’s spokesperson.7  
Second, the relevance of the theory that language ‘does’ something in 
political practice is also apparent in instances, in which the ‘right’ choice of 
language seems to be perceived as having a positive impact and even ‘pro-
ducing’ the social world by naming it. An obvious example is the practice of 
code-naming military operations, such as ‘Cast Lead’, the name of the 
                                                    
6 This debate is deeply embedded in post-1945 German history and culture and re-
lates to debates about the role of the German Federal Armed Forces (Bun-
deswehr). According to the German Grundgesetz (Art. 87a) the role of the Bun-
deswehr is a defensive one only. Before 1990 the only active exercise, in which 
the Bundeswehr was allowed to be involved, was related to disaster control oper-
ations. With the end of the Cold War and Germany’s (re)unification, debates 
about the role of the Bundeswehr came up. In 1994, the Federal Constitutional 
Court ruled that the idea of the Bundeswehr as ‘defending’ German borders 
needs to be reconsidered and understood more broadly than it used to be; the idea 
of ‘defence’ now also includes the reaction to crises and the prevention of con-
flicts elsewhere in the world in order to preserve Germany’s security. This ruling 
has made the question of what is the task of the Bundeswehr a highly politically 
charged issue.   
7 The 2002 ‘Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at Guantanamo’ (Bush 2002e) expli-
cates the US policy under President Bush: “The United States is treating and will 
continue to treat all of the individuals detained at Guantanamo humanely and, to 
the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner con-
sistent with the principles of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949. The Presi-
dent has determined that the Geneva Convention applies to the Taliban detainees, 
but not to the al-Qaida detainees. Al-Qaida is not a state party to the Geneva 
Convention; it is a foreign terrorist group. As such, its members are not entitled 
to POW status. Although we never recognized the Taliban as the legitimate Af-
ghan government, Afghanistan is a party to the Convention, and the President has 
determined that the Taliban are covered by the Convention. Under the terms of 
the Geneva Convention, however, the Taliban detainees do not qualify as POWs. 
Therefore, neither the Taliban nor al-Qaida detainees are entitled to POW status.”   
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2008/9 strike of the Israel Defence Forces in the Gaza Strip, which refers to 
a children’s Chanukah song (Ronen 2008). Codenames are usually chosen 
with a view to boost public relations and support, as it was the case when 
the 1989 US invasion of Panama was code-named ‘Just Cause’ and when 
the 2001 US military build-up to the ‘war on terror’ ran under the label ‘En-
during Freedom’, after its initial name, ‘Infinite Justice’, was reconsidered 
in order to avoid outrage by Muslims. The name change was officially an-
nounced on 24 September 2001 when the US Administration realised that in 
the Islamic faith ’infinite justice’ is only to be provided by God (BBC 
2001). The linguistic move by the US military during the 1991 Gulf War to 
replace the term ‘body bags’ with the euphemism ‘human remains pouches’ 
in order to avoid associations with (the trauma of) the Vietnam War (see 
Freedberg 2003) is another prominent example that hints to an underlying 
theory, according to which words ‘do’ something – even beyond being acts 
with concrete (legal) implications; so is the case of the labelling of the Ber-
lin Wall, which, in official East German (GDR) political jargon, was not 
simply called ‘wall’ but antifaschistischer Schutzwall (‘antifascist protection 
rampart’). This encoded the founding narrative and guiding ideology of the 
GDR as a socialist and explicitly anti-fascist society that, within this narra-
tive, required protection from a fascist capitalist ‘outside’.8 US President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s public endeavour in 1942 to find an appropriate 
name for the 1939–1945 war is another example along these lines:  
 
“So I am looking for a word – as I said to the newspapermen a little while ago – I 
want a name for the war. I haven’t had any very good suggestions. Most of them are 
too long. My own thought is that perhaps there is one word that we could use for this 
war, the word ‘survival’. The Survival War.” (Roosevelt 1942)9 
 
This endeavour, like the previous example, makes apparent that the sign us-
ers, such as Roosevelt, seem to hold a theory according to which, as feminist 
                                                    
8 In contrast, in West Germany, the border, which was erected by the GDR, was 
usually called innerdeutsche Grenze (internal German border) in order to indicate 
that the separation of the Soviet zone from the three zones initially occupied by 
the Western Allies was not officially acknowledged and that Germany was still 
one and not two countries. This is also why, by default, it is a political statement 
if one chooses to speak of the re-unification (Wiedervereinigung) of Germany or 
the unification (Vereinigung) of Germany in 1990. While the former implies that 
something came together again which was always there but was artificially sepa-
rated, the latter suggests that there is a new Germany as a result of two Germanys 
coming together.   
9 As we know, the name Survival War did not take hold. However, as Reynolds 
(2003) discusses in detail, even World War II, which became the common label 
in the West, was not used worldwide.   
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theorist Dale Spender (quoted in Bhatia 2005: 9) puts it in a different con-
text,  
 
“[t]hose who name the world have the privilege of highlighting their own experiences 
– and thereby identify what they consider important.”10  
 
The notion that choices of the ‘right’ words make a difference beyond hav-
ing actual legal implications is further apparent in attempts by political ac-
tors to actively ‘occupy’ and ‘capture’ linguistic signs with specific mean-
ings and associations. A recent attempt was US President Barack Obama’s 
move to ‘capture’ the term change for the purposes of his 2007-8 Presiden-
tial nomination campaign.  
As Martin Wengeler (2005) points out, the belief that words could be 
‘occupied’ with specific meanings has its origin in leftist thoughts.11 It 
builds on Antonio Gramsci’s theory of hegemony as outlined in his famous 
Prison Notebooks (1991[1929-35], 1996, 2007) but it was also taken up by 
conservative and right wing groups. Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch ex-
plained the success of the Nazis in resurrecting wide parts of former social-
ist discipleship in Germany in the 1930s with the fact that the Nazis man-
aged to ‘occupy’ for their purposes critical concepts, such as Nation (na-
tion), Seele (soul), Reich, Einheit (unity). For Bloch it was the task of the 
Left to ‘re-occupy’ these terms in order to be able to reach the “soul of the 
people” (Wengeler 2005: 181). The German student movement of the 1960s 
argued in a similar way and built on Herbert Marcuse, who claimed that po-
litical linguistics was “one of the most effective ‘secret weapons’” of the po-
litical establishment (ibid.). And in the 1970s, the belief in the ‘power of 
words’ went so far that Germany’s conservative party, CDU, after its defeat 
in the general elections, officially established a so-called Projektgruppe Se-
mantik (‘project group for semantics’), the task of which was to develop 
strategies to ‘occupy’ terms with meanings according to the CDU’s party 
line (Wengeler 2005; also Klein 1991).12 Given the insights into the com-
plexity of meaning, which I provided in Chapter 2, the idea that words could 
be easily ‘occupied’ with specific meanings is, of course, misguided. Mean-
                                                    
10 Historian David Reynolds (2003: 29) stresses in a similar vein, “[t]he labels we 
apply […] are as important as the events themselves. Sometimes these concepts 
are developed retrospectively; often they are taken from the vocabulary of the 
time. But the labels are rarely neutral, either in their political bias or their analyt-
ical implications.” This point is backed up when we consider that in the Soviet 
Union the Second World War was officially called The Great Patriotic War, 
which gives the historical event a completely different meaning in that it “linked 
the conflict with the struggle against Napoleon (‘The Patriotic War’)” (ibid. 14).   
11 For the following, including fn 13 in this chapter, see Wengeler (2005: 181).   
12 The ‘study group’ existed from 1973-77.  
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ings are inevitably products of social processes and less one-dimensional 
and functional than the assumption behind the Projektgruppe Semantik and 
similar endeavours seems to suggest. As became clear above, words are not 
containers that could be readily filled.13  
Moving now from political practice back to the study of politics (under-
stood in the broadest sense), the theory that language ‘does’ something has 
come to inform a diverse and growing body of works, which build on the 
philosophy of speech acts, developed by J. L. Austin (1962, 1971, 2013) and 
John Searle (1969).  
As Krallmann and Ziemann (2001: 74) note, J. L. Austin was the first 
philosopher who argued for a theory of linguistic action. Building on prag-
matic language philosophy, or, as it is also called, the ‘ordinary language 
philosophy’ of Ludwig Wittgenstein (especially 1953),14 Austin was the first 
who explicitly developed the theory that language has a performative poten-
tial. Suggesting that “[w]hat we need, perhaps, is a more general theory of 
speech-acts” (Austin 1971: 20), he set out to develop this theory by distin-
guishing between constative and performative utterances. The function of 
constative utterances is to use language in order to say something; the func-
tion of performative utterances, in comparison, is to use language in order to 
do something:  
 
“if a person makes an utterance of this [performative] sort we should say that he is 
doing something rather than merely saying something. […] When I say ‘I name this 
ship the Queen Elizabeth’ I do not describe the christening ceremony, I actually per-
form the christening and when I say ‘I do’ […], I am not reporting on a marriage, I 
am indulging in it.” (Austin 2013: 22) 
 
Building on this, Austin argues that the context, in which the use of lan-
guage as a performative act is embedded, needs to be acknowledged as criti-
cal for its success. Surely, as he makes clear, marrying is not “simply saying 
a few words”, rather, “the words have to be said in the appropriate circum-
stances” (ibid.). Wrong circumstances, such as a missing convention, make 
the intended performative act misfire:  
 
“Suppose that, living in a country like our own, we wish to divorce our wife. We may 
try standing her in front of us squarely in the room and saying, in a voice loud 
enough for all to hear, ‘I divorce you’. Now this procedure is not accepted. We shall 
not thereby have succeeded in divorcing our wife […]. This is a case where the con-
vention, we should say, does not exist or is not accepted.” (ibid. 23) 
                                                    
13 Jürgen Habermas (1979) was among those who made this point clear in the pub-
lic debate about the usefulness of the CDU’s ‘project group for semantics’ (see 
Wengeler 2005; Klein 1991). 
14 Refer back to Chapter 2, fn 7.  
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Austin’s emphasis on the pragmatic and performative dimension of (the use 
of) language turns away from the idea that utterances are only about making 
statements about ‘facts’. In other words, it turns away from perceptions ac-
cording to which the use of language is only about truthful or untruthful 
propositions about an independently existing reality. This becomes apparent 
in his explanation that a performative utterance is an utterance,   
 
“which looks like a statement and grammatically […] would be classed as a state-
ment, which is not non-sensical, and yet it is not true or false. […] They will be per-
fectly straightforward utterances, with ordinary verbs in the first person singular pre-
sent indicative active, and yet we shall see at once that they couldn’t possibly be true 
or false.” (ibid. 22) 
 
Rather than being either ‘true’ or ‘false’, performative utterances may be 
‘unsatisfactory’ and ‘unhappy’ or, as he calls it, they may be “infelicities” in 
that they “fail to come off in special ways” due to the fact that “certain rules, 
transparently simple rules, are broken” (ibid. 23), of which the above noted 
missing conventional context is one – for instance, when trying to divorce 
somebody by standing in front of this person and saying ‘I divorce you’. In 
this sense, performative utterances are about the ‘right way’ of using lan-
guage; they are either ‘successful’ or ‘unsuccessful’ but they are never ‘true’ 
or ‘false’.15    
The notion of the performative dimension of language has found its way 
into social and political scientific discourses, for instance, through Jürgen 
Habermas’ work on ‘communicative action’ (e.g. Habermas 1981a, 
1981b).16 It was also taken up by Nicholas Onuf (1985, 1998), who intro-
                                                    
15 In his posthumously published How to Do Things with Words (1962), Austin 
stresses the performative nature of language in that he revises his initial taxono-
my of speech acts. In How to Do Things with Words Austin moves away from 
the dual distinction between constative and performative acts because he realises 
that, in fact, constativa have a performative function too. This conceptual shift is 
not of relevance for our purposes here, for which we just need to understand the 
basic premises of speech act theory. However, to give an idea of the direction in-
to which Austin moves: In How to Do Things with Words he shifts his attention 
away from the dual distinction between constative and performative acts to the 
three dimensions or forms of action, which he recognises as being inherent in 
every utterance. These are the locutionary act, the illocutionary act and the perlo-
cutionary act (Austin 1962: esp. 94-119). He understands the locutionary act as 
the actual performance of an utterance. The concept of the illocutionary act, 
“such as informing, ordering, warning, undertaking” (ibid. 108), refers to the 
conventional force of an utterance. The perlocutionary act is about the actual ef-
fect of an utterance on those who are addressed.   
16 Refer back to fn 1 in Chapter 4.   
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duces it into the study of international law. Onuf’s aim is to criticise legal 
positivism. Based on the insight that “saying is doing” (Onuf 1998: 59), he 
uses speech act theory to establish a “typology of rules” in order to “show 
that the international order is a legal order”, which, as he argues, is a state-
ment that could not be defended if one looks from the perspective of legal 
positivism (ibid. 386). 
Another prominent instance, in which speech act theory has entered the 
study of politics and the IR scholarship, is the concept ‘securitisation’, 
which was developed by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Joop de Wilde 
(1998). The securitisation scholarship has come to be labelled Copenhagen 
School. Building on Austin’s pragmatic premises, scholars of the Copenha-
gen School set out to reconceptualise ‘security’ by moving away from con-
sidering it as something objectively measurable and as an issue that is solely 
linked to the military sector. This is how the issue of security has been 
commonly treated in the mainstream IR scholarship (see Williams 2008). 
Instead, the main argument of the Copenhagen School is that “security is a 
particular type of politics applicable to a wide range of issues” (Buzan, 
Wæver and de Wilde 1998: vii).17 Security is not to be understood “just as 
the use of force” (ibid. 19). Rather, Copenhagen School scholars argue that 
security is to be understood as a speech act. It is this speech act that they la-
bel ‘securitisation’. As Ole Wæver (1995: 55) puts it, for securitisation 
scholars “security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more 
real; the utterance itself is the act.”  
 
“Security is […] a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue 
becomes a security issue – not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but 
because the issue is presented as such a threat.” (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998: 
24) 
 
The central claim of securitisation scholars is that this speech act lifts issues 
beyond the sphere of ‘normal politics’ into the sphere of ‘security’.  
 
“Traditionally, by saying ‘security’, a state representative declares an emergency 
condition, thus claiming a right to use whatever means are necessary to block a 
threatening development.” (ibid. 21) 
 
Hence, by saying something, namely ‘security’, something is done, namely 
an issue is described as, or one could say, is transformed into something 
“posing an existential threat” (ibid.). Through this (symbolic) transfor-
mation, that is, through this securitisation-speech act, the respective issue 
                                                    
17 In addition to the military, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde suggest four sectors, in 
which security is a crucial component: the environmental sector, the economic 
sector, the societal sector, and the political sector.   
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gets pushed to the far end of a spectrum, which, as the Copenhagen School 
scholars explain, consists of the following three main stages:  
 
“nonpoliticized (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any way made 
an issue of public debate and decision)[,] politicized (meaning the issue is part of 
public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rare-
ly, some other form of communal governance) [and] securitized.” (ibid. 24) 
 
Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (ibid. 23) describe this securitisation-move as 
an “extreme form of politicization” because it enables political actors to 
break rules of political conduct and procedures. Importantly, it legitimises 
the use of force or the prohibition of debates about a ‘securitised’ issue in 
public or academic discourses.  
The securitisation-speech act is conceptualised as consisting of “three 
components (or steps): existential threats, emergency action, and effects on 
interunit relations by breaking free of rules” (ibid. 26). Yet, as Buzan, 
Wæver and de Wilde (ibid. 25) stress, just saying ‘security’ does not yet 
count as a successful act of securitising an issue.     
 
“A discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a 
referent object does not by itself create securitization – this is a securitizing move, 
but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such.” (ibid.) 
 
This brings in the context of the securitising-speech act, which is something 
also Austin stresses. Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (ibid. 32) explain that to 
grasp a successful securitisation-speech act does not only require “to gain an 
increasingly precise understanding of who securitizes, on what issues 
(threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results” but also “not 
at least, under what conditions (i.e., what explains when securitization is 
successful)” (ibid.). In this sense, the securitisation-speech act is more than 
the act of using the word security and of calling and presenting an issue as 
an ‘existential threat’; it also requires the acceptance of the issue as a ‘secu-
rity’ issue by the respective addressees (ibid. 25). In short, as Buzan, Wæver 
and de Wilde (ibid. 32) argue, the success of a securitising-speech act de-
pends on two criteria: a) “internal, linguistic-grammatical” criteria and b) 
“external, contextual and social” conditions.18  
                                                    
18 In utilising pragmatic language philosophical premises and Austin’s concept of 
speech acts, the notion of ‘securitisation’ highlights the normative dimension of 
‘security’-debates. The acknowledgment that empirical reality (in the particular 
case of ‘securitisation’ this means ‘existential threats’) is not objectively ‘out 
there’ – in other words, that it is not just innocently perceived and reacted to by 
political actors – but that political actors are actively involved in creating it 
through the use of language, i.e. speech acts, highlights “the responsibility of 
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‘Securitisation’ has come to be a popular concept in the political studies 
and IR scholarship. A growing number of empirical case studies look at the 
‘securitisation’ of a variety of socio-political issues, prominently the envi-
ronment (e.g. Ney 1999; Litfin 1999) and migration (e.g. Ceyhan and 
Tsoukala 2002; Huysmans 1995, 2002a), but also HIV/AIDS (e.g. Peterson 
2002/3; Elbe 2006), as well as less obvious issues, such as the ‘securitisation 
of Africa’ through the UK Blair Government, analysed by Rita Abrahamsen 
(2005).  
In her study, Abrahamsen argues that the British approach to Africa un-
der UK Prime Minister Tony Blair has changed significantly after the terror-
ist attack of 11 September 2001. She argues, the continent has been subject 
to securitisation. This process of securitisation has taken place through the 
UK government’s explicit linking of the trope of global interdependency, on 
the one side, with the “interpretation of poverty and underdevelopment as 
dangerous” (Abrahamsen 2005: 62), on the other side. Following on from 
this, Abrahamsen (ibid. 55) argues, the British approach to Africa under 
Blair has been “part of an ongoing securitization of the continent” after 
9/11. This ‘ongoing securitisation’ is manifest, she argues, in public state-
ments of the British government, such as Blair’s cognition that “we are real-
ising how fragile are our frontiers in the face of the world’s new challenges” 
(quoted in ibid. 65), Jack Straw’s claim that “we care about Africa because 
it is no longer possible to neglect the world’s problems without running the 
risk of eventually suffering the consequences” (ibid.), and Chris Mullin’s 
claim that there are “sound practical reasons why we cannot afford to ignore 
the state of Africa. The most immediate of these is terrorism” (quoted in 
ibid. 67). Abrahamsen (ibid. 56) argues that although the UK engagement in 
Africa is “less visibly militarized than U.S. policies”, it has come to be 
shaped by a discourse of “risk/fear/security” rather than “develop-
ment/humanitarianism”. This shift of discourse, she concludes, may lead to 
a ‘demonisation’ of the continent, justifying a tightening of immigration and 
asylum laws in the UK, and, more generally, may result in policies which 
have “very little to offer in terms of solving Africa’s development prob-
lems” (ibid. 74). It is this discursive shift that Abrahamsen takes as an indi-
cator for that there is “an ongoing securitization of the continent” (ibid. 55) 
unfolding.  
On close scrutiny, there is something curious about Abrahamsen’s study. 
While she provides a valuable interpretation of the official UK discourse 
                                                    
talking security, the responsibility of actors as well as of analysts who choose to 
frame an issue as a security issue. They cannot hide behind the claim that any-
thing in itself constitutes a security issue” (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998: 
34). The use of “the security label”, as Ole Wæver (1995: 65) puts it, is then a 
“political choice”. As such, it provokes us to question “with some force whether 
it is a good idea to make [an] issue a security issue – to transfer it to the agenda 
of panic politics” (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998: 34).   
154 | THE NEGOTIATION OF THE “NEW WORLD” 
 
towards Africa, she actually does not really study ‘securitisation’. This is 
not least because the dimension of the ‘acceptance’ of a securitising-speech 
act is left unexplored in her study. Abrahamsen’s study unveils a distinct 
kind of naming and, perhaps, framing of ‘Africa’ and offers insights into 
how UK representatives, such as the above quoted Blair, Straw and Mullin, 
symbolically address and grasp ‘Africa’. It leaves out, however, the question 
whether this reference to ‘Africa’ with security-terminology is actually a 
successful securitisation-move. Following the theory of ‘securitisation’, it 
would be a successful securitisation-speech act if the addressees of the secu-
ritisation-move, such as the British public, accepted it as a securitising-
move. This, however, is not part of Abrahamsen’s examination.  
I mention Abrahamsen’s study not only to indicate that empirical anal-
yses of ‘securitisation’ are challenging endeavours that have to go beyond 
the analysis of the linguistic level and have to take into account perceptions 
and attitudes on the side of those who are addressed. I mention it because it 
points to another way, in which the relationship between language, meaning 
and social reality is treated in the study of politics. It seems to me that, ra-
ther than following a pragmatic speech act-approach, Abrahamsen’s study 
uncovers the symbolic legitimation of political decisions in a particular case, 
more generally. With that, it seems to me, she is close(r) to another kind of 
established literature, which takes seriously that language ‘does’ something, 
than to the pragmatic speech act-scholars. This other literature is the schol-
arship that follows, in the broadest sense, an approach called critical dis-
course analysis.  
There is a comprehensive literature that looks critically at the linguistic 
legitimation of past and present (future-oriented) political decisions. This is 
done in various different ways. Particularly popular are approaches that fol-
low, in one way or other, a tradition called critical discourse analysis. Nor-
man Fairclough (1992, 1995, 2015) is one of the scholars who set the foun-
dations for this kind of theory and study of language and politics. In contrast 
to the concept ‘discourse’, that I sketched in Chapter 4, the word discourse 
is used by Fairclough to refer to the use of language as a particular aspect of 
social life that stands in a dialectical relationship with other parts of social 
life (Fairclough 2015: 7).19 Language is seen as a social practice that is em-
bedded in a broader social context. The focus of critical discourse analyses 
is on unveiling in written or spoken texts “contradictions between what [the 
discourse] is claimed and expected to be and what it actually is” (ibid. 9). 
The analysis focuses on explaining “how such contradictions are caused by 
                                                    
19 With reference to David Harvey (1996), Fairclough (2015: 7) lists five other el-
ements that form social life: “power; social relations; material practices; institu-
tions (and rituals); beliefs (values and desires)”. He (ibid.) explains that these 
“elements are distinct, but dialectically related – […] for example […] discourse 
is a form of power, a mode of forming beliefs/values/desires, an institution, a 
mode of social relating, and a material practice.”  
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and are a part of […] the wider social reality, which they exist within” 
(ibid.). The aim is to understand “how language contributes to the domina-
tion of some people by others as a step towards social emancipation” (ibid. 
46). As the adjective critical suggests, critical discourse analysis is a  
 
“normative critique of discourse, leading to explanatory critique of relations between 
discourse and other social elements of the existing social reality, as a basis for action 
to change reality for the better.” (ibid. 48; emphasis in the original)       
 
This brings me to the end of my excursus on ways in which language is tak-
en seriously by scholars and political practitioners and in which it is taken as 
something that does something. The purpose of my excursus is to point to 
the fact that, in general, theories according to which language ‘does’ some-
thing are a well-established ‘ingredient’ both of political practice and the 
scholarship. At the same time, it helps me to distinguish from these theories 
the idea of the relationship between language, meaning and social reality 
that informs my conception of the omnipresence of the adjective global as a 
political phenomenon. As sketched above, according to this theory lan-
guage, meaning and texts “systematically form the objects of which they 
speak” (Foucault 1972: 49) and have “concrete and significant, material ef-
fects. They allocate social capacities and resources and make practices pos-
sible” (Weldes et. al. 1999: 16). My excursus on the widespread understand-
ing that language, in one way or other, does something helps me to point to 
the specificity of this theory.  
The many examples, which I presented above, make apparent that the 
conception that language and meaning do not simply mirror, or as Stuart 
Hall (1997: 15) puts it, “reflect” social reality but somehow construct this 
social reality, is well and widely established. Yet, despite this general simi-
larity, the above sketched theories according to which language does some-
thing differ significantly from the theory of the relationship between lan-
guage, meaning and social reality that informs my conception of the omni-
presence of the adjective global as a political phenomenon. Importantly, in 
the above sketched approaches the use of language is seen as doing some-
thing “intentionally”, to use Hall’s (1997: 15) words again. There is an idea 
implied in the above sketched approaches that clearly confined actors do 
something to, i.e. construct and shape a world ‘outside’ (of themselves). It is 
in this respect that the theory of the relationship between language, meaning 
and social reality, which informs my conceptualisation of the omnipresence 
of the word global as a political phenomenon, differs; it is more radical. Ra-
ther than just presuming that actors do something through the use of lan-
guage, my theoretical assumption is that social reality (‘unintentionally’) 
emerges from within language and meaning. This includes the social actors, 
who ‘construct’ the world; they, too, ‘emerge’ from within language and 
meaning. This means nothing less but that language and meaning, as mani-
fest in texts, fundamentally open and close pathways as they produce social 
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facts and identities.20 Language and meaning bring out “interpretive disposi-
tions which create certain possibilities and preclude others”, explains 
Roxanne L. Doty (1993: 298). As Weldes et al (1999: 17) put it with refer-
ence to Stuart Hall,  
 
“[c]onstructions of reality and codes of intelligibility out of which they are produced 
provide both conditions of possibility and limits on possibility; that is, they make it 
possible to act in the world while simultaneously defining the ‘horizon of the taken-
for-granted’ (Hall 1988: 44) that marks the boundaries of common sense and ac-
ceptable knowledge.” 
 
This symbolic production of social reality through language and meaning is 
not only ‘not intentional’ (in Hall’s sense above). It is also highly complex, 
provisional and historical. Given that, as I pointed out in Chapter 2, lan-
guage and meaning are a “constant flickering of presence and absence to-
gether” (Eagleton 1983: 128) social reality, including (the identities of) so-
cial actors, are principally in flux; they are anything but naturally stable. 
Consequently, any symbolic production of reality must be regarded only ev-
er as a production of a possibility of reality rather than of reality per se.  
This is where ‘politics’ comes in. Implied in this theory of the relation-
ship between language, meaning and social reality is a distinct idea of ‘poli-
tics’ and ‘power’, where the latter is not held by stable actors but re-
produced within the web of meanings that is social reality.  
I come back to this point and elaborate on it in due course. However, be-
fore doing this, I want to conduct a second excursus on a scholarly approach 
that has similarities with the theory of the relationship between language, 
meaning and social reality that informs my conception of the omnipresence 
of global as a political phenomenon but that differs in its foundation. This is 
the theory of social constructivism. Again, I embark on this excursus in or-
der to clarify the hallmarks of the theoretical premises that inform my own 
conception. At the same time, it is a way of situating the omnipresence of 
the adjective global as a political phenomenon and object of study in the 
broader political studies and IR scholarship.   
The social constructivist approach entered the political studies and espe-
cially the IR scholarship in the context of the wider post-positivist turn. This 
post-positivist turn is grounded in the assumption that “social reality does 
not fall from heaven but that human agents construct and reproduce it 
through their daily practices”, as IR scholar Thomas Risse (2007a: 128) puts 
it with reference to Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s seminal work 
The Social Construction of Reality (1967). Although the oppositional labels 
                                                    
20 As stressed at the beginning of this section, social facts and identities emerge 
from within language and practices. Yet, in the context of this project, I only 
stress the issue of language.  
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‘positivism’ (understood as ‘pro-science’) and ‘post-positivism’ (understood 
as ‘anti-science’) are still used in the debate about the nature of the disci-
plined knowledge production in political studies and IR, the scholarship has 
come to be shaped by broader recent developments in the philosophy of so-
cial science (Kurki and Wight 2007). This has lead to a basic rejection of the 
idea of positivism as a valid, let alone as the only account of science. Milja 
Kurki and Colin Wight (2007: 23-25) point out that the idea of ‘positivism’ 
has been largely replaced by what has come to be called ‘scientific realism’. 
Scientific realism, in turn, is based on the premise that  
 
“what makes a body of knowledge scientific is not its mode of generation, but its 
content. Contra a positivist account of science, a body of knowledge is not declared 
scientific because it has followed a particular set of procedures based upon empirical 
‘facts’ but, rather, because it constructs explanations of those facts in terms of entities 
and processes that are unknown and potentially unobservable.” (ibid. 24) 
 
This general turning-away from the idea of ‘positivism’ and the growing, 
relative ease with ‘post-positivist’ accounts is apparent in Thomas Risse’s 
hypothetical question: 
 
“[i]f ‘post-positivism’ means, 1) a healthy scepticism toward a ‘covering law’ ap-
proach to social science irrespective of time and space and instead a strive toward 
middle-range theorizing; 2) an emphasis on interpretive understanding as an intrinsic, 
albeit not exclusive, part of any causal explanations; and 3) the recognition that social 
scientists are part of the social world which they try to analyse […] – is anybody  still 
a ‘positivist’ then […]?” (Risse 2007a: 127) 
 
Today, “it has simply become too difficult not to be a constructivist”, argues 
Niels Akerstrom Andersen (2003: ix).  
This philosophical ‘open-mindedness’ has lead to a growing body of lit-
erature in political studies and IR, which runs under the label ‘social con-
structivism’. Alexander Wendt (e.g. 1992, 1994, 1999) is the most promi-
nent representative of this scholarship, famously arguing that  
 
“people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that 
the objects have for them. States act differently toward enemies than they do toward 
friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not.” (Wendt 1992: 396-7) 
 
With the acknowledgement of the mutually constructing relationship be-
tween actors and structure, social constructivists have moved ideational as-
pects into the spotlight of their political analyses. Notions such as the ‘col-
lective identity’ of political actors, e.g. states, have come to be considered as 
relevant components that guide the action of political agents – especially 
when it comes to foreign policy (e.g. Hellmann 2006; Risse 2007b; Weller 
1999; Wendt 1994, 1999). Closely related to the concept of collective iden-
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tity, and sometimes even used synonymously, are the concept ‘political cul-
ture’ (Duffield 1998, 1999) and the idea of so-called ‘role perceptions’ of 
state actors (Kirste and Maull 1996). Together, these three concepts – politi-
cal culture, role perceptions and collective identity – share reference to the 
collectively shared ideas and world-views, which are considered to underlie 
and, to some degree, direct policy making, and especially foreign policy 
making.   
In the study of international politics this conceptual shift constitutes a 
significant development. The growing number of works, which ac- 
knowledge the significance of collective identity, political culture and role 
perceptions in and for policy / foreign policy, move away from the idea that 
policy making is guided by national interests, which are objectively prede-
termined either (from a realist perspective) through the conditions ‘dictated’ 
by the international environment or (from a liberal perspective) as the out-
come of the demands and processes of the formation of coalitions within the 
social environment (see in more detail Risse 2007b: 49). Rather than assum-
ing that interests and preferences are objectively and extrinsically predeter-
mined, these interests and preferences themselves are exposed as socially 
constructed and, as such, are moved onto the radar of critical exploration.21 
                                                    
21 This brings in again the breakdown of the bipolar bloc system at the end of the 
1980, which I identified as the discursive ‘door opener’ for the concept ‘globali-
sation’ to come to be ‘in the true’. Again, it was this event and especially the 
question of German foreign policy after the end of the Cold War and after the 
unification of both Germanys in 1990, which played a distinct role in triggering 
the above sketched shift away from traditional (especially realist) approaches in 
policy analysis (see Risse 2007b; Baumann and Hellmann 2001; Duffield 1998, 
1999). Based on realist presumptions, German post-Cold War foreign policy was 
expected to alter significantly in the face of the power political changes, which 
followed from the breakdown of the bloc system. A new(ly) powerful Germany 
was expected to adjust its strategic interests and (power political) behaviour ac-
cordingly. Yet, post-1990 German foreign policy did not change significantly – 
at least not as dramatically as realist premises made analysts predict. German 
foreign political decisions, such as the rejection of the 1994 NATO-request to ac-
tively enhance the UN-authorised flight ban over Bosnia, which came only 
months after the historic decision of the German constitutional court, according 
to which German armed forces could join collective military actions under UN 
auspices, left those political analysts puzzled who built on ‘traditional’ approach-
es – at least it left them without explanation (see Duffield 1999). It was this ob-
vious inability of traditional (realist) approaches to fully capture, in this case, 
German foreign policy behaviour, which caused some to turn to ideational as-
pects, to the concepts of collective identity and political culture, in order to ex-
plain and understand policy / foreign policy behaviour and, not least, to detect 
and predict policy change. In the German case, for instance, a significant body of 
literature became devoted to considering Germany’s collective self-perception as 
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This brings me back to the theory of the relationship between language, 
meaning and social reality, which informs my conception of the omnipres-
ence of global as a political phenomenon. While the social constructivist 
approach shares with this theory the idea that social reality ‘does not fall 
from heaven’ but is constructed, it remains committed to traditional premis-
es regarding the very constitution of social reality. Theorists, such as Eman-
uel Adler (1997), Maja Zehfuss (2002), Karin Fierke (2007), as well as the 
already mentioned Kurki and Wight (2007) elaborate on this point. The lat-
ter identify social constructivism as a “via media, or middle ground, be-
tween rationalism and reflectivism” (Kurki and Wight 2007: 25). It is a ‘via 
media’ because ideational factors, like collective identities and political cul-
ture, are considered to be independent variables. They are not questioned 
and de-constructed themselves. In short, social constructivist approaches are 
committed to and reproduce an essentialist understanding of the world. De-
spite a belief in a socially constructed nature of socio-political reality and 
the stress of ideational aspects (such as collective identity and world-views) 
as crucial components in the analysis of world politics, the presumption that 
there is an essence of socio-political reality is not questioned as such – or at 
least it is not explicitly taken into account and built into the scholarly pro-
duction of knowledge. 
This is where the theory of the relationship between language, meaning 
and social reality, which informs my conception of the omnipresence of 
global as a political phenomenon, differs from these accounts. And this dif-
ference accounts for the fact that it finds itself positioned at the ‘unconven-
tional’ margins of the political studies and IR scholarship.  
While studies, which take the productive nature of language seriously, 
like the speech act-inspired securitisation scholarship and (parts of) the stud-
ies that follow social constructivist premises, are rising in popularity and 
have settled into the mainstream,22 “unconventional” studies, as David 
                                                    
a Zivilmacht (civil power) as a crucial variable determining its policy / foreign 
policy behaviour (see further Kirste and Maull 1996; Maull 1993). For an empir-
ical study see also Hellmann, Weber, Sauer and Schirmbeck (2007), which I 
mentioned in the Introduction of this book.   
22 This ‘rise’ is to be seen in relative terms. Overall, the focus on language, even in 
the pragmatic sense, is (still) relatively unpopular in the political studies dis-
course and IR. For the IR scholarship, Karin Fierke (2002: 351) finds, “[t]he 
question of language […] has been marginalized, given assumptions that dealing 
with language is equivalent to being uninterested in research”. Joseph Klein 
(1991) observes that the majority of scholars in political studies and IR either 
remains assuming that language is a neutral tool, which captures an externally 
existing empirical reality (in this sense language is not considered to be worthy 
of investigation in itself), or thinks that one cannot be sure that political actors 
‘really mean’ what they say but that they might use language in order to obscure 
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Campbell (1998[1992]: ix) calls them, which fall outside an essentialist out-
look on the world, continue to be faced with profound scepticism on the part 
of the mainstream scholarship. Michael H. Lessnoff’s decision to explicitly 
exclude, among others, Michel Foucault, Richard Rorty and Jacques Derri-
da, from his introductory book Political Philosophers of the Twentieth Cen-
tury (1999) on the basis that “none of them seems […] to have said anything 
about politics that is both original and significant – in so far as their writings 
are comprehensible at all” (Lessnoff quoted in Finlayson and Valentine 
2002: 2), might be an extreme form of this ‘scepticism’, but in its basic sen-
timent it is symptomatic for the nature of the contemporary mainstream in 
political studies and IR. As Milja Kurki and Colin Wight (2007: 23) detect,  
 
“the mainstream has been reluctant to take the knowledge claims of [‘unconvention-
al’] scholars seriously, because they challenge the very status of the ontological, epis-
temological, and methodological assumptions upon which the mainstream depends.” 
 
Richard J. Bernstein (1983) calls this rejection the “Cartesian Anxiety”, 
which David Campbell (2007: 211) explains as  
 
“the fear that, given the demise of objectivity, we are unable to make judgements that 
have been central to the understanding of modern life, namely distinguishing between 
true and false, good and bad.” 
 
To replace the idea of ‘objective reality’ (essence) with ‘textuality’ (dis-
course) and to focus on the symbolic systems through which the distinctions 
that guide life are made, as it is in one way or other at the heart of ‘uncon-
ventional’ approaches, and, subsequently, to challenge the “cognitive validi-
ty, empirical objectivity, and universalist and rationalist claims of idealist, 
realist, and neorealist schools alike” (Der Derian and Shapiro 1989: ix), is 
(still) unthinkable and unacceptable for the majority of scholars in the field.  
Yet, despite the fact that, as Peeter Selg (2010) observes, “due to current 
power relations (in terms of institutional resources, careers, funding, pres-
tige, status, discipline’s public relevance and ‘impact factors’)” it seems that 
‘unconventional’ approaches will remain at the margins of the political stud-
ies and IR scholarship, these margins have been steadily colonised by more 
and more scholarly contributions. These contributions bring along nothing 
less than a distinct idea of ‘politics’ and ‘power’. Implied in the non-
essentialist outlook of these approaches is a widening of what is to be 
grasped as ‘politics’. As IR scholar R. B. J. Walker (2000: 23) puts it, “[t]he 
most challenging political problems of our time […] arise primarily from a 
need to re-imagine what we mean by politics.” But the implied notion of 
‘politics’ is not only broader; it is also different from existing ones that 
                                                    
their ‘actual intentions’ (consequently, the use of language is not considered as 
‘hard fact’).   
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shape the mainstream scholarship in the field. It differs, for instance, even 
from those understandings of politics, which are already relatively broad, 
like Adrian Leftwich’s idea, according to which:   
 
“[p]olitics consists of all the activities, within and between societies, whereby the 
human species goes about obtaining, using, producing and distributing resources in 
the course of the production and reproduction of its social and biological life. These 
activities are not isolated from other features of social life. […] Politics is therefore a 
defining characteristic of all human groups, and always has been.” (Leftwich 1983: 
11) 
 
The notion of politics that is implied in an ‘unconventional’, non-essentialist 
theory of the relationship between language, meaning and social reality, 
which informs my conception of the omnipresence of global as a political 
phenomenon, goes beyond the one quoted above, in that it implies that 
“there is nothing given about the elements and forms of the political, the 
mode in which politics appears” (Finlayson and Valentine 2002: 4). Rather, 
“[e]veryday life is [seen as] ideological in an ontological sense; that which 
we know and which seems true depends on our sense of what is real” 
(Gregory 1988: xxi). Consequently, as David Rochefort and Roger W. 
Cobbs (1994) make clear, politics is the perpetual struggle over alternative 
realities, manifested in and through symbolic webs of meanings – such as 
the one re-produced in utterances, which contain the adjective global.  
Finally, along with an ‘unconventional’ idea of politics comes an equal-
ly ‘unconventional’ idea of power. This idea is well captured by Michel 
Foucault (1984: 92-3) in his The History of Sexuality:  
 
“[P]ower must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations 
immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organi-
zation; as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, trans-
forms, strengthens, or reverses them; as the support which these force relations find 
in one another, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one an-
other; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or 
institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of 
the law, in the various social hegemonies. Power’s condition of possibility, […] must 
not be sought in the primary existence of a central point, in a unique source of sover-
eignty from which secondary and descendent forms would emanate; it is the moving 
substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender 
states of power, but the latter are always local and unstable. The omnipresence of 
power: not because it has the privilege of consolidating everything under its invinci-
ble unity, but because it is produced from one moment to the next […]. Power is eve-
rywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from every-
where.” 
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This kind of ‘unconventional’ idea of power implies that power is not simp-
ly in the hand of a particular, ‘powerful’ person, let alone a state, as it is of-
ten presumed in the mainstream of the political studies and IR scholarship. 
Rather, in ‘unconventional’ approaches, a powerful person is understood to 
be a product of discourses, which produce distinct (‘powerful’) identities / 
speaking positions.23 Myriam Dunn and Victor Mauer (2006) illustrate em-
pirically this point in regard to the US President in the aftermath of the ter-
rorist attack on the World Trade Centre in New York City in September 
2001.  
Taking the above together, politics is the  
 
“contests over the alternative understandings (often implicit) immanent in the repre-
sentational practices that implicate the actions and objects one recognizes and the 
various spaces […] within which persons and things take on their identities.” 
(Shapiro 1989: 12) 
 
This brings me back to the adjective global. It is this theoretical ground and 
its idea of ‘politics’ and ‘power’ that make the omnipresence of the contem-
porary adjective global not only a relevant and interesting but also a politi-
cal phenomenon. Utterances, which contain the adjective global, constitute 
a dimension of the symbolic production of social reality, that is, they consti-
tute a dimension of the perpetual contestation over the understanding of the 
social world, which, following the above sketched theoretical premises, is 
politics.       
      
Preliminary summary 
To this point in this chapter, I have substantiated my argument that the om-
nipresence of the contemporary adjective global is not just a relevant and in-
teresting but also a political phenomenon. I have stressed in the introduction 
to this section that this is a theoretical argument. Contrary to the two aspects 
that make the phenomenon relevant and interesting, its political nature is not 
grounded in the word global itself or in the object, which uses of the word 
global bring out. Rather, it is grounded in a distinct, ‘unconventional’ and 
non-essentialist theory of the relationship between language, meaning and 
social reality. I carved out the hallmarks of this theory by referring to rele-
                                                    
23 This also reveals the distinction between ‘unconventional’ approaches and the 
premises that inform classical transcendental takes; in his elaboration on ‘dis-
course theory’, Jacob Torfing (2005: 10) explains that in the case of the former, 
“[f]irst, the conditions of possibility are not invariable and ahistorical as Kant 
suggests, but subject to political struggles and historical transformation. […] Se-
cond, [it] does not see the conditions of possibility as an inherent feature of the 
human mind, but takes them to be a structural feature of contingently constructed 
discourses.”   
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vant theorists, such as Stuart Hall, and through an excursus on popular ap-
proaches in the political studies and IR scholarship that follow an apparently 
similar theory of the relationship between language, meaning and social re-
ality but differ in their essentialist foundation. In juxtaposing these popular 
approaches with the theory that informs my conception of the omnipresence 
of the adjective global as a political phenomenon, I was able to position my 
project in the broader political studies and IR scholarship. I put forward that 
the political phenomenon of the omnipresence of global is an ‘unconven-
tional’ object of study at the margins of the political studies and IR scholar-
ship.        
Building on this general conception of the omnipresence of global as a 
political phenomenon, I now move a step further and add a nuance to it. I 
suggest there is something special about the omnipresence of the adjective 
global, understood as a dimension of the perpetual contestation over the 
meaning of social reality. What is special about the omnipresence of global 
is that the object ‘new world’, which it re-produces, is a mode of the tem-
poral category ‘present’. This means that historical appearances of the ‘new 
world’, i.e. distinct actualisations of the object that is re-produced through 
uses of the word global, constitute ways, in which the conceptual space 
‘present’ is filled with meaning. In what follows, I illustrate the relevance of 
this point. I do this by highlighting the prominent role that the conceptual 
spaces ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’ play in the organisation of social and 
political life.  
 
The ‘new world’ as a distinct mode of the present  
Together with the past and the future, the present constitutes a central cate-
gory that guides social life. Grounded in a linear idea of time, divided into 
past (the realm of memory and experience), present and future (the realm of 
expectation), the present is the realm from within which decisions are 
made.24  
                                                    
24 The familiar threefold distinction between past, present and future is not a uni-
versal idea. As Hartmut Rosa (2001, 2001a, 2001b) elaborates, the idea of time is 
culturally specific and historically contingent. In fact, it is not only the relation-
ship between the categories present, past, and future that is historical but the very 
categories as well; they are variable (Rosa 2001a: 618). The respective concep-
tion of time determines whether there are three main temporal categories to begin 
with. In a conception of time that distinguishes between ‘now’ and ‘not-now’, 
past and future merge (Rosa 2001b: 677). The same applies to a cyclic idea of 
time. Here, too, the past (memory) and the future (expectation) are almost con-
gruent. It is only in the context of a linear conception of time, in which time is 
seen as flowing from the past via the present to the future, that the past (the realm 
of memory and experience) and the future (the realm of expectation) are separat-
ed from each other and from the present. It is only in this context that the three-
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“Every perception of reality and time takes place in the present. Action, too, is al-
ways ever present action, even though it is shaped by the past and directed at the fu-
ture.” (Rosa 2001: 210; my own translation)  
 
As Rosa indicates above, the present is intimately enmeshed with the past 
and the future. In general, 
 
“[t]hrough memory and expectation the unity of past, present and future is constituted 
in every present anew. The existence of past and future presents, futures and pasts 
remains untouched by this. Certain is that the present present will appear in the future 
memory as the past.” (ibid. 211; my own translation) 
 
In particular, the past, as memory and experience, determines the present 
and present decisions made for a(n imagined) future; just as the future, 
namely expectations, determines the present. The constructed (present) 
‘content’ of the remembered past and of the expected future shapes present 
action. In this sense, the past and future serve as coordinates for the now; 
they serve as a trigger for a pluralisation of presents (see further Rosa 2001). 
This is because “[p]ast and future […] are horizons of the present; they ap-
pear as past and future of the present” (ibid. 211; my own translation).  
At the same time, the relationship between past, present and future, as 
well as, the way in which the past and the future are made meaningful, is 
grounded in the present. For instance, the technology of ‘risk’, which I dis-
cussed in Chapter 5, is a strategy to fill with meaning an ‘open’ future from 
within the present. Through ‘risk’, the future is ‘colonised’ (from with)in the 
present, grounded in the (present) memory of past experiences. The past, 
too, is the product of the present in that it is constructed from within the pre-
sent. This is because, in a linear notion of time, the past and the future can-
not be directly accessed. There is no direct access to the future because it is 
the realm of the potential. There is also no direct access to the past because 
what has passed inevitably needs to be remembered and ‘communicated’; 
the past does not exist in a repository, where it could be accessed from a 
                                                    
fold distinction between past, present and future fully appears (ibid.). But even in 
the linear conception of time, there are different understandings of these temporal 
categories and of what is the relationship between them. For instance, the future 
is either imagined as something that is ‘closed’, the form of which is derived 
from religious or philosophical assumptions, or as something that is ‘open’, i.e. 
uncertain and the product of human action (see ibid.; for the above see also in 
general Rosa 2001, 2001a). The latter is the kind of modern idea of time and fu-
ture that I mentioned in the context of my excursus on ‘risk’ in Chapter 5. There, 
I quoted Anthony Giddens (1994: 7) explaining that modernity is about the active 
“colonization of the future”, and that ‘risk’ is “the mobilising dynamic of a socie-
ty bent on change, that wants to determine its own future rather than leaving it to 
religion, tradition, or the vagaries of nature” (Giddens 2002: 24).   
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present position, by going ‘back in time’ (see Rosa 2001, 2001a, 2001b).25 
As Christian Lotz (2001: 660) points out with reference to Edmund Husserl, 
the notion that one could go ‘back in time’ is misleading. One can only ever 
understand something as having passed; in practice, time is always only ex-
perienced in memory and in the present. What has passed needs to be re-
membered, and remembering is a distinct way of constructing the past from 
within the present. In this respect, both, the past and the future are conceptu-
al spaces, which are ‘filled’ from within the present. It is ‘memory’ that 
constructs the past from within the present, and ‘expectations’ that construct 
the future – also from within the present (see Rosa 2001b: 677).26 At the 
same time, however, the past (memory and experiences) and the future (ex-
pectations) shape the present. In short, past and future are only ever present 
pasts and present futures. They are the products of the present. First, the pre-
sent shapes how the temporal categories ‘past’ and ‘future’ are imagined in 
relation to the present. Second, the present shapes how the conceptual spac-
es ‘past’ and ‘future’ are ‘filled’ with meaning. At the same time, both of 
these aspects play back into the present.  
There is a comprehensive scholarship, which deals with the (present) 
‘filling’ of the conceptual spaces past and future, and their interplay with the 
present. In particular, the ‘filling’ of the (present) past, more precisely, the 
collective ‘filling’ of the present past, has attracted significant scholarly at-
tention. It runs under the labels ‘memory studies’, “politics of memory” 
(Hodgkin and Radstone 2003), and “politics of the past” (e.g. Munasinghe 
2005).27 Grounded in an understanding that there is a social dimension of 
memory, i.e. that there is a ‘collective memory’,28 scholars analyse 
                                                    
25 Again, this is not natural and universal, refer back to fn 24 in this present chapter. 
26 As Rosa (2001: 211; my own translation) adds, in addition to being the position, 
from which the conceptual spaces past and future are filled with meaning, the 
present impacts on the future in that the “present action and experience […] de-
termines […] the possible content of future memory – then, as a memory of a 
past present.” 
27 Astrid Erll (2003: 156-6) provides a catalogue of aspects, which explain the 
striking rise of the interest in (collective) constructions of the past at the end of 
the 1980s. One of them are the profound changes regarding the media of memory 
and the possibility of the generation of large sets of data. Another aspect is the 
gradual diminishing of witnesses of the ‘big catastrophes’ of the 20th century, 
prominently, the Second World War and the Holocaust. It has brought up ques-
tions about what it means to rely solely on modi of memory other than the ac-
counts of historical witnesses. Furthermore, Erll points to a general tendency at 
the end of the 20th century to ‘look back’.  
28 The concept ‘collective memory’ goes back to Maurice Halbwachs (1925, 1950), 
who stresses the social dimension of memory. Halbwachs argues that memory is 
not solely an individual, cognitive phenomenon, but that it is social and collec-
tive in that individuals are part of groups and these groups’ collective memory. 
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“[c]ontests over the meaning of the past [as] contests over the meaning of 
the present and over ways of taking the past forward” (Hodgkin and Rad-
stone 2003: 1). Of interest are the “strategic, political, and ethical conse-
quences” (ibid.) of the collectively memorised past.  
For instance, Ruth Wittlinger and Steffi Boothroyd (2010) discuss Ger-
many’s “‘usable’ past” in its post-unification present. They unveil a change 
in German collective memory of the past of the Third Reich from being  
 
“polarized before the fall of the Wall […] to a past that is much more accommodating 
and allows an easier identification with the German nation. A more institutionalized 
and internationalized approach to the Nazi past, which incorporates the memory of 
German suffering, is increasingly complemented by a focus on positive aspects of 
German history, like the successes of the Bonn Republic, the peaceful East German 
revolution of 1989, and unification in 1990.” (ibid. 489) 
 
In a related study, Wittlinger and Larose (2007) show how the distinct pre-
sent past of the Nazi era at the beginning of the millennium impacted on 
various (foreign) policy moves under the Schröder Administration. In a dif-
ferent context, Dario R. Paez and James Hou-Fu Liu (2009) unveil how col-
lective memory of past conflicts affects present conflicts through “aggres-
sive forms of in-group favoritism, a duty of retaliation, [and] generalized ha-
tred”, which makes “the current situation appear as a repetition of previous 
violent conflicts” (ibid. 105). Richard S. Esbenshade (1995) provides an ac-
                                                    
Halbwachs’ notion of ‘collective memory’ was prominently refined and extended 
by Aleida Assmann (1999) and Jan Assmann (1992, 1995). They develop a theo-
ry, which distinguishes between “communicative memory” and “cultural 
memory”. Assmann’s and Assmann’s concept ‘communicative memory’ refers 
to the kind of collective memory that “includes those varieties of collective 
memory that are based exclusively on everyday communications” (Assmann 
1995: 126). The concept ‘cultural memory’, in contrast, refers to a kind of collec-
tive memory that is grounded in highly symbolic and fixed points in the past. As 
Jan Assmann (ibid. 128-9) explains, “[j]ust as the communicative memory is 
characterized by its proximity to the everyday, cultural memory is characterized 
by its distance from the everyday. Distance from the everyday (transcendence) 
marks its temporal horizon. Cultural memory has its fixed point; its horizon does 
not change with the passing of time. These fixed points are fateful events of the 
past, whose memory is maintained through cultural formation (texts, rites, mon-
uments) and institutional communication (recitation, practice, observance)”. 
While everybody is involved in ‘communicative memory’, which is shaped by “a 
high degree of non-specialization, reciprocity of roles, thematic instability, and 
disorganization” (ibid. 126), ‘cultural memory’, as suggested above, is grounded 
in ‘fixed points’ and, as such, depends on and ‘demands’ expert interpretation. 
With this distinction, Assmann and Assmann enable a nuanced approach to the 
issue of collective and political identity (see further Erll 2003: 173).  
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count of the contest over and impact of memory in national narratives con-
structed in Central Eastern Europe after the end of the Communist era; and 
Jelena Subotić (2013: 306) illustrates “the way in which hegemonic state 
narratives of the past influence contemporary human rights policies in the 
western Balkans.”29  
Another example of the enmeshment of the (present) past with the pre-
sent (as the basis for imagining and approaching the future) is the everyday 
linguistic feature of analogies. In analogies something complex and (poten-
tially) ‘unfamiliar’ is explained through a comparison with something from 
the past. Using Daase and Kessler’s words, analogies “represent codes for 
secured knowledge” (Daase and Kessler 2007: 420); they provide “certainty 
where uncertainty reigns” (Fry 1991: 13) by grasping the world through ref-
erence to something familiar, namely something ‘from the past’. Yet, analo-
gies are, of course, not universal and ahistorical. Which analogy is consid-
ered useful in which context is a product of the present.30 The inauguration 
                                                    
29 Referring back to Chapter 5, the case of Christopher Columbus’ ‘discovery’ of 
the ‘New World’ and the way this narrative is inscribed in US culture is, of 
course, another prime example of the impact of a distinctly memorised (present) 
past on the present and the future. In this context, Thomas J. Schlereth (1992) not 
only shows the influence of the memory of Columbus on US collective identity 
in various historical presents, he also demonstrates that there are various histori-
cal present ‘fillings’ of the past of Christopher Columbus’ ‘discovery’ of the 
‘New World’. Each of them serves a distinct purpose in establishing the respec-
tive present from within which they are imagined. Columbus “has been interpret-
ed and reinterpreted as we have constructed and reconstructed our own national 
character”, finds Schlereth (ibid. 937). In fact, as I mentioned in Chapter 5, Co-
lumbus has actually not even always been a part of the American past, of Ameri-
can collective memory to begin with. He only entered it in 1792. As Schlereth 
(ibid.; emphasis in the original) explains: “[Columbus] was ignored in the colo-
nial era. […] Americans first discovered the discoverer during their quest for in-
dependence and nationhood; successive generations molded Columbus into a 
multipurpose American hero, a national symbol to be used variously in the quest 
for a collective identity. This process in the public (rather than the professional) 
American history of Columbus can be traced over three chronological periods: 
first, Columbus as a feminine, classical deity, Columbia, an allegorical figure 
symbolizing liberty and progress; second, the masculine, fifteenth-century Euro-
pean, Columbus, who sanctioned nineteenth-century American Manifest Destiny 
and western expansionism; and third, Columbus as the major symbol of Colum-
bianism, a late nineteenth century form of patriotic Americanism that involved 
cultural and political hegemony and various ethnic and religious identities.” 
30 With reference to Yuen Foong Khong (1992: 10), Milo Jones (2004) highlights 
the relevance of analogies in politics. He explains that “analogies assist poli-
cy-makers by performing three diagnostic tasks: they 1) help define the nature of 
the situation confronting the policy-maker; 2) help assess the stakes; and 3) pro-
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of US President Barack Obama in 2009 was a concert of analogies in that it 
provided historical references from Lincoln to the invocation of the spirit of 
Martin Luther King. Amnesty International’s Irene Khan’s (2005) compari-
son of the US detention camp in Guantanamo Bay with the gulags of the 
Stalinist era is another prime example of an analogy,31 and so is the link be-
tween the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001 and the 1941 Japanese at-
tack of Pearl Harbor. This analogy was institutionalised through the Execu-
tive Summary of The 9/11 Commission Report (National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 2004), which starts with the fol-
lowing paragraph:   
 
“More than 2,600 people died at the World Trade Centre; 125 died at the Pentagon; 
256 died on the four planes. The death toll surpassed that at Pearl Harbor in Decem-
ber 1941.”  
 
Following David Hoogland Noon (2004: 339), we realise that the ‘war on 
terror’ discourse or, as he aptly calls it, ‘Operation Enduring Analogy’ in es-
sential ways “capitalizes on post-Cold War historical memory” in that   
 
“the ‘liberation’ of Kabul or Baghdad has been likened (albeit awkwardly) to the lib-
eration of Paris or the capture of Berlin; the accumulating disarray in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan is optimistically compared with the slow postwar reconstruction of Germa-
ny and Japan; the unusual bond between Bush and Tony Blair is regularly measured 
against that gold standard of Anglo-American relations, the Roosevelt-Churchill alli-
ance; and during the buildup to the war in Iraq, critics of the impending war were 
chastened by forceful warnings about ‘appeasement’, Neville Chamberlain, and the 
ineffectual League of Nations.”  
 
Above and beyond this, the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001 itself, or 
better the abbreviation of it, ‘9/11’, is widely used as an analogy, seen for 
instance in the context of the November 2008 terror attacks in Mumbai, 
when Indian film-maker Kunal Kohli stressed that one of the targets, the Taj 
Mahal hotel,  
 
“is not just a hotel, it is a symbol of Mumbai and for that to be attacked is no less 
than the World Trade Centre being attacked in New York. It is truly our 9/11.” (BBC 
2008) 
                                                    
vide prescriptions. In addition, they help policy-makers evaluate alternative op-
tions by: 1) predicting their chances of success; 2) evaluating their moral right-
ness; and 3) warning about the dangers associated with the options” (Jones 2004: 
40).  
31 The fierce and immediate reaction to Khan’s analogy by US President George 
W. Bush (2005e), who called it “absurd”, illustrates that such linguistic moves 
are powerful and clearly taken seriously by political actors.  
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We can get a sense of the cultural specificity and complexity of analogies 
when we consider that any kind of analogy using the Third Reich in general 
and the Holocaust in particular is tabooed in Germany to a degree that the 
disregard of this norm by public figures immediately and inevitably leads to 
public condemnation and calls for their resignation. This also shows that 
analogies are ultimately a product of the historical present.32 
In contrast to the scholarship on the constructed present pasts and their 
influence on the present, the study of the ‘politics of the future’, or ‘politics 
of expectation’ is less institutionalised.33 This is despite the fact that in a 
                                                    
32 Another tool through which the (present) memorised past is brought into and 
shapes the present are ‘frames’. In the social sciences, the concept ‘frame’ is as-
sociated with Erving Goffman’s (1975) work on “the organization of experi-
ence”, as well as with the literature on social movements and collective action, 
where it goes back to sociologists such as Maurice Halbwachs (1925, 1950) and 
his above mentioned work on collective memory. Outside the social sciences, 
‘frame’ is a concept used in the study of semantics (e.g. Fillmore 2006), as well 
as in the cognitive sciences, especially in research on artificial intelligence. 
Marvin Minsky (1997[1974]) is one of the prominent developers of the concept 
in this latter field, where it is linked to several related concepts, such as ‘scripts’, 
‘schemes’ and ‘scenarios’ (see further Donati 2001; Ziem 2005); these latter con-
cepts have been taken up by scholars in other fields such as corpus linguistics 
(e.g. Fraas 2000, 2003). In the context of the cognitive sciences, the concept 
‘frame’ was developed in an attempt to understand the process of cognition. As 
Minsky (1997[1974]: 109) explains, “the essence of the theory [is]: when one 
encounters a new situation […], one selects from memory a structure called a 
frame. This is a remembered framework to be adapted to fit reality by changing 
details as necessary.” Erving Goffman (1975: 10) defines ‘frames’ as follows: “I 
assume that definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with principles of 
organization, which govern events […] and our subjective involvement in them; 
frame is the word I use to refer to such of these basic elements, as I am able to 
identify.” In this sense, the concept ‘frame’ refers to quasi-memorised structures 
that are applied to make sense of the world. At the same time, they restrict what 
is visible and determine how something is visible. Like analogies, ‘frames’ are 
not simply individual cognitive phenomena; they are social and cultural products. 
Following this theory, cognition is always already socio-culturally shaped in that 
it is embedded in and the outcome of collectively ratified knowledge. Hence, 
when it comes to colletive memory, in one way or other, only those things can be 
‘remembered’ in those particular ways, for which there is a collective frame, i.e. 
what is already socially ratified as acceptable to remember.  
33 There is something like ‘future studies’ in the academy (see Dunmire 2011: 31). 
Yet, in contrast to ‘memory studies’, the label ‘future studies’ does not cover 
works that critically engage with the present construction of the future. Rather, 
the literature in ‘future studies’ sets out to predict (possible) future developments. 
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modern linear conception of time, it is the (open) future that serves as the 
dominant horizon of the present (see Rosa 2001: 678).34  
The significance of the future in modern life and for the present is mani-
fest in what I discussed in Chapter 5, namely the fondness for the striving 
for the ‘new’, in which the entrepreneur and the one, who makes everything 
‘new’, are attributed with intrinsic positive value.35 This fondness for the 
‘new’ to come shapes the present and policies in the present profoundly. In 
this sense, one could say that, in one way, all policy analysis is (implicitly) 
an analysis of the ‘filling’ of the future because modern politics is essential-
ly future-oriented. Yet, only a portion of analyses explicitly start on the 
premise that  
 
“[a]s the site of the possible and potential, the future represents a contested rhetorical 
domain through which partisans attempt to wield ideological and political power” 
(Dunmire 2011: 1), 
 
and explicitly investigate the distinct political practice of the ‘filling’ of the 
conceptual space future. Patricia L. Dunmire’s (2011) study of the “projec-
tion of the future” under the post-9/11 Bush Administration is one of a few 
of such analyses. It unveils the “politics, rhetoric, and ideology of projecting 
the future” (ibid. 27) in the case of the Bush Administration’s post-9/11 na-
tional security discourse and discusses its impact on present policy deci-
sions. The kinds of studies that deal with perceptions of uncertainty, such as 
Wynne and Dressler (2001) to which I referred in Chapter 5, also fall into 
this category. In a way that is similar to Wynne and Dressler’s study, Stefan 
Böschen, Karen Kastenhofer, Luitgard Marschall, Ina Rust, Jens Soentgen 
and Peter Wehling (2006: 296) explore the controversy over genetically 
modified organisms and find, 
 
“while a more empiricist-oriented British (Anglo-Saxon) institutional culture only 
accepts robust evidence (e.g. specific causal models) as justifying environmental pro-
tection, the general public in continental European countries (particularly Germany) 
                                                    
In this respect, the contributions to ‘future studies’ are exercises in the construc-
tion of the present future themselves, rather than studies of it. 
34 With reference to Fraser (1975: 303), Patricia L. Dunmire (2011: 7) stresses the 
relevance of the future by pointing out that “children […] express expectations 
for the future and make references to the future earlier in their development than 
they recount memories of the past.” Quoting Masini (1999: 36), Dunmire (2011: 
8) argues, “people become human the minute they begin to think about the fu-
ture, the moment they try to plan for the future.”   
35 It is probably precisely this intrinsic positive value that means that there are more 
studies about the imagination of the (present) past than the critical study of the 
‘politics of expectation’.   
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is more willing to act on the grounds of uncertainty or even ‘merely’ presumed non-
knowledge in a precautionary approach.”  
 
The authors demonstrate how the present future is collectively filled with 
meaning and how this plays back into present decisions. Furthermore, they 
unveil the present re-production of distinct understandings of the relation-
ship between the temporal categories present and future, namely one in 
which the future is (imagined) as more or less ‘determinable’ and predicta-
ble from within the present. Again, this is interesting because it is not natu-
ral. As discussed in Chapter 5, the comparison between the UK and Germa-
ny demonstrates the cultural nature of this ‘filling’ and its profound implica-
tions for present decisions.  
Taking all of the above together, we see the relevance of the temporal 
category and conceptual space ‘present’ and the enmeshment of the past, 
present and future, where the present is the realm from within which the past 
and future are made meaningful; they are made meaningful in that they are 
‘filled’ with sense and in that their relationship with the present is imagined.  
It is this relevance of the present that makes the object ‘new world’, 
which is re-produced in uses of the adjective global, special. The ‘new 
world’ constitutes a distinct filling of the present; it is the present, the ‘now’ 
that is rendered ‘new’ and suddenly confronts social actors. As I already in-
idcated in Chapter 5, such an idea of a ‘new world’ that came implies a dis-
tinct imagination of the role of the (temporal categories) past and future. In 
principle, it establishes a break with the past in that it quarantines experi-
ences as something that no longer ‘naturally’ holds as the basis for present 
decisions. Simultaneously, it brings into question the nature of the future as 
a readily determinable horizon of expectation that provides guidance for 
present actions. I developed this point in Chapter 5, in which I conceptual-
ised the notion of the ‘new world’ that came as an indication of an ‘aware-
ness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, including the ‘return of 
uncertainty’. This implies an idea of the future as ‘open’ but not necessarily 
easily ‘predictable’, at least not predictable in a ‘traditional’ modern way.   
It is in this sense that the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective 
global not only constitutes a political phenomenon because it is a part of the 
contest over the meaning of the world but because it takes a special position 
in this contest. It takes a special position because its object, the ‘new world’, 
fills nothing less but the ‘present’ with meaning.  
 
 
APPROACHING THE OMNIPRESENCE OF GLOBAL AS AN 
‘UNCONVENTIONAL’ OBJECT OF STUDY  
 
In the previous second main part of this chapter, I conceptualised the omni-
presence of the contemporary adjective global as a political phenomenon. 
This conceptualisation is grounded in an ‘unconventional’ theory of the rela-
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tionship between language, meaning and social reality. According to this 
theory, the omnipresence of global constitutes a dimension of the perpetual 
contest over the meaning of the world; it brings out the world. Furthermore, 
I argued that it is not just any dimension of the contest over the world; the 
omnipresence of global ‘fills’ nothing less with meaning than the present. 
Consequently, the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective global is of 
interest not necessarily to linguists but to scholars, who have an interest in 
the political world. Inevitably, though, it constitutes an ‘unconventional’ ob-
ject of study.  
In this third and final main part of this chapter, I reflect on this latter 
point. I reflect on how to approach the omnipresence of global as an ‘un-
conventional’ object of study. The aim is not to provide a methodological 
blueprint for its empirical exploration. As a matter of fact, the provision of 
such a blueprint would be contradictory to the ‘unconventional’ theoretical 
premises that I outlined above. Rather, I sketch the general nature of the ap-
proach to the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective global, provide 
basic guiding questions for such a research endeavour and introduce two 
techniques, namely concordances and collocations, or co-occurrences, 
which are fruitful tools for the way into the field.  
At the outset, it is worth reinterating that the study of the omnipresence 
of global is a study of the phenomenon of the omnipresence of global in and 
of itself and not of something ‘behind’ it. The study of the omnipresence of 
the contemporary adjective global is not a way of gaining better insight into 
an already established object of study in political studies and IR, such as 
foreign policy behaviour, the design of security policies or one of the above 
mentioned ideational factors that have come to play a role in the study of 
(international) politics these days, such as role perceptions. This is not to say 
that, in one way or other, the empirical exploration of the omnipresence of 
global might not generate insights into established objects of study and con-
tribute to the literature on established disciplinary research questions. How-
ever, from the outset, it can only be understood and designed as an explora-
tion of an obviously widespread contemporary dimension of the contested 
symbolic production of social reality. Due to the lack of an already estab-
lished and delineated framework and a well-trodden ground to walk on, this 
means that the study of the omnipresence of global demads some creativity 
and, referring back to my elaboration on Ulrich Beck in Chapter 5, a will-
ingness to endure a degree of ‘provisionality’.   
I proceed in three steps in this chapter and move from the general to the 
particular. First, I point out the basics that inform the empirical approach to 
an ‘unconventional’ object of study, such as the omnipresence of global. 
Second, I suggest that there is something distinct about the omnipresence of 
the adjective global as an ‘unconventional’ object of study; I suggest it is 
‘unconventional’ and experimental in two ways. Finally, I introduce two 
tools that are helpful in generating initial insights into the exploration of the 
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omnipresence of global; these are concordances and collocations, or co-
occurrences.  
 
In general: ‘Like bike riding’  
The theoretical premises that I elaborated in the previous part of this chapter 
and that make the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective global a po-
litical phenomenon and an ‘unconventional’ object of study, demand a dis-
tinct approach to its empirical exploration. Using Campbell’s (2007: 206) 
words, it demands an approach that puts “the issues of interpretation and 
representation, power and knowledge […] at the forefront of concerns”, that 
acknowledges that  
 
“[r]ather than conceiving of a world of discrete variables with discrete effects, […] 
there are constructions and versions that may be adopted, responded to or under-
mined.” (Potter 1997: 147-8) 
 
As Matthias Jung (1994) elaborates, it demands an approach that is in-
formed by the conviction that there is something “suspect”, or, using Torf-
ing’s (2005: 27) words, “absurd” about the ‘conventional’ ideal of a deduc-
tive approach, which starts strictly on the basis of a theory that is trans-
formed into a consistent and decontextualised method, and is eventually ver-
ified based on empirical findings. Instead of verifying a pre-set hypothesis, 
studying an ‘unconventional’ object of study, like the omnipresence of 
global, is about the evaluation and carving out of the specificity of what is 
typical about the respective socio-political phenomenon (Wagner 2005: 68). 
This means that the study of the omnipresence of global is an “interven-
tion[…] in conventional understandings or established practices” (Campbell 
2007: 219), and not an endeavour that sets out to detect causal explanations 
and ‘real causes’, as it is, in one way or another, at the heart of the main-
stream scholarship in political studies and IR.  
In addition, I suggest, the study of an ‘unconventional’ object of study, 
such as the omnipresence of the adjective global, is shaped by three of the 
criteria that Ulrich Franke and Ulrich Roos (2013) identify for their ‘social 
scientific reconstruction’-approach. These are the recognition of the princi-
ple of fallibility (ibid. 23), a principle openness for a pluralism of methods 
(ibid. 22) and a “willingness on the side of the researchers to lay open the 
rules that guide their professional action” (ibid. 23; my own translation). To 
explore the omnipresence of the adjective global is to ‘de-naturalise’ alleged 
natural orders and perceptions; it is to ‘make them strange’ (Der Derian and 
Shapiro 1989). Using Jonathan Potter’s (1997: 147) words, it is an approach 
that resembles a “craft skill, more like bike riding […] than following the 
recipe for a mild chicken rogan josh.” Inevitably, this makes it an experi-
mental endeavour that requires a degree of creativity and openness.  
To sum up, in general, the exploration of the omnipresence of the adjec-
tive global as an ‘unconventional’ object of study involves the study of the 
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contest over the meaning of social reality. It is about exploring the possibili-
ties that are opened and closed in the re-production of the web of meanings 
that comes out of the utterances that contain the adjective global – where, as 
implied in the ethos of the above theoretical premises, ‘possibilities’ are not 
so much about concrete policies but about broader issues, such as identities, 
speaking positions, as well as about what is normal and common sensical to 
begin with. In principle, studying the omnipresence of global is about the 
exploration of ‘interpretative dispositions’, to pick up Doty’s words from 
above. 
 
In particular: ‘Unconventional’ and experimental in two ways 
The above section provided a general sense of how an approach to the om-
nipresence of global as an ‘unconventional’ object of study looks and what 
such a study is generally about. I now move from the general to what I iden-
tify as particular about the study of the omnipresence of the contemporary 
adjective global, i.e. the discursive re-production of the web of meanings 
‘new world’.  
As stressed above, the study of the omnipresence of global is a study of 
the omnipresence of the word global as a distinct phenomenon. It is not 
about studying the use of the adjective global to gain a better understanding 
of something ‘behind it’, i.e. it is not a strategic way to gain insight into an-
other, already established object of interest in political studies and IR. But 
what is it then about? What is one to look at and what is one to look for if 
one explores the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective global? As 
discussed in the Introduction of this book, no matter how inductive and in-
terpretative an approach aspires to be, “[t]here is always something ‘before 
the beginning’” (Pope 2005: xv). So, what is it in the case of the omnipres-
ence of global? 
There are two aspects to the study of the omnipresence of the word 
global, understood as a political phenomenon. First, to study the omnipres-
ence of global is to study the phenomenon of the omnipresence of global in 
and of itself. Second, to study the omnipresence of global is to study the ob-
ject ‘new world’ that it re-produces. The concrete and individual design of 
such a two-fold study is open to scholarly imagination and interest. This is 
the case not least because the exploration of the phenomenon of the omni-
presence of global is as yet an untrodden path; any capturing of the occur-
rence of the phenomenon, as well as, any study of the object it re-produces 
adds to our understanding of this object of study. The study of the omni-
presence of global could be designed with a diachronic or synchronic out-
look, the corpus that it builds on could be thematically assembled, or ar-
ranged in terms of a particular historical or political or cultural or institu-
tional context and setting, such as the UN discourse or the Public Papers of 
the US Presidents, which I select for my own empirical exploration in Chap-
ter 7. However, independent of the research design, the generation of the 
corpus is straightforward. The phenomenon of the omnipresence of the word 
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global is manifest in the occurrences of the word global, i.e. wherever the 
adjective global is, is the object of study.  
The first aspect of the study of the omnipresence of global identified 
above involves capturing the political phenomenon itself. This means it is 
about mapping where the phenomenon can be found and how it unfolds. In 
concrete terms, it is a study of where the adjective global appears. There are 
three basic questions that guide entry into the field: Where does the phe-
nomenon appear? Where does it not appear? With which thematic discours-
es is it enmeshed? Again, depending on scholarly creativity and interest, the 
phenomenon could be traced and captured comparatively, in a diachronic or 
synchronic way, and in a distinct institutional, cultural, political or historical 
context. Once in the field, subsequent questions emerge inductively. 
The second aspect of the study of the omnipresence of global involves 
the analysis of the object ‘new world’ that this phenomenon re-produces. In 
general, it is a study of how this object looks. In particular, and following 
the theoretical elaborations in the previous section, it is a study of the ‘inter-
pretive dispositions’ that this object ‘new world’ implies, and the possibili-
ties that these dispositions open and close. In contrast to the first aspect, this 
second aspect is about meanings; it is about more than ‘just’ the appearance 
of the adjective global. In the previous part of this chapter, I explained that 
what is special about the object ‘new world’ is that it fills the conceptual 
space ‘present’ with meaning and that it constitutes an actualisation of the 
tradition of the ‘national perspective’. This insight brings along a set of gen-
eral questions that guide entry into the field of the exploration of the object 
‘new world’: How is the temporal category ‘past’ constructed? How is the 
temporal category ‘future’ constructed? What kind of an idea of ‘uncertain-
ty’ is constructed? What is the relationship between past, present and future? 
How are consequences of actions and decisions constructed? What kind of 
an idea of agency is constructed? How ‘modern’ or ‘beyond modern’ is the 
‘new world’? How much space does it open to go beyond modern principles 
and institutions, and to fundamentally reimagine the world?   
Again, given the theoretical premises sketched above that inform the ap-
proach to an ‘unconventional’ object of study, such as the omnipresence of 
global, all these questions are guiding questions and not ‘traditional’ re-
search. The aim is not to answer these questions but to be guided by them 
into the field. They are stepping stones in the endeavour to capture the polit-
ical phenomenon of the omnipresence of the adjective global. They provide 
an initial orientation in the field and facilitate initial steps that generate fur-
ther, corpus-driven questions from within the analytical process.  
The above means that the empirical study of the omnipresence of the ad-
jective global, i.e. the re-production of a web of meanings called ‘new 
world’ through utterances, which contain the adjective global, is ‘unconven-
tional’ and experimental in a twofold sense.  
First, it is ‘unconventional’ and experimental in a way that all analyses 
of the symbolic re-production of social reality – by nature of the theoretical 
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premises that inform them – are. As I elaborated above, these studies are 
neither about following a pre-set recipe nor about the application of a decon-
textualised method. Given that they do not set out to test a pre-set hypothe-
sis, which is grounded in an established theory, but aim to make things 
‘strange’ and intervene into conventional knowledge (production), they are 
inevitably less clearly anchored in an existing scholarly environment than 
‘conventional’ studies. In my reflection on the nature of the research project 
that brought out this book, which I outlined in the Introduction, I reflected 
on challenges of such an ‘unanchored’ approach.  
Second, the empirical study of the omnipresence of global is also ‘un-
conventional’ and experimental, in fact, has to be somewhat ‘provisional’ 
because of the nature of the object that the uses of the adjective global bring 
out, namely the ‘new world’. As I demonstrated in Chapter 5, the omnipres-
ence of global indicates an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of mod-
ernisation. More specifically, the object ‘new world’ that utterances with 
global bring out is an actualisation of the tradition of the ‘national perspec-
tive’. This makes the study of the omnipresence of global fundamentally 
experimental and provisional simply because there is no established lan-
guage yet for grasping the generated insights. I made this point clear when I 
discussed the nature of Ulrich Beck’s ‘provisional’ project of rethinking 
how we think about social reality. I stressed the inherent ambivalence of his 
project, which is the result of the ambivalent character of the ‘reflexive 
modern’ world that Beck set out to grasp (see also Bronner 1995: 67). This 
world is a both/and-world, as opposed to an either/or-world. While this in-
sight is theoretically manageable, it poses challenges when it comes to em-
pirical explorations because of a lack of ‘ratified’ language to grasp it; for 
instance, a language that reproduces the idea of linearity and ‘either/or’ is 
not adequate (any longer) (see Selchow 2016a). For sure, it requires a de-
gree of experimentalism and provisionality. As Beck (2013) puts it, “[i]n the 
state of total change we try to think this change. This is difficult. Hence, we 
cannot appear with full confidence.”  
This brings me to the final step in this last main part of this chapter: I in-
troduce two analytical tools that are fruitful in taking initial steps into the 
empirical field of the exploration of the omnipresence of global.  
 
Concordances and collocations, or co-occurrences 
To study the omnipresence of global is to focus on the word global without 
conducting a linguistic analysis. The study of the omnipresence of global is 
a study of the symbolic production of the world. As I suggested above, it is 
an unconventional, experimental and provisional study that demands a de-
gree of creativity. It is an interpretative and inductive endeavour. Yet, there 
are two techniques in linguistics, more precisely in corpus linguistics, that 
form helpful tools for the first steps into the field: concordances and colloca-
tions, or co-occurrences. These techniques are helpful because they allow 
the generation of initial insights into the meanings that are associated with 
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the adjective global in a corpus. With that they help generating initial in-
sights into the object ‘new world’, which is re-produced in uses of the word 
global. In concluding this subsection, I elaborate on this point and introduce 
these techniques, while stressing that they can only provide initial triggers 
and initial insights. In contrast to ‘conventional’ studies of the use of lan-
guage in politics and, for that matter, in contrast to my brief analysis of 
President George W. Bush’s use of global, which I presented in Chapter 2, 
the study of the omnipresence of the word global is a study of the re-
production of a distinct object ‘new world’. Its goal is not to detect strategic 
uses of the word or to find out what a supposedly extra-discursive social ac-
tor means when they use the adjective global. It is about the web of mean-
ings ‘new world’ that the adjective brings along wherever it is applied.      
In Chapter 2, I showed that meanings are not attached to a linguistic 
sign. Meanings are arbitrary and a constant flickering of presence and ab-
sence together. Yet, despite this essential flexibility, meanings are actually 
relatively stable. As we saw in Chapter 2, only in theory can Humpty 
Dumpty use the word glorious to mean ‘a nice knock-down argument’. In 
practice, Alice does not understand him if he does. While meanings are es-
sentially arbitrary, they are also social and conventional; they are ‘made 
possible’ and ‘tamed’ by what I referred to with the word discourse in 
Chapter 4; not everything is sayable. As Claudia Fraas (1996, 1998, 2000, 
2001, 2003) suggests, this means that because words and their encoded web 
of meanings are only used and only ‘survive’ (over time) if they relate and 
are adaptable to socially accepted meanings, it is possible to ‘sift out’ col-
lectively shared meanings through an analysis of how words are used in 
texts. Putting it differently, linguistic signs, such as global, can be ap-
proached as ‘focal points’, in which collective meanings crystallise. In order 
to empirically ‘sift out’ these collectively shared meanings one needs to 
look at a word, such as the adjective global, within a large number of texts. 
Such a systematic analysis enables scholars to detect socially ratified mean-
ings instead of only those meanings which are held by individual sign users 
and text producers (Fraas 2001). It is the examination of the broader inter-
textual context that enables the discovery of the wider collective meanings 
that are encoded in a particular word. In other words, it is this intertextual 
context, in which the web of references is manifest that enables the detec-
tion of and ‘sifting out’ of socially ratified meanings.36  
This kind of approach to language is at home in corpus linguistics, 
which is a way of studying language that does not look “at what is theoreti-
cally possible in a language, [but at] the actual language used in naturally 
occurring texts” (Biber, Conrad and Reppe 1998: 1). The basic idea is to 
look at a corpus of texts in order to see “how words form meaningful units. 
By exploring corpora we begin to see how meaning is created in language,” 
                                                    
36 This is what I did to understand that the contemporary global encapsulates ‘glob-
alisation’.  
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explains Pernilla Danielsson of the Centre for Corpus Research at the Uni-
versity of Birmingham (URL).37  
Fraas’ study of the German word Wald (forest) is a concrete example of 
such an analysis and gives also an idea of the methodological techniques 
that are helpful in such an endeavour, namely concordances, or ‘key word in 
context’ (KWIC), and collocations, or co-occurrences. Looking for collo-
cates, or co-occurrences, is a way of determining, which words appear par-
ticularly frequently in a defined distance to a word of interest, such as glob-
al. As Michael Stubbs (1996: 172; emphasis in the original) puts it,  
 
“[t]he main concept is that words occur in characteristic collocations, which show the 
associations and connotations they have, and therefore the assumptions which they 
embody.” 
 
Collocations stand for sequences of words, which appear together more fre-
quently than statistical possibility suggests, such as ‘good morning’ or ‘cli-
mate change’ or ‘global warming’. Stubbs’ definition is: “‘collocation’ is 
frequent co-occurrence” (Stubbs 2002: 29). Based on the assumption that 
there is an equal probability that each word in a language co-occurs with 
any other word within this language, it can be determined to what extent in-
dividual word combinations occur more frequently than chance suggests. 
This computation then shows not only how words are used in specific texts 
and by individual sign users, but, as long as the analysis uses a corpus of a 
large number of texts, it also enables scholars to reveal patterns in the col-
lective, socially ratified uses of words.38 In Chapter 2, I referred to a co-
                                                    
37 This above sketched capturing of socially ratified meanings distinguishes corpus 
linguistic approaches from the ones that are inspired by the methodological genre 
of Begriffsgeschichte (conceptual history) – developed by German historian 
Reinhart Koselleck (1972, 1982, 1985) and taken up by the earlier referenced 
Bach (2013) in his analysis of the concept ‘globalisation’ – and related methodo-
logical strategies and research programmes, such as the so-called ‘Cambridge 
School’ (around Quentin Skinner [e.g. 1989] and the work of James Farr [e.g. 
1989] and Terence Ball [e.g. 1988]). Notably, corpus linguistic approaches are 
also distinct in that they do not focus on elite texts.  
38 For Fraas (1998), this strategy is particularly fruitful for detecting the meanings 
that are encoded in ‘abstract terms’. The concept ‘abstract terms’ refers to those 
linguistic features, which, as the name suggests, refer to abstract, ideal concep-
tions about the world as such, about life and about social processes; ‘freedom’, 
‘justice’, ‘equality’, ‘identity’ but also terms such as ‘love’ and ‘family’ fall into 
this category. Fraas (ibid. 256-7) highlights five characteristics of ‘abstract 
terms’: First, they are disputable regarding what it is to which they precisely re-
fer. In different situations, ‘abstract terms’ can refer to very different phenomena. 
Second, they are disputable regarding their intention. This means that it is not 
clear which characteristics the object of reference needs to hold in order to be re-
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occurrence analysis of the adjective global; in their study of a corpus of 
American English, Davies and Gardner (2010: 74) find that the adjective 
global particularly frequently co-occurs with warming, economy, change, 
system, market, climate, issue, network, trade, community, positioning, envi-
ronment, and with the words economic, environmental, local, regional, in-
ternational, financial, increasingly, truly.  
To calculate collocations, or co-occurrences, the assistance of a comput-
er programme is needed. One of these programmes is the freeware AntConc, 
which I used for my analysis of the use of the word global in President 
George W. Bush’s Public Papers at the end of Chapter 2.  
In addition to providing collocations, or co-occurrences, AntConc also 
provides the second technique that is helpful in approaching the omnipres-
ence of global, namely, concordances. Concordances are lists that present a 
distinct word in the context, in which it appears, as a “first stage in an analy-
sis” (Stubbs 2002: 62). As Stubbs (1996: xviii) finds,  
 
“[t]his provides a convenient layout for studying how a speaker or writer uses certain 
words and phrases, and whether there are particular patterns in his or her use of lan-
guage.” 
 
To reiterate a point from above, the study of the omnipresence of the con-
temporary adjective global is not a linguistic endeavour, or a corpus linguis-
tic analysis. The goal is not to gain statistical insights into the use of the 
word global as part of an endeavour to learn something about the English 
language. The research interest is in the omnipresence of the adjective glob-
al as a political phenomenon, i.e. as something that re-produces an object 
‘new world’, which is part of the contest over the meaning of the world. 
This means that the above introduced techniques can only be a first step into 
the field. As we saw in Chapter 2 in the context of the analysis of Bush’s 
use of the adjective global in the GWOT-discourse, they can help to make 
patterns visible, which would not be visible without computation – especial-
ly if the text corpus is large. As Stubbs (2002: 62) finds, “computer assis-
tance is necessary to allow the human linguist [or, for that matter, the ana-
lyst of the omnipresence of global] to see the wood for the trees”. The reali-
sation that there was a shift in the use of the adjective global in the corpus of 
Bush’s Public Papers from ‘global terror’ to ‘global war’, and that this shift 
                                                    
ferred to with the respective abstract term. Third, ‘abstract terms’ often encode 
values. The fourth characteristic that Fraas points out is that ‘abstract terms’ are 
particularly often part of expert languages. Although terms such as ‘family’, ‘jus-
tice’, and ‘identity’ are commonly applied in everyday language, in collective in-
terpretations they also refer to expert discourses, such as sociology, law and psy-
chology. Finally, ‘abstract terms’ can build up prestige. The application of an 
‘abstract term’ often indicates a particular degree of education, class or it simply 
encodes a sense of the zeitgeist.  
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took place on 30 September 2004 as a consequence of the debate with John 
F. Kerry (see Figure 2), would not have been visible without the help of 
concordances and the analysis of co-occurrences. Yet, adopting Fairclough’s 
assessment of the usefulness of corpus linguistics for critical discourse anal-
ysis, these techniques are only “best regarded as part of the preparation from 
which the real work of analysis and critique can begin” (Fairclough 2015: 
21). They help to deal with the corpus, bring to the fore patterns, which 
would otherwise be invisible and can trigger ideas for the interpretation and 
assessment. However, they do not constitute findings as such. Regardless of 
whether quantitative techniques are used, the study of the omnipresence of 
the adjective global, understood as a political phenomenon in the symbolic 
contest over the meaning of the world, is an interpretative endeavour that is 
‘unconventional’, ‘experimental’ and ‘provisional’; as a matter of fact, giv-
en its theoretical ground, it is somewhat ‘uncomfortable’, relative to estab-
lished ‘conventional’ studies in political studies and IR.       
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
It is hard to imagine public, political, and social and political scientific dis-
courses today without the adjective global. The word is (quasi) omnipresent. 
But it is not only that global is more popular than ever today (up to the point 
where a politician uses it 47 times in a single public address [Brown 
2008a]), the spectrum of its meanings has also expanded remarkably (up to 
the point where a journalist in an established newspaper describes a restau-
rant menu as “post-global” [Sifton 2004]). The contemporary global is high-
ly polysemic and used with a remarkable variety of meanings, ranging from 
‘not national’ and ‘not just Northern’, to ‘exclusively Northern’, ‘world-
wide’, ‘ethnically-inspired’ and ‘contemporary’. Global has turned into a 
key linguistic tool, with the help of which social actors grasp the contempo-
rary world.  
Yet, while being used enthusiastically, the word global and its omni-
presence have not triggered a heightened sense of interest, let alone, suspi-
cion among social and political actors and scholars. Global is rarely per-
ceived as a “difficult” word, to paraphrase Raymond Williams (1976). As 
discussed in Chapter 2, occasionally global is criticised or dismissed as a 
fad or labelled as a crucial and problematic ingredient in hegemonic (North-
ern) discourses; yet, comprehensive engagements with the adjective, which 
are grounded in systematic critical scrutiny are hard to find.  
My project arose at the intersection of the observation that the adjective 
global has come to be omnipresent in public, political and scholarly dis-
courses and the astonishment about the fact that this linguistic development 
has so far attracted only little attention. I was keen to explore whether there 
was anything of interest in the omnipresence of the contemporary global for 
scholars beyond the disciplinary realm of linguistics. Is the omnipresence of 
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global more than a linguistic curiosity? Does it matter? What do actors do 
when they use the adjective global?  
Synthesising the insights that I generated over the course of the previous 
chapters, in this chapter I provided the answer to these questions. I argued 
that the omnipresence of the contemporary ‘new word’ global constitutes a 
discursive re-production of a web of meanings called ‘new world’. With 
that, the omnipresence of the adjective global is more than a linguistic curi-
osity; it is a political phenomenon and an ‘unconventional’ object of study. 
The omnipresence of the adjective global can be seen and studied as an es-
tablished, in the sense of ‘normal’ and widespread, dimension of the negoti-
ation, the perpetual contest over the meaning of the world. As such, it can be 
seen as a common dimension of the symbolic production of the world. It is 
to be acknowledged as ‘political’ because the discursively re-produced ‘new 
world’ opens and closes possibilities; it brings out subjects and makes some 
things imaginable and other unimaginable. Particularly intriguing is that it 
‘fills’ the influential conceptual space ‘present’ with meaning and implies an 
‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation. As such, the 
study of the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective global is always 
also a study of the actualisation of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’, 
a central aspect of contemporary ‘reflexive modern’ social reality.             
 
 

  
 
7 For Example: The Web of Meanings ‘New 
World’ in US President Obama’s Public 
Papers 2013 
 
But there are things we can do right now to 
accelerate the resurgence of American 
manufacturing. […] Last year, my admin-
istration created our first manufacturing in-
novation institute. We put it in Youngs-
town, Ohio, which had been really hard hit 
when manufacturing started going overseas. 
And so you had a once-shuttered ware-
house, it’s now a state-of-the art lab where 
new workers are mastering what’s called 3-
D printing, which has the potential to revo-
lutionize the way we make everything. 
That’s the future. […] And I’m calling on 
Congress to help us set up 15 institutes: 
global centers of high-tech jobs and ad-
vanced manufacturing around the country.  
BARACK OBAMA (2013F) 
 
 
Over the course of the previous chapters, I conceptualised the omnipresence 
of the adjective global as a discursive re-production of a web of meanings 
‘new world’; I framed it as both a political phenomenon and an ‘unconven-
tional’ object of study. In this present chapter, I present an exemplary explo-
ration of this ‘unconventional’ object of study. I explore the web of mean-
ings ‘new world’ as it is re-produced in US President Barack Obama’s Pub-
lic Papers of 2013.1 I chose Obama’s public communication because of my 
                                                    
1 As I explained in Chapter 2, the Public Papers of the US Presidents include all 
public messages, statements, speeches, and news conference remarks, as well as 
documents such as proclamations, executive orders, and similar documents that 
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general interest in US politics and culture and because the President of the 
USA is a particularly powerful actor in the contest over the meaning of the 
world, where ‘powerful’ and ‘actor’ are to be understood in the ‘unconven-
tional’ sense that I sketched in Chapter 6.  
My choice of selecting a corpus comprising all Public Papers from the 
year 2013 is not a theory-driven choice but motivated by research practical 
considerations. I am interested in taking a synchronic, in-depth approach to 
a distinct case. A corpus of appearances of the word global in Obama’s pub-
lic communication over the course of one year is well suited for such an en-
deavour simply because it is still manageable in the context of an interpre-
tive and detailed exploration.  
Inevitably, my exploration of the web of meanings ‘new world’ in 
Obama’s 2013 Public Papers is a narrow study; as we saw in Chapter 6, 
‘unconventional’ studies are by nature ‘narrow’. However, in my conclud-
ing outlook, I broaden the perspective. I position my study as the empirical 
starting point for analyses that could move into three different research di-
rections.  
Before embarking on my analysis, it is worth reiterating two interlinked 
points that I outlined in Chapters 4 and 6.  
First, it is important to keep in mind that, in contrast to ‘conventional’ 
research endeavours, the study of the omnipresence of global understood as 
a discursive re-production of a web of meanings called ‘new world’ is not 
about the critical study of the strategic use of language. Nor is it about the 
study of what a social actor, in this case US President Obama, thinks, means 
(by global), holds as his worldview, or, as it were, imagines how a scholarly 
predefined thing ‘new world’ looks. The study of the omnipresence of glob-
al is about the exploration of a discursive web of meanings that is brought 
into play and that is re-produced through the use of the adjective global. As 
I stressed in Chapter 4 with reference to Keller (in Landwehr 2009: 21) and 
Landwehr (2009: 20), ‘discourse’, or, for that matter, the web of meanings 
‘new world’, is an analytical concept rather than an ontological object that 
exists in texts and waits to be unveiled through the right choice of data. It is 
an analytical concept that presumes the understanding of the relationship be-
tween language, meaning and social reality, which I sketched in Chapter 6. 
For the study of the re-production of the web of meanings ‘new world’ this 
means that the compilation of a dataset does not face the ‘conventional’ 
concern of being representative of a predefined idea of the web of meanings 
‘new world’. In other words, my (‘random’) choice of a 2013-corpus is not 
problematic.2  
                                                    
are published in the Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations, as re-
quired by law (see The American Presidency Project URL). 
2 In contrast, see Gerhards’ (2004) approach to ‘discourse’ in a comparative con-
tent analytical study of the debate about abortion in the public discourses in 
Germany and the US.  
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The second aspect that is worthy of reiteration is that the study of the 
omnipresence of global as a re-production of a web of meanings called ‘new 
world’ is not about the study of causalities – it is not about ‘why’-questions. 
Being an ‘unconventional’ object of study, the exploration of the omnipres-
ence of global constitutes a scholarly exercise, the aim of which is to ‘make 
strange’ (Der Derian and Shapiro 1989) the normalised symbolic production 
of the world. In this sense, it is about ‘how’-concerns. It is about the explo-
ration of a discursive web of meanings, which is brought into play and is re-
produced through the use of the adjective global, and which constitutes a 
distinct dimension of the contest over the meaning of the world. It is about 
the exploration of a discursive web of meanings that re-produces “interpre-
tive dispositions which create certain possibilities and preclude others” 
(Doty 1993: 298); it is this production that is the focus of analysis. As I 
pointed out in Chapter 6, what is particularly interesting about the omni-
presence of the adjective global is that the web of meanings, which it brings 
out, fills the conceptual space ‘present’ with meaning. Furthermore, as I ar-
gued in Chapter 5, it constitutes an actualisation of the tradition of the ‘na-
tional perspective’. How precisely this actualisation looks is a/the empirical 
question.  
 
 
CORPUS AND RESEARCH STRATEGY 
 
The theory that I developed in this book is that the omnipresence of the ad-
jective global is a discursive re-production of the web of meanings ‘new 
world’; whenever the word global is used this web of meanings is re-
produced. Consequently, the appearance of the adjective global in a text 
signals this re-production; it signals the web of meanings ‘new world’. As I 
suggested in the previous chapter, this makes the compilation of a data cor-
pus relatively straightforward. Capturing the re-production of the web of 
meanings ‘new world’ requires capturing and analysing the appearance of 
the word global.  
In order to establish the data corpus for my example analysis, I used the 
database The American Presidency Project (URL) and compiled all of US 
President Obama’s Public Papers from 2013 that contain the adjective glob-
al at least once. I transformed these documents into simple text files in order 
to be able to process them with the computer programme AntConc. The da-
taset comprised 158 documents with a total of 333 appearances of global.3 A 
concordance approach helped me to find out that 37 of these 333 appearanc-
                                                    
3 I decided to leave the documents “Joint Statement – Group of Eight Leaders 
Communique” (Obama 2013d), containing 50 appearances of the adjective glob-
al, and “Joint Statement by Group of Eight Leaders on the Global Economy” 
(Obama 2013e), containing 2 uses of global, out of my dataset as I felt they were 
insufficiently closely connected to the other texts contained in the dataset. 
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es were in the context of set names, such as ‘Global Fund To Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis, and Malaria’ (Obama 2013a), ‘U.S. Global Change Research 
Program’ (Obama 2013b) and ‘President’s Committee on Global Entrepre-
neurship’ (Obama 2013c). I did not consider these particular uses of the ad-
jective, which left me with a dataset of 296 appearances of global.  
To get an initial sense of my database, I compiled two additional data-
bases.4 The first contained all Presidential Public Papers from the first ap-
pearance of the word global in one of Roosevelt’s Papers until 31 December 
2015. The second database comprised all Public Papers of President Obama 
from 7 January 2009 to 31 December 2015 with the word global. This se-
cond database consists of around 1,360 documents with around twice as 
many uses of the word global. I set up each of the additional databases to 
get an initial sense of my 2013-database and the word global in it as an indi-
cation of the web of meanings ‘new world’.  
In the initial stage of my analysis, I gained three general insights. First, 
through a comparison of the number of documents, which contain global 
over time, I realised that the web of meanings ‘new world’ intervenes more 
steadily in Obama’s Public Papers than in any other Presidential Papers be-
fore (see Figure 3).   
 
Figure 3: Percentage of Public Papers of US Presidents that contain the ad-
jective global at least once (4 March 1933 – 31 December 2015) 
 
 
                                                    
4 Again, I used The American Presidency Project (URL) for each of these data-
bases. 
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Second, through a calculation of the annual percentage of Public Papers that 
contain global at least once, relative to the total number of Obama’s Public 
Papers (illustrated in Figure 4), I learned that the spread of the web of mean-
ings ‘new world’ in the 2013-corpus falls around the annual average of 
18%. 
 
Figure 4: Percentage of Obama’s Public Papers that contain the adjective 
global at least once (7 January 2009 – 31 December 2015) 
 
Third, through a look at the words, with which the adjective global co-
occurs, more precisely, which the adjective pre-modifies in all of Obama’s 
Public Papers, I realised that there is a relatively homogenous picture across 
the years. In each year, economy is the word that is most frequently pre-
modified with the adjective global, with other ‘economic’ terminology, such 
as market/s, marketplace and financial, also ranking relatively highly. I 
learned that there is nothing extraordinary about my 2013-corpus in this re-
spect. These initial insights gave me a general feeling for my chosen corpus.       
In the systematic empirical exploration of my 2013-database, I proceed-
ed in the two steps that I sketched out in Chapter 6. The aim of the first step 
was to capture the phenomenon of the re-production of the ‘new world’, 
which unfolds through utterances that contain the adjective global. Where 
can it be found and how does it unfold? This first step focused on the ap-
pearance of the word global in the corpus as a whole. My unit of analysis 
was each document as a whole. Through a process of inductive and circular 
coding, I categorised the documents according to broad themes. My coding 
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exercise brought out a catalogue of eight categories, which turned out to be 
related to text genres rather than themes narrowly understood.5 This cata-
logue helped me to understand, into which broad thematic discourses and 
contexts the re-production of the web of meanings called ‘new world’ inter-
venes in Obama’s 2013 Public Papers.  
The aim of the second and main step of my empirical exploration of the 
2013-database was to generate insights into the nature of the web of mean-
ings ‘new world’, more specifically. I sought to determine what the re-
produced object ‘new world’ looks like and, ultimately, what ‘interpretive 
dispositions’ it holds, and which possibilities it opens and closes. Rather 
than each document as a whole, the unit of analysis in this second step was 
each single utterance, more precisely, each sentence, in which the adjective 
global appeared. In some instances, I extended the unit of analysis to the 
paragraph, in which the adjective global appeared. These were instances, in 
which the sentences were too short to enable me to detect the meanings of 
the reproduced web of meanings ‘new world’, or in which particularly valu-
able insights could be gained through this strategy.  
In Chapters 5 and 6, I established that the web of meanings ‘new world’ 
fills the conceptual space ‘present’ with meaning and constitutes an actuali-
sation of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’. These theoretical as-
sumptions guided my interpretation in the second step of my analysis; in 
Chapter 6, I translated them into the general questions: How is the temporal 
category ‘past’ constructed? How is the temporal category ‘future’ con-
structed? What kind of an idea of ‘uncertainty’ is constructed? What is the 
relationship between past, present and future? How are consequences of ac-
tions and decisions constructed? What kind of an idea of agency is con-
structed? How much space does the re-produced web of meanings ‘new 
world’ open to go beyond modern principles and institutions and to funda-
mentally reimagine the world?  
As per the theoretical premises that I outlined in Chapter 6 and that I 
partly summarised above in this present chapter, the study of the re-
production of the web of meanings ‘new world’ in Obama’s 2013 Public 
Papers is a scholarly reconstruction of a particular dimension of the (con-
structed) world. This is reflected in the language I use for presenting my 
findings below. I describe (my findings of) the web of meanings ‘new 
world’ as a reality and not as something that is ‘intuitively’ and ‘actively’ 
constructed by Obama in the texts; for instance, I write ‘the ‘new world’ is 
xyz’ instead of ‘the ‘new world’ is presented as xyz’.  
 
 
                                                    
5 The categories are: 1. Acknowledgment of individuals; 2. Memorandum, proc-
lamation and report; 3. Weekly Address; 4. State of the Union Address; 5. Joint 
statement with foreign political leader; 6. Address to a distinct domestic audi-
ence; 7. Statement addressing international event; 8. Address to audience abroad. 
THE WEB OF MEANINGS ‘NEW WORLD’ IN OBAMA’S PUBLIC PAPERS 2013 | 189 
 
THE WEB OF MEANINGS ‘NEW WORLD’ IN OBAMA’S 
2013 PUBLIC PAPERS: MODERN AND  
‘HYPER COSMOPOLITISED’ 
 
The web of meanings ‘new world’ intervenes in contexts as diverse as ad-
dresses to a distinct domestic audience, such as at US colleges and US com-
panies, memoranda, joint statements with foreign leaders, State of the Union 
Addresses and speeches addressed at audiences abroad. In particular, as 
Figure 5 illustrates, it intervenes in the context of joint statements with for-
eign leaders, concrete addresses to a distinct domestic audience, as well as 
the acknowledgement (of achievements) of individual Americans.6 
 
Figure 5: The spread of the web of meanings ‘new world’ across the corpus 
of documents   
 
So, how does the web of meanings ‘new world’ concretely look? Which 
possibilities does it open or close? What kind of actualisation of the tradition 
                                                    
6 Examples for the latter category are the “Statement by the President on the Res-
ignation of Steven Chu as Secretary of Energy” (Obama 2013h) and the “Re-
marks on the Nomination of Ernest J. Moniz To Be Secretary of Energy, Gina 
McCarthy To Be Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and 
Sylvia Mathews Burwell To Be Director of the Office of Management” (Obama 
2013m). 
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of the ‘national perspective’ do we see? Does is it open spaces to reimagine 
the world beyond modern principles and institutions? 
In Chapter 6, we saw that exploring the ‘unconventional’ object of study 
of the omnipresence of the contemporary adjective global is inevitably an 
interpretative exercise that is a “craft skill, more like bike riding […] than 
following the recipe for a mild chicken rogan josh” (Potter 1997: 147). 
Hence, before presenting the digested outcome of my analysis as a whole, I 
decided to present a sample interpretation of a sample text extract. The aim 
of presenting my interpretation of a sample extract is simply to make trans-
parent how I went about my interpretation, i.e. to give but a general sense of 
the nature of and steps in my interpretative, ‘bike riding’ exercise.  
 
Sample extract and interpretation  
“And I’m calling on Congress to help us set up 15 institutes: global centers of high-
tech jobs and advanced manufacturing around the country.” (Obama 2013f; emphasis 
added)  
 
Given the developed theoretical premises, the exploration of the web of 
meanings ‘new world’ focuses on the adjective global; the strategy is to ex-
plore the context, in which the word appears, in order to grasp the web of 
meanings ‘new world’ that, according to the theory that I developed in this 
book, is re-produced through utterances that contain the adjective global. As 
an indication of an ‘awareness’ of the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisa-
tion, the appearance of the word global constitutes, in principle, an opening 
of conventional (modern) constructions of the world; as such, it holds the 
possibility of generating insights into actualisations of the tradition of the 
‘national perspective’ (ref Chapters 5 and 6). How precisely this opening 
looks in a distinct case, i.e. what it makes imaginable and desirable and what 
it favours, or what it rules out as unimaginable and undesirable, as well as, 
how precisely the actualisation of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’ 
looks in this ‘new world’, is a/the empirical question to be tackled in the 
study of the omnipresence of global.  
Keeping these theoretical points in mind, I turn to the sample extract 
above. A first close reading of it brings out three observations. First, the 
challenges that the US is facing are manageable through established tradi-
tional state institutions; in fact, there is a concrete and measurable answer to 
whatever challenges there are: what is needed is the establishment of “15 in-
stitutes […] around the country” by the Obama Administration. Second, 
“high-tech jobs and advanced manufacturing” are desirable achievements. 
Third, decisions in the present and for the future are closely interwoven with 
the past; this is implied in the expression “advanced manufacturing”, where 
the word advanced implies that there is something ‘old’ that is to be ad-
vanced, and where the word manufacturing, e.g. as opposed to production, 
is a language that refers to the notion of an industrial setting of a distinct 
time in the past.  
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Keeping these three initial observations in mind, I extend my analytical 
gaze beyond the single sentence, in which the adjective global is used, and 
look at the paragraph, in which this sentence and the word global are em-
bedded.    
 
Extended sample extract and interpretation  
“But there are things we can do right now to accelerate the resurgence of American 
manufacturing. […] Last year, my administration created our first manufacturing in-
novation institute. We put it in Youngstown, Ohio, which had been really hard hit 
when manufacturing started going overseas. And so you had a once-shuttered ware-
house, it’s now a state-of-the art lab where new workers are mastering what’s called 
3-D printing, which has the potential to revolutionize the way we make everything. 
That’s the future. […] And I’m calling on Congress to help us set up 15 institutes: 
global centers of high-tech jobs and advanced manufacturing around the country.” 
(Obama 2013f; emphasis added)  
 
A close reading of this extended text extract around the word global brings 
out additional observations. These additional observations broaden the pic-
ture and make it more nuanced. The branching of the web of meanings ‘new 
world’ starts to become apparent. What comes to the fore is a ‘new world’, 
in which perceived contemporary challenges are to be managed through the 
innovation of the past. Challenges are to be managed through the adjustment 
of what has been proven; they are to be managed by building on past experi-
ence. The expression “resurgence of American manufacturing” indicates 
this; it is also implied in the fact that “new workers” have replaced ‘old 
workers’ in the “once-shuttered warehouse” of the past, which has now been 
transformed into a “state-of-the art lab”. A belief in progress is driving deci-
sions in the ‘new world’. This is apparent not only in the fact that the goal of 
building “high-tech jobs” is desirable but also in the glorification of the 
technology of 
 
“3-D printing, which has the potential to revolutionize the way we make everything. 
That’s the future.” (ibid.)  
 
These observations allow me now to take another interpretative step for-
ward. I detect three main points. First, the web of meanings ‘new world’ re-
produces a strictly modern understanding of time, in which the decisions in 
the present are about the innovative adjustment of the past in a linear out-
look on a (better) future to come. Second, decisions are strictly national de-
cisions, where the national and its institutions are in full control of the fu-
ture. It is the national, “all around the country”, that is to be built up, 
grounded in past, again, distinctly national experiences and through concrete 
and measurable steps, such as the set up of 15 high tech hubs. At the same 
time, ‘the national’ is subject to and ‘threatened’ by extra-national, nebulous 
forces. These come, like a second nature, from outside. They are not driven 
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by identified and identifiable agents; their impact on the national just hap-
pens, as “when manufacturing started going overseas”. This is a ‘new 
world’, then, in which ‘the national’ is re-produced as something distinctly 
confined. It becomes what it is via natural (external) forces that threaten 
(jobs in) the inside. Third, in addition to being a re-production of the mod-
ern notion of time, the ‘new world’ is also a reproduction of modern princi-
ples, such as progress and innovation. This suggests that ‘global risks’ do 
not exist in the ‘new world’. A technology like 3-D printing constitutes an 
innovative transformation of past technologies. While being innovative, new 
and potentially “revolutionising”, this technology is nevertheless something 
familiar; it is the innovative transformation of what has been there in the 
past. The reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation, an ‘awareness’ of which is 
implied in the use of the adjective global, does not play a role in this ‘new 
world’; potential unintended consequences – such as ‘global risks’ associat-
ed with the new technology 3-D printing – do not play a role. They are dis-
cursively ‘blocked out’ through a normalised reliance on modern concep-
tions and principles.  
 
Findings: The ‘new world’ in Obama’s 2013 papers 
My above interpretation of a concrete sample extract gives a general sense 
of how my interpretative exercise of exploring the web of meanings ‘new 
world’ unfolded. At the same time, it also already captures important in-
sights into the ‘new world’ that is re-produced in Obama’s 2013 Public Pa-
pers. I now move to present a synthesis of my findings of the analysis of all 
296 appearances of the adjective global in the corpus as a whole. This ex-
tends the initial observations above and brings out an intriguing picture.  
The ‘new world’ that is re-produced in Obama’s 2013 Public Papers is a 
complex and fascinating web of meanings. At its heart is an actualisation of 
the tradition of the ‘national perspective’ that is best labelled, modern and 
‘hyper cosmopolitised’. For lack of a better term, the expression ‘modern 
and ‘hyper cosmopolitised’’ is to capture the two central aspects that, in 
their interplay with each other, shape Obama’s ‘new world’. This is a ‘new 
world’ that essentially relies on and re-produces modern (market) principles 
and institutions, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, constitutes a dis-
tinct national reality that fuels its own ‘internal (hyper) cosmopolitisation’. 
What is intriguing is that one leads to the other and vice versa. 
To begin with, in the ‘new world’ that is re-produced in Obama’s 2013 
Public Papers ‘the national’ as a unique and distinctly value-loaded unit is 
dissolved. Places, which are commonly taken as distinct, like “Calcutta or 
Cleveland” (Obama 2013g), are the same in the ‘new world’. ‘The national’ 
loses its uniqueness and its distinct value. With this dissolution, a central 
traditional aspect of ‘the national’, which accounts for its exclusive nature, 
disappears. The idea of ‘the national’, as it is at the heart of traditional actu-
alisations of the ‘national perspective’, is demystified in the ‘new world’. 
This demystification and dissolution of ‘the national’ as a unique unit is due 
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to a distinct ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ that is triggered by the market. In 
the ‘new world’, which is re-produced in Obama’s 2013 Papers, the market 
constitutes a second nature that intervenes from the outside and dissolves 
‘the national’ as a distinct value-loaded unit. It is the market that makes 
places like ‘Calcutta and Cleveland’ the same. It accounts for an ‘internal 
cosmopolitisation’ of the US national; more generally, it accounts for a ho-
mogenisation of ‘the nationals’. 
The kind of dissolution and demystification of ‘the national’ through the 
distinct ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ that comes along with the market is re-
markable and intriguing in itself. What makes it even more remarkable and 
intriguing, however, is that the demystification of ‘the national’ does not 
mean that ‘the national’ disappears altogether in the ‘new world’. National 
units, such as the US, neither disappear nor do they actually lose their exclu-
siveness as such. The contrary is the case. The ‘new world’ in Obama’s 
2013 Papers is a world that is constituted by strictly confined and exclusive 
national units. It is a highly compartmentalised ‘new world’ that is re-
produced in the 2013 Papers. In other words, on the one hand, ‘the national’ 
loses its uniqueness and distinct national value; on the other hand, however, 
the ‘new world’ is constituted of exclusive national units. 
So how do these demystified national units then look that make up the 
‘new world’? To begin with, they are, what one could call, ‘pragmatic’ 
units. The national units in the ‘new world’ are the product of the potentially 
threatening market environment that surrounds and brings out these units. 
They are the product of this nebulous second nature ‘out there’ that might 
intervene into the national, triggering “manufacturing […] going overseas” 
(Obama 2013f). It is a ‘pragmatic’ national and a ‘pragmatic’ market-driven 
exclusiveness that informs the national units in the ‘new world’, in fact, that 
brings them out to begin with. This means that although places lose their 
(national) distinctiveness in the ‘new world’ they do not dissolve into one 
homogenous whole. The ‘new world’ consists of a set of, in principle, ho-
mogenous but strictly autonomous units. The ‘pragmatic’ national units of 
the ‘new world’ are autonomous units in that they each struggle for survival 
in the face of the second nature of the market. They gain their shape and ex-
istence as units in an individual struggle for survival in the market. In the 
‘new world’ the national units form players in a competitive game, in which 
it is, for instance, a goal to “put our country on a path to win the global race 
for clean energy jobs” (Obama 2013h), to succeed and, in fact, survive in 
“the global race for jobs and industries” (Obama 2013i), and to generally 
“keep our edge and stay ahead in the global race” by figuring out “how to 
fix our broken immigration system, to welcome that infusion of newness 
while still maintaining the enduring strength of our laws” (Obama 2013j). In 
this sense, the ‘new world’ is shaped by an intriguing fueling of national ex-
clusiveness and compartmentalisation, in which ‘the national’ loses its na-
tional uniqueness, while, simultaneously, turning into a ‘pragmatic’ exclu-
sive unit. This makes the ‘new world’ a strictly international system. Yet, it 
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is an international system with homogenous units, which come into being 
not because of an ‘inherent’ national uniqueness or in the face of an existen-
tial threat posed by other national units, but in the course of the struggle 
with each for survival in the second nature that is the market.  
Applying the language and concepts from Chapter 5, the above findings 
motivate me to conceptualise the ‘new world’ that is re-produced in 
Obama’s 2013 Public Papers as a ‘hyper cosmopolitised’ reality. In Chapter 
5, I established that national societies are always inevitably subject to an ‘in-
ternal cosmopolitisation’, which brings out distinct national realities with 
distinct actualisations of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’. In the 
case of Obama’s ‘new world’ this distinct national reality is ‘hyper cosmop-
olitised’. For lack of a better term, I use the expression ‘hyper cosmopo-
litised’ to highlight that this reality is not only a product of the process of 
the reality of its ‘internal cosmopolitisation’, which the market brings along, 
but that it also fuels its own ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ in a distinct and 
‘essential’ way. National societies, these ‘pragmatic’ national units in the 
‘new world’ fuel their own ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ because, as seen in 
the quote above, as ‘pragmatic’ exclusive national units in the market they 
need ‘immigration’ in order to “stay ahead in the global race” (Obama 
2013j). In other words, the exclusive ‘pragmatic’ national units in the ‘new 
world’ depend for their very survival on their opening towards ‘others’. In 
fact, it is this opening that brings out their distinct exclusive national exist-
ence to begin with. What we then see is a distinct actualisation of the tradi-
tion of the ‘national perspective’: it is a ‘hyper cosmopolitised’ one.  
 And there is more to the ‘new world’ in Obama’s Papers. While being 
shaped by a ‘hyper cosmopolitised’ actualisation of the tradition of the ‘na-
tional perspective’, the ‘new world’ is simultaneously shaped by a reliance 
on and re-production of modern institutions and principles. More precisely, 
it is shaped by the reliance on and reproduction of particular modern institu-
tions and principles, namely market institutions and principles. As we saw 
above, important modern political principles, such as the idea of ‘the na-
tional’ as it is at the heart of ‘traditional’ actualisations of the tradition of the 
‘national perspective’, are questioned and partly disappear in the ‘new 
world’, yet, modern market institutions and principles are unquestioned. 
They essentially shape the ‘hyper cosmopolitised’ reality. In fact, it is exact-
ly these particular modern market institutions and principles that produce 
the ‘hyper cosmopolitised’ ‘pragmatic’ national units to begin with. In this 
respect, the modern market principles are nothing less of fundamentally in-
scribed in the ‘hyper cosmopolitised’ national. In short, a ‘new world’ is re-
produced in Obama’s 2013 Public Papers, in which modern political princi-
ples associated with a ‘traditional’ actualisation of the tradition of the ‘na-
tional perspective’ do not play a guiding role (anymore) in producing ‘the 
national’ but are replaced by another set of, again, modern institutions and 
principles, namely the institutions and principles of the market.  
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This distinct actualisation of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’  
favours and brings out two kinds of political actors. On the one side, the re-
produced ‘new world’ favours non-governmental and private political ac-
tors. In fact, these actors take a more favorable position in the ‘new world’ 
than state actors. While state actors are good for “diplomatic initiatives”, 
“international and nongovernmental organizations and the private sector” 
are there to strive for “partnerships and enhanced coordination” (Obama 
2013l). On the other side, it is responsible individuals, who are desirable and 
favoured in the ‘new world’. They are favoured because it is individual ac-
tors and their personal talent that attract ‘market attention’ and, with that, 
essentially contribute to the survival of the ‘pragmatic’ national unit in the 
‘new world’.  
 
“You know, in a global economy where the best jobs follow talent […] we need to do 
everything we can to encourage that same kind of passion, make it easier for more 
young people to blaze a new trail.” (Obama 2013g)  
 
Taken together, the above presented insights into the ‘new world’ that is re-
produced in Obama’s 2013 Public Papers bring out a complex and intri-
guing web of meanings, which holds a mix of openings and closings of pos-
sibilities.  
To begin with, we see a radical move away from central modern politi-
cal principles associated with ‘the national’, as it is at the heart of ‘tradition-
al’ actualisations of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’. This holds the 
possibility of an opening to a radical reimagination of the international 
world. Yet, simultaneously, this radical opening is discursively ‘tamed’ 
through the emergence of exclusive ‘pragmatic’ national units that compete 
with each other and struggle for survival in the context of a market that sur-
rounds it like a second nature. For manifestations of the reflexive ‘backfir-
ing’ of modernisation, such as climate change, this means that they cannot 
be seen as anything but ordinary problems that are to be solved by potent 
national agents, grounded in the same practices and principles that brought 
out these manifestations of the ‘backfiring’ of modernisation in the first 
place. They are to be solved as part of a race among ‘pragmatic‘ national 
units that is there to be won. Furthermore, the ‘new world’ is a world that 
essentially builds on modern instutions and principles, namely market insti-
tutions and principles. These are inscribed in and are re-produced through 
the ‘pragmatic’ national units that it brings out, as well as in the political 
subjects that this ‘new world’ holds as desirable. The re-produced ‘new 
world’ is shaped by a modern linear notion of time, in which the present is 
intimately enmeshed with the past and looks optimistically at a ‘shapable’ 
future. This means that the desirable attributes that political actors need to 
hold are not different in kind from the past. This is because the market, this 
second nature out there, is not different in kind; it is different in degree. 
Consequently, the ‘new world’ requires and favours adjustment of the old, 
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as well as innovation and an advancement from the past. Radically different 
steps or attributes of actors are not required and desirable. Attributes, which 
used to be valued in the past, such as “talent and hard work” (Obama 
2013k), are also valued and desirable in the ‘new world’.  
In this sense, the ‘new world’ in Obama’s 2013 Papers leaves little room 
for radical moves and fundamental re-imaginations of the world and the in-
ternational system beyond the premises of modernity. In one way, modern 
national (“zombie” [Beck in Grefe 2000]) institutions and principles are 
normalised and re-produced. They are accredited with agency and are ‘in 
full control’ in an extra-national environment of the market that, as a second 
nature, intervenes from the outside. With that, behaviours and institutions 
that fuel the reflexive ‘backfiring’ of modernisation are normalised and 
symbolically favoured. In such a re-produced ‘new world’ ‘global risks’ do 
not exist. In fact, in a world with ‘pragmatic’ national units, which are 
grounded in modern market institutions and principles, ‘global risks’ cannot 
exist and cannot inform present decisions as this would threaten nothing less 
but the very existence of these units. The kind of hyper ‘internal cosmopo-
litisation’ that shapes the ‘new world’ and brings out a ‘hyper cosmopo-
litised’ national reality essentially opens up the ‘pragmatic’ national units 
towards ‘others’, however, without opening room for going beyond a na-
tional exclusiveness. In the case of the ‘new world’ in Obama’s 2013 Pa-
pers, the ‘internal cosmopolitisation’ fuels the exclusiveness of the national 
units.  
And yet, the ‘new world’ also holds the possibility of openings. The po-
litical subject that is desirable and favoured in the ‘new world’ does not only 
bring along ‘old’ attitudes but, as we saw above, also needs to be ‘passion-
ate’ about its role in the market. It is expected “to blaze a new trail” (Obama 
2013g). It is this individual ‘passion’ that secures the national unit’s place in 
the market and, with that, ensures its survival. This means, in turn, that 
while the ‘new world’ is intimately inscribed and locked in a trajectory from 
the past to the future, which re-produces experiences and favors tested 
(modern) behaviour and attributes, the idea that ‘passion’ plays a notable 
role for the survival of the ‘pragmatic’ national units in the market holds the 
seed of radical openings – in short, openings in the ‘new world’ lie in the 
distinct subject that is the product of the modern ‘hyper cosmopolitised’ 
‘new world’.  
 
 
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
 
In this chapter, I presented the findings of an exemplary exploration of the 
re-production of the web of meanings ‘new world’ in Obama’s public com-
munication in 2013. The analysis brings out a complex picture of a ‘modern 
‘hyper cosmopolitised’’ ‘new world’. Particularly interesting in the ‘new 
world’ is the dissolution of ‘the national’ as a unique entity and the emer-
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gence of ‘pragmatic’, homogenous national units, which are the product of 
an environment shaped by a market that constitutes a second nature. Fur-
thermore, we saw that the re-produced ‘new world’ relies on and re-
produces modern (market) institutions and principles, while simultaneously 
constituting a distinct national reality that fuels its own ‘internal (hyper) 
cosmopolitisation’. Intriguingly, each of these aspects fuels the other.  
Within the confines of this book, my study of the re-production of the 
web of meanings ‘new world’ through the use of the adjective global in 
President Obama’s 2013 communication is intended to serve an exemplary 
purpose only. It is only intended to provide an initial empirical ground for 
future research, which may proceed in one of three kinds of directions.  
First, my study can serve as the ground for those kinds of studies which, 
in a way that is similar to my endeavour above, focus on a particular corpus 
of texts and, with that, broaden our understanding of the omnipresence of 
the adjective global by adding concrete insights into its empirical existence 
across political, cultural and institutional fields. As suggested in Chapter 6, 
additional synchronic but also diachronic studies are imaginable, and com-
parative studies as well as single cases could be included in this branch of 
future research.  
Second, my findings could serve as the empirical ground for studies that 
focus explicitly on the discursive re-production of the world and investigate 
the interplay of the ‘new world’ with other webs of meanings. My, albeit, 
general grasp of the thematic contexts, in which the re-production of the 
web of meanings ‘new world’ intervenes in Obama’s Papers, that I present-
ed at the beginning of my analysis, could serve as a basis for such an en-
deavour. Here, the task would be to connect the ‘new world’ with the other 
webs of meanings, with which it correlates in a particular text corpus.        
The third research direction, in which my study may lead, proceeds 
deeper into the nature of the empirical exploration of the omnipresence of 
global as a re-production of the web of meanings ‘new world’. My study 
can serve as the foundation for future scholarly radicalisations of my own 
findings. As suggested in Chapter 6, the empirical study of the phenomenon 
of the omnipresence of global is not only an ‘unconventional’, experimental, 
and interpretative endeavour but also a ‘provisional’ exercise. It is ‘provi-
sional’ because of the nature of the object ‘new world’, which the adjective 
global brings out. Referring back to Chapter 5, as an actualisation of the tra-
dition of the ‘national perspective’, there is no established language, as yet, 
to readily grasp the web of meanings ‘new world’. I highlighted this point in 
general in Chapter 5 when I discussed the ‘provisional’ nature of Ulrich 
Beck’s project of rethinking how we think about social reality. Given that 
the reflexive modern world is a both/and-world (as opposed to an either/or-
world), the challenge is to grasp linguistically phenomena, such as the re-
production of the web of meanings ‘new world’ and the distinct actualisa-
tion of the tradition of the ‘national perspective’ that it brings out, without 
‘taming’ insights through conventional language. While the lack of an ade-
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quate, ‘ratified’ ‘reflexive modern’ language, which does not reproduce the 
notions of linearity and ‘either/or’, is not theoretically problematic, it does 
tame the potential of empirical insights and inevitably makes them ‘provi-
sional’. We see this in my empirical endeavour above, which does not radi-
cally go beyond our existing vocabulary. Yet, as argued in Chapter 5 (see 
also Selchow 2016a), this is not a shortcoming but an inevitable aspect of 
such research, which demands a constant rewriting and (linguistic) ‘radicali-
sation’, with the aim of eventually establishing a ‘reflexive modern’ lan-
guage, i.e. a language that, paraphrasing the earlier quoted Bronner (1995: 
68), is able to capture the world, in which we live, rather than re-producing 
“the [‘national’] one in which we think.”  
  
 
8 Conclusion 
 
Uncertain times demand an unconventional 
analysis.  
DAVID CAMPBELL (1998[1992]: IX) 
 
 
I argued in this book that the (quasi) omnipresence of the contemporary ad-
jective global is more than a linguistic curiosity. It is a political phenome-
non and, as such, a valuable, albeit ‘unconventional’ object of study for 
scholars outside the linguistics discourse. I argued that the omnipresence of 
the contemporary adjective global constitutes the discursive re-production 
of a web of meanings that is best labelled ‘new world’. As such, it consti-
tutes a distinct dimension of the enduring contestation over the meaning of 
the world. Given the word’s current popularity and unscrutinised existence, 
and given the nature of the web of meanings ‘new world’ that it brings out, 
this dimension is not just a minor matter but plays an important, hence, re-
search-worthy role in the contemporary symbolic struggle over the meaning 
of the world.      
This book presented my exploration of what was behind the curious om-
nipresence of the adjective global in contemporary public, political and aca-
demic discourses. It sketched a research endeavour that is not ‘convention-
al’. At home in the political studies and IR discourse, my curiosity for the 
adjective global forced me to start on a blank field, without being able to set 
an anchor into a predefined research environment and without being able to 
talk to a clearly confined audience. This was because my exploration of the 
omnipresence of the adjective global could not start conventionally on a 
pre-set idea of what the word global means, without contributing to the very 
phenomenon that I set out to explore. This, meant that my exploration of the 
omnipresence of global was a risky endeavour. At the outset, I did not only 
not know what I would find, as probably should always be the case in aca-
demic knowledge production, but I also did not know whether or not the ex-
ploration of the omnipresence of global would bring out insights that would 
be valuable for the political studies and IR scholarship to begin with.  
In this sense, the study presented in this book does not only provide in-
sights into the curious omnipresence of the contemporary adjective global. 
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It also constitutes a contribution to the ‘unconventional’ scholarship at the 
margins of the political studies and IR discourse. It contributes to this schol-
arship in that it is a case of an exploration of an ‘unconventional unconven-
tional’ path.  
“Uncertain times demand an unconventional analysis,” this is the sug-
gestion with which David Campbell ([1992]1998: ix) opens his seminal ‘un-
conventional’ study of US foreign policy, identity and danger, threats and 
security. Indeed, more and more scholars in political studies, IR and beyond 
position themselves at the margins of their disciplines and express the need 
to find new ways of dismantling and grasping the complexity of contempo-
rary times – like sociologist Ulrich Beck (2006: 74), who calls “for new 
thinkers outside the academic guild”, who extend the “rails on which stand-
ard academic […] inquiry runs into new regions”. What strikes me as a 
fruitful step in regard to explorations of ‘new regions’ is not only to find and 
apply ‘unconventional’ approaches to pre-existing problems and objects of 
study but to follow an ‘unconventional unconventional’ path and take the 
risk of searching for ‘new’ (politically loaded) objects of study. An example 
of such an object is the omnipresence of the adjective global, which I 
brought to life in this book as a political phenomenon, the study of which 
enables novel scholarly interventions into “conventional understandings or 
established practices” (Campbell 2007: 219). 
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